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

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HAROLD D. LASSWELL: A SCIENCE OF POLITICS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY

University of Notre Dame   PH.D.   1986

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HAROLD D. LASSWELL: A SCIENCE OF

POLITICS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School

of the University of Notre Dame

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Department of Government and International Studies

Notre Dame, Indiana

December, 1986

For my parents
and Linda

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the intellectual status of liberal democracy in
the writings of Harold Dwight Lasswell. The purpose of this
investigation is twofold. First, this work seeks to elaborate the
profound intellectual challenge to the conventional theory and practice
of liberal democracy that Lasswell presented through his application of
a naturalistic science of politics. Secondly, it attempts to identify
and discuss his proposed response to the problematic character of
democracy as both a practicable and desirable form of political rule.

The initial chapter of this work provides a brief overview of the
general context of this study. At the same time, it presents the basic
intellectual problem which constitutes the central focus of this
investigation. Consequently, this chapter first of all offers a short
historical account of the emergence and early growth of an empirical
science of politics. Secondly, it outlines and subsequently amplifies
some of the potentially anti-democratic implications of both the
methodological standpoint and derived findings of some of the original
proponents of a naturalist behavioral approach to the study of political
phenomena.

The second chapter of this study delineates the distinctive
intellectual orientation espoused by Lasswell in his own investigation
of political behavior. In particular, it elucidates his understanding
of the scope, methods and logic appropriate to an empirical science of

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politics. Furthermore, and on a related note, this chapter highlights
and explicates the role he assigned to the configurative method of
analysis in political inquiry.

Having examined Lasswell's distinctive orientation to political
analysis, the third chapter of this work focuses on the results he
derived through his own intellectual approach to the study of political
behavior. Especially relevant for our purposes here is a consideration
of the ramifications of his findings for both the theory and
conventional practice of democratic politics. Specifically, through a
consideration of his actual application of a several different
analytical frameworks and perspectives, this chapter shows that his own
work culminated in a set of findings which debunked many of the
fundamental tenets underlying democratic liberalism. At the same time,
it also shows that the results of his own research raised some rather
disturbing questions concerning the democratic regime's capacity for
adaptation and survival in the modern world.

The fourth chapter of this study discusses how Lasswell tried to at
least partially address the problematic character of democracy as a
desirable and practicable form of political rule. In this regard, it
first of all shows that underlying his commitment to a democratic social
order was the conviction that such a polity, more than any other, was
conducive for the development of a sound and psychologically healthy
human society. Secondly, it outlines and discusses the specific
palliative, namely, the policy sciences of democracy, which he
prescribed for the ills of "democratic statecraft."

Finally, we conclude this study by assessing the inherent weaknesses of Lasswell's proposed democratic technology. In particular, this last section concentrates on the undesirable and potentially anti-democratic and anti-liberal implications of Lasswell's call to constrain a politics of irrationalism and popular depravity by subjecting it to rationalist principles.

CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF AN AMERICAN SCIENCE OF POLITICS

The decade that followed the conclusion of the First World War was a period of profound intellectual ferment in American political science. Disillusioned by the failures of the Wilson Administration and the elevation of Warren G. Harding to the Presidency, many political scientists of this era turned their attention from direct involvement in politics back to scholarly research. Out of the belief that the political goals of the progressivism with which they had previously identified could only be realized through the application of reason, intelligence, and scientific method, they accelerated the drive to make the study of politics more scientific and hence more relevant.[1]

To some extent, the proponents of a science of politics who entered the ranks of higher education during this period followed a path already hewed by an earlier generation of scholars. Much like pre-war political scientists such as Albert Shaw, Woodrow Wilson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, and Henry Jones Ford who admonished their colleagues to concentrate on the "facts" and the "actual working of political institutions," this post-war generation of scholars stressed empirical observation of socio-political institutions and behavior. Also, like their predecessors who believed that a political science "conducted without bias" and in the "purely scientific spirit" could provide assistance to "reform movements" so as to create "better" and more

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efficient institutions, this post-war generation of scholars emphasized that a problem-solving, scientific study of politics could ultimately be enlisted so as to provide for more effective democratic structures.[2]

Yet even though this new order of scholars exhibited some intellectual continuity with an earlier tradition of political science, they also introduced significant variations which extended their scope of analysis and placed greater stress on the use of the techniques and logic of inquiry employed by the natural sciences. To be sure, people like Wilson, Bryce, Lowell, and others believed that the "investigator" must continue to study politics "as a science, as a series of phenomena of which he is seeking to discover the cause and effects." Yet even though they emphasized "relentless and unbiased observation," "patient inquiry, dispassionate exposition, fearless analysis and frank inference," they nonetheless remained convinced that "human phenomena" were "not the subject of computation" and could not be studied with a strictly "scientific eye."[3] After the war, however, political scientists were less reluctant to fashion a political science out of the methodological tools which their forebearers, given their aversion to the reduction of man to a simple object of analysis to be examined as one would probe an inanimate object of nature, viewed with circumspection. Thus, even though the ultimate end of inquiry for this post-war generation remained the same, their perspective contained a distinctively heavier emphasis on scientism in political analysis.

Both this shift and continuity in emphasis can be detected in a wide spectrum of scholarly pieces of the post-war era. These included, besides numerous hortatory and investigatory writings in the discipline,

summaries of periodic conferences convened to consider the practicality

of applying the techniques of the empirical sciences to the study of

politics.[4] First, with respect to the change in emphasis, a review of

the literature of this era reveals that this post-war generation, as

Charles E. Merriam put it, endorsed the view that "the cross-

fertilization of politics with science" and its "modern methods of

inquiry and investigation" would "not be unprofitable."[5] At the same

time, however, it must be admitted that this group of scholars intended

something more than a political science which aped the canons of inquiry

commonly associated with the empirical sciences. Like Wilson, Bryce,

Lowell, and the other "early realists," they had an ulterior purpose in

mind. Specifically, they anticipated that a refined science of politics

could be used to service the ends of public policy making and socio-

political reform. Consequently, they believed such a science could be

used to remove the "prejudice, guesswork, and ignorance" from those

governmental "decisions" required to resolve "countless problems"

confronted in the modern world. Through the application of scientific

intelligence, man, they maintained, could "become the creator rather

than the helpless creature of destiny."[6]

The New Aspects of Politics

For this post-war generation of political scientists, the initial

item on the agenda was the articulation and application of the

"scientific method of approach" to their subject matter. They were

acutely aware that they still lacked a mode of analysis appropriate

for their purposes. As A. B. Hall wrote: "We have had little

experience in finding, collecting, and dealing with the facts that are

material. We do not know how to isolate the variable from the constant

factors in a given situation...[W]e do not have a scientific technique

of political science."[7] So, to rectify this methodological deficiency,

a number of political scientists gathered at conferences to discuss and

assess a series of possible methodological innovations which would

enhance their discipline's scientific stature. What they sought was a

"fact-finding technique" that would provide an "adequate basis for sound

generalization."[8] And, as the attendance and spirit at these

conferences clearly indicated, it was a lack of technique and not a lack

of vision or professional concern that constituted the basic problem to

be surmounted.[9]

Concern With Method

At these conferences, the most sustained consideration of what

scientific research entailed when applied to the social sciences was

provided by a psychologist, L. L. Thurstone, who introduced political

scientists to the methods of experimental psychometrics.[10] In his

report on the discussion of the relationship between political studies

and psychology, Thurstone offered a concise summary of the steps to be

followed in conducting scientific research. Specifically, his

conception of scientific procedure was reduced to the following stages:

the delineation of bivariate relationships ("What is the effect of A

upon B?"); the definition of variables in quantitative terms and the

"adoption of a unit of measurement for each variable"; the observation

of experimental arrangements and "the statistical analysis of these

observations to determine, objectively, the degree of the relation and

the nature of the relation between A and B"; and the inferential

judgment of causality based upon observed correlation of selected variables.[11]

Though not all those who attended these meetings were converted to the belief that the logic and methods of science could be applied to the study of politics, there is telling evidence to indicate that many found such a standpoint appropriate for their purposes.[12] William Bennett Munro, for example, remarked that political scientists should turn "to the natural sciences" "for suggestions as to the reconstruction of...[their] postulates and methods."[13] In a similar vein, John Fairlie urged his colleagues to adopt the "attitude of the physical scientist," while Leonard White informed his readers that the social sciences had finally "reached the point where it is open for them to use laboratory methods."[14] Moreover, at the first conference a round table on legislative politics concluded in its written report:

> We were experimenting to see if the methods of the established
> sciences were applicable to the study of legislative
> bodies....[Our] working theory was that the factors which make
> legislation can be measured, perhaps statistically, and most
> of us came away encouraged.[15]

And Pittman Potter, chairman of a round table discussion on international organizations at one of the conferences, wrote:

> ...it has seemed...surprisingly practicable to adopt a
> strictly scientific method in the treatment of problems of
> international organization on a par with problems outside the
> fields of social science,...and...the results promise to be
> more reliable than any obtained by a less objective and
> critical mode of treatment.[16]

Finally, this affinity for the more rigorous canons of scientific inquiry was clearly underscored by Merriam. In a wide band of exhortatory writings, he exemplified the extensive metamorphosis undergone by political science since the days of Wilson, Bryce, and

Lowell when less rigid variants of scientific thinking were propounded.

His faith in the possibility of using the techniques of the empirical

sciences in the study of politics was exposed when he remarked:

> It may be said that the methods of science cannot be properly
> or successfully applied to the problems of this type. But
> that remains to be demonstrated. Even Bryce's concession that
> we cannot experiment with political forces is dubious, and,
> indeed, experiments have not been undertaken. Is it
> impossible to devise mechanisms for the study of controlled
> groups for the measurement of political values, interests, or
> attitudes?[17]

This desire to build a science of politics which scrutinized the

processes of government "objectively," and not in "the spirit of worship

of tradition or authority," eventually prompted these scholars to turn

their attention to the findings and methods of cognate fields of

inquiry. They believed, as Merriam put it, that the "scientific result"

would be "imperfect" if the "different" "angles of approach" were not

"brought together in some effective way."[18] Consequently, the

literature of this era embodied numerous calls for greater

interdisciplinary cooperation and "cross-fertilization." Emblematic of

such exhortations was the political research committee's recommendation

"that every effort be made to bring about the closest cooperation"

between political scientists and other "branches of social science, and

also with the students of psychology, anthropology, geography,

biological sciences, and engineering."[19] Further, the pervasiveness of

this desire to forge closer ties between politics and other disciplines

was reflected in the creation of a number of research institutes and

organizations which aimed to facilitate multi-disciplinary cooperation

and investigation. Two such organizations emerged at the University of

Chicago: the Social Science Research Council and the Local Community

Research Committee. Both of these were designed to foster a spirit of collaboration among assorted fields of inquiry, and both intended to accommodate and promote the adaption of a wide variety of techniques to an empirical, systematic study of socio-political institutions and behavior.[20]

Although they believed all possible "angles of approach" should be consulted, the disciplines which appeared most attractive to these political scientists were statistics and psychology. Both of these disciplines seemed to complement a science of politics which endeavored to study and explicate, through systematic, empirical inquiry, political structures and the network of human interactions they embodied. Indeed, the importance attributed to these two cognate fields of inquiry was clearly reflected at the second conference on science and politics when it was decided, with "almost spontaneous unanimity," "that every round table needed the presence of both a psychologist and a statistician."[21]

First, this demand to quantify political phenomena was not novel. Almost twenty years earlier Arthur Bentley had declared that "it is impossible to attain scientific treatment of material that will not submit itself to measurement in some form."[22] Yet at that time most political scientists rejected the possibility of subjecting political phenomena to "computation." Scholars like Bryce, for example, did not believe "human phenomena" could be "counted or weighed as you can count and weigh natural phenomena." The expansion of a more strictly scientific viewpoint, however, eventually nullified the antagonism towards the mathematical treatment of political data. Thus post-war

scholars like Stuart Rice and Harold Foote Gosnell could point to the
benefits to be gained from the application of the "quantitative method"
to the study of political phenomena. They believed, first of all, that
the statistical analysis of political data would provide greater freedom
from "personal bias." In addition, they anticipated that the
application of the techniques of correlation would ultimately disclose
relationships that would otherwise remain hidden or obscured. Thus they
expected that use of the "quantitative method" would point the way for
"intensive qualitative studies of a particular sort."[23] Similarly,
Charles Merriam emphasized the instrumental role the statistical
approach played in advancing scientific inquiry. As he saw it, the
statistical method provided "means of checking the validity of the
theories, of determining the strength, direction, and relations involved
in the assumption." Therefore he believed it could be used in the
verification of "tentative hypotheses" adopted to explain the initial
problematic confronted by the investigator. Furthermore, he expected
that "out of this very process" would "come new hypotheses" which, like
the earlier ones, might "be tested and proven or disproven."[24]

Merriam's enthusiasm for the application of quantitative
measurement to political studies, when combined with a supportive
environment provided by the University of Chicago -- where quantitative
analysis had already been established as a staple of social science
education -- resulted, in the works of his students, in a series of
pioneering studies in survey research which foreshadowed subsequent
inquiries in political science.[25] Such studies included rather
sophisticated research designs and quasi-experimental techniques.

Emblematic of these was Harold Foote Gosnell's use of the "controlled
experiment" to measure the effects of "non-partisan appeals sent through
the mails" on voting behavior.[26]

Just as statistical analysis and its conclusions could find ready
acceptance in political science during this era, the techniques and
results of psychology evoked a great deal of attention from political
scientists. To be sure, the domain of psychology did not constitute
virginal terrain to be explored by political scientists for the first
time. Indeed, concern for the psychological determinants of man's
behavior has been central to political inquiry since antiquity. This
generation, however, wanted to make sure that the political scientist
was properly informed with respect to the most recent developments in
psychological methods and findings. In effect, they believed that
failure to synchronize inquiry with the intellectual transformations
wrought in psychology left the political researcher with an antiquated
and incomplete understanding of human nature. Such a point had been
first addressed by Graham Wallas in his influential and provocative
work, Human Nature in Politics. Later this theme was resurrected by
Walter Lippmann in A Preface to Politics.[27] And almost two decades
after Lippmann published his work, this notion was picked up and given
serious consideration by several of the devotees of a more scientific
political science.

With respect to the study of human nature by political scientists,
Merriam, for example, emphasized that the psychological perspective
could augment the political scientist's understanding of behavior in the
socio-political order. As he saw it, the "psychological method,"

because it provided a "more accurate understanding of the fundamental
traits of human nature," offered "golden possibilities to the social
sciences."[28] Later, under the direction of Charles Merriam a number of
scholars like Gosnell and Harold Lasswell applied the "psychological
method" for the sake of improving the current understanding of the
determinants of political behavior. And, as the writings of these
scholars clearly indicated, they found this "cross-fertilization" of
psychology and politics to be extremely useful for their purposes.
Indeed, as Gosnell ruminated in this regard, the addition of the
psychological perspective to the study of politics enhanced the
likelihood that "at some future time" it would be possible to "produce a
science of politics."[29]

The Goal of the New Aspects of Politics

Although these scholars remained committed to scientific inquiry in
the study of politics, their purported goal of a science of politics
should not be allowed to obscure their final aim. For them, a
scientific understanding of the political order was ultimately gauged to
the ulterior aim of meliorism through conscious social control. This
was a theme that was consistently reflected in many of their writings.
For instance, Hall remarked that a scientific "technique of politics"
could ultimately provide the basis to evolve "some system of social
control which will guide humanity by its intelligence than by its
passion."[30] In a similar vein, Lasswell noted that society could use
"rational processes" "supplied by its scientific servants" "for the
control of social no less than physical processes."[31] And, finally,
Merriam observed that a science of politics could assist in the

"reconstruction of the ʹpurely politicalʹ into a more intelligent
influence on the progress of the race toward conscious control over its
own evolution."[32]

Essentially, many of those associated with this scientifically
inclined political science were propounding "a realistic political
science engineering." By stressing the application of their accumulated
knowledge to maximize societal benefits through guided reforms, they
sanctioned a shift of emphasis analogous to that which had transpired in
"the art of factory management." In certain respects, then, the
culmination of such a change of emphasis in inquiry was the inauguration
of "the engineering point of view" in the study of politics.[33]

Granted, it is possible to discern the intellectual roots of an
applied science of politics in the professionʹs formative years. With
its fundamental conviction that a science of politics could deliver
substantive information on the implementation of possible reforms, which
usually centered on matters as to their efficiency, feasibility, and
anticipated consequences, the discipline manifested at least a partial
orientation towards an engineering mindset. Its presence in embryonic
form, however, did not mean that a Wilson, or a Bryce, or even a Lowell
conceived of politics as an applied science on the magnitude envisioned
by their intellectual progeny. Rather, their understanding of the
limitations of a scientific political science ensured that they would
only cautiously encourage the use of conclusions, tentatively derived,
in the manipulation of the socio-political order. Nevertheless, they
remained convinced that the study of politics must be relevant and,
therefore, must illuminate the avenues towards change. Thus, when their

intellectual scions achieved prominence in the discipline, the
underbrush obstructing the path to a reform-oriented political science
had already been cleared away. Scholars like Merriam and his disciples,
however, believed it was possible, via a dogged pursuance of a more
rigorous science of politics, to convert a simple path into a heavily
travelled, well-paved thoroughfare. As their faith in the method was
strengthened, their expectations as to their ability to harness and
shape the forces of society increased markedly.

Although these scholars were preoccupied with "social control," it
scarcely needs to be mentioned that "control" is not a neutral act.
Rather, it is purposive; it presupposes an ideal to be realized, an end
to be achieved. And the goal sought by these scholars was the
implementation of those values constitutive of the liberal democratic
regime, especially as construed by their own tradition. For instance,
Hall noted the development of the "power controlling sciences" was
wedded to the survival and ultimate realization of the "ideals" and
"most cherished ends" of "our civilization."[34] Similarly, Merriam
emphasized that there was "no fundamental inconsistency...between
democracy and scientific rule, however much an effort may be made to
create such a conclusion." Thus, for example, the "forces producing
municipal misrule" could be studied so that they might eventually "be
educated and constructively adapted to the new modes of life under the
forms of the cooperative enterprise of democracy."[35] Finally, Lasswell
observed that the application of "intelligence" to "social processes"
could create a society in which individuals were provided with "equality
of opportunity" so that they might develop their "innate capacities."

Seen from this perspective, he added that the process of social

reconstruction should be "approached" in a "spirit" that was "frankly

democratic, and, in the larger sense of the term, humanistic."[36]

This basic commitment to the order of priorities indigenous to

their own liberal democractic inheritance was also reflected in their

selection of the processes, institutions, and problems to be studied.

This was exemplified in a broad spectrum of discussions centering on

possible avenues to be explored by political science in the future. In

this regard, discussions on prospective topics of significance included,

inter alia, matters of interest like the following, all of which are

embodied in the warp and woof of the liberal tradition: the causes,

ramifications, and control of "prejudices" in judicial behavior; the

consequences of "arbitrariness" entailed by the delegation of

legislative authority to administrative agencies; the nature of the

relationship between different nominating procedures and the "public

interest"; the effect of legislative bicameralism on political

"responsibility"; the shape of public opinion, including the causes of

its modulation as well as the possible sources of its distortion; the

effect of "propaganda" on public opinion; the connection between the

dissemination of information and citizen participation; and the causes

and consequences of "non-voting."[37]

From the tenor of their writings, it appeared as though these

scholars approached their task at hand with a sense of urgency. As they

saw it, political science could be used to master and tame the

obstreperous forces of "jungle politics" and the vicissitudes of "the

jungle of human nature." Such a response, they averred, would bring

about the progressive realization of a stable, harmonious, equalitarian

society. If, however, students of politics decided not to engage in a

probing scientific analysis, they would, wittingly or not, be forcing

the regime to succumb to the power left in "the hands of jungle

governors." The results of such a scenario could possibly include

"world war, anarchy, industrial and political revolution, recurring

discontent and distress."[38] In other words, the survival of liberal

democracy in the dawning era was perceived to be at stake, and political

scientists were, according to this view, confronted with a choice

between progress, intelligence, and democracy on the one hand, and

regression, ignorance, and despotism on the other.

In the final analysis, the depiction of scientific political

analysis as a natural ally of an interminably progressive liberalism

enhanced its attractiveness to the profession which, at that time, was

under the tutelage of confirmed liberals still enchanted by the lure of

pragmatism. The concepts of "science," "progress," and "democratic

liberalism" were so completely interwoven that it was virtually

impossible to entertain any one of them without considering the other

two. That such was the case was clearly exemplified in a poignant

passage written by Merriam:

> The stream of scientific invention will roll on, in all human
> profitability, and if the devices of social invention are able
> to keep pace with the scientific organization of nature, the
> new world may be a fairyland of human achievement. The
> burdens of hunger, disease, toil, fear may be lifted, the book
> of leisure may be opened, and treasures of human appreciation
> and enjoyment may be made available to the mass of mankind.[39]

For the most part, political scientists were incognizant of

possible tensions emanating from an attempt to merge an "objective"

science of politics with a reformist orientation which bore the marks of
a distinctively liberal cultural ethos. The two were presumed to be
complementary, to fit hand in glove. To some extent, the inability to
apprehend potential incompatibilities between them might be ascribed to
a dearth of competing ideological paradigms capable of challenging the
hegemony of liberalism.[40] Ultimately, the strength of political
scientists´ faith in the credo of American liberal democracy left them
almost impervious to the possibility that the course of inquiry they
endorsed and plotted could be used for purposes at odds with their
inherited tradition. Thus as long as they were bound to traditional
presuppositions and convictions, these scholars could ardently promote
the posture analogous to "the impartial attitude of the physical
scientist" in their discipline.[41] Consequently, they could argue the
importance of abiding by the restraints imposed on them by their
adoption of the scientific attitude while at the same time believing
that such a stance would culminate in measured reforms within the
framework of the liberal polity.

Furthermore, just as a science of politics was depicted as an
expedient means to realize the values embedded in the American
tradition, that very same tradition was viewed as reciprocally ensuring
the preservation of an environment conducive to the developing social
sciences. Indeed, it was as characteristic of this generation´s
political scientists to portray liberal democracy as a precondition
"essential for scientific progress" as it was for them to represent
"science as a reinforcement of democracy."[42] This motif, firmly
anchored in the bedrock of pragmatic thought and generally endorsed by

political scientists, dulled further their sensitivity to tensions
endemic to a reformist science of politics which, at least purportedly,
was bound by the strictures of objectivity characteristic of the
physical sciences. A political science which bolstered traditional
norms, it was believed, enhanced the chances of its own survival.

The Challenge to Democracy

As much of the foregoing has indicated, the aim of this
scientifically inspired political science was social meliorism, with
primary emphasis given to the realization of American liberal
democractic values or norms. A new science of politics which, according
to Merriam, "would endeavor to substitute ascertained fact and observed
relations for mere opinion, and experiment for unfounded belief," would
"wield more precise methods of political and social control than mankind
has hitherto possessed." Control stemming from the manipulation of
"habits," "education and eugenics," knowledge of the "recesses of human
nature," and mastery of "inheritance and environment," was thought to
culminate in the liberation of man; "the laboratory," it was believed,
would "master the jungle of human nature and turn its vast, teeming
fertility to the higher uses of mankind."[43] But, somewhat
paradoxically, it soon became clear that strict adherence to the logic
and methods of this naturalistic approach to the study of politics
concluded in the vitiation of certain core assumptions underlying the
theory and practice of liberal democracy. Though unanticipated in the
movement's earliest days, such a problem, the corrosion of liberal
democratic premises, became readily apparent during the 1930s.[44] Once
entrenched, the problem accompanied the scientific propensities within

the discipline. Consequently, even during the latter decades, when
scientific research had reached its zenith under the auspices of
behavioralism, skepticism of the basic principles undergirding a liberal
consensus remained quite commonplace.[45]

Basically, this challenge to the theory and practice of liberal
democracy came from two separate directions. First, fidelity to the
methods of science in the study of society precluded the possibility
that the ultimate desirability of such a regime could be conclusively
demonstrated. Such a political order, it was maintained, could no
longer be vindicated by logical derivation from an absolute,
transcendental norm. Furthermore, science could not, in response to the
elimination of a priori, deductive reasoning as a way to show the
ethical superiority of such a regime, provide an alternative absolute
justification. Secondly, the results of empirical research given
impetus by this new orientation in political science seemed to indicate
that the liberal view of man was a caricature, with little foundation in
reality. Thus the critical assumption of an autonomous, well-informed,
equal citizen able to rationally calculate his own interests and choose
a preferred strategy of behavior within a framework of neutrally applied
laws was confounded by seemingly damning evidence to the contrary.[46]

Problem of Relativism

The inability to validate the ethical superiority of liberal
democratic suppositions was perceived to flow from the strictures
entailed by the organon of science. Moreover, such a contention was
buttressed by the growth and articulation of a complementary attitude of
logical positivism/empiricism in philosophical circles. In addition,

this position was sustained and fortified through the emergence of a
Wertfrei social science, a concept traditionally imputed to Max Weber's
expository writings on social investigation.[47]

Theoretically, while under the aegis of science the political
scientist was not intellectually equipped to arbitrate, in absolute
terms, between contending hierarchies of values. Qua scientist, he had
relinquished his ability to pass judgment on the ultimate worth of
competing values and purposes. This position was unavoidable given the
following related developments: the characterization of a priori,
deductive reasoning as a purely analytical exercise; the reaffirmation
of the logical chasm separating assertions of "fact" from those of
"evaluation"; and the restriction of knowledge qua scientific knowledge to
theoretically verifiable propositions.

First, during the 1930s and 1940s a priori, deductive thinking was
consistently characterized as a formal exercise which started from
arbitrarily chosen, unprovable postulates. Deductive reasoning, it was
argued, provided no knowledge in addition to that already present in the
initial premises; quite simply, the consequent only made explicit that
which was inherent in the antecedent. From this perspective, then, a
priori, deductive thought was understood to be tautological, not
synthetic.[48] This conception of deductive reasoning, however, extracted
a price which soon became painfully clear; that is, the representation
of deductive reasoning as a strictly formal activity, dependent upon
arbitrarily selected posits and devoid of experiental knowledge, eroded
the plausibility of providing a rational, deductive justification of the
ideals and order embodied in the heritage of American liberalism.[49]

Secondly, the intellectual gap left by underscoring the limitations of deductive reasoning could not be filled by a naturalist behavioral political science. Qua scientist, the researcher was compelled to keep separate judgments of "fact" from judgments of "evaluation." Because these two propositions were "absolutely heterogenous," attempts to derive "evaluative" statements from judgments of "fact" were construed to be logically untenable. This, in turn, meant it was impossible to educe a code of moral prescriptions by appealing to observed relationships. Thus, for example, the empirical assertion that human being are unimpeded in their ability to dispose of the fruits of their labor could not be used to justify the altogether logically different contention that they "ought" to be free to do so.[50]

Finally, adherence to the logical chasm separating these two types of statements enjoined the researcher, qua scientist, to eschew the pressing of scientific claims for evaluative judgments. As a scientist, the student of politics was confined to exploring matters which were empirically grounded. The scientific paradigm ordained that only existential phenomena were susceptible to corroboration via the tools of scientific inquiry; and it further dictated that only propositions amenable to empirical verification -- those susceptible to replication by others -- could be intersubjectively transmitted qua scientific knowledge. Statements with empirical referents were, at least in principle, open to verification. Thus, since they could be confirmed or refuted by others, factual assertions fell within the purview of science. Such statements satisfied the requirements imposed by the tenet of intersubjective transmission. Normative propositions, however,

were devoid of references to existential phenomena; they could not be affirmed or confuted. Therefore unless valuational assertions were treated as data, they were excluded from the domain traditionally ascribed to science. Holding them to be unverifiable was tantamount to saying that they could not be intersubjectively transmitted as scientific knowledge.[51] Furthermore, denied stature as scientific knowledge, normative propositions were reduced to expressions of subjective preferences. Extremists in the camp of logical positivism/empiricism, by equating verifiability with meaning, reduced normative propositions to "meaningless" ejaculations, statements which "do not say anything."[52]

With respect to values, then, the role science could legitimately play was greatly circumscribed. At best, it could only be used to illuminate evaluative discourse. This position was probably most clearly articulated by Max Weber in his discussion of a _Wertfrei_ social science. Specifically, Weber noted that science could be illuminative with respect to "the factual consequences which the realization of a certain practical evaluation must have." Furthermore, he observed that science could supply information about the means required to meet a postulated goal. Finally, he indicated that science could point to the consequences entailed by the procurement of a desired end through a specific means. As he saw it, such information could make relevant contributions to evaluative discourse. It could promote more enlightened choices within a context of certain presumed ends or goals, and it could prompt a reconsideration of previously accepted values. But given the inescapable logical "gulf" separating propositions of

"fact" from those of "evaluation," science, he declared, could not

demonstrate the ultimate superiority of any one set of norms or

prescriptions.[53]

In the final analysis, then, strict adherence to scientific method

entailed a posture of relativism for the researcher qua scientist;

relativism, though the "seamy side of Scientific Method," was its

"logical implication." Therefore, though science did not prevent the

researcher from supplying, on the basis of personal faith or intuition,

moral content to an end, it did dictate that evaluative assertions could

not be transmitted as scientific knowledge. In short, science could

identify, probe, and consider existential phenomena; however, it could

not conclusively determine the desirability of the examined state of

affairs.[54] Arnold Brecht concisely summed up the impact of this

injunction in his classic discussion of "Scientific Value Relativism."

There he wrote:

> Scientific Method cannot state in absolute terms which of
> several conflicting ultimate purposes is better than others
> except in relation to some presupposed goal or ideal. In
> short, it does not enable the scientist to render an
> unconditional scientific value judgment.... It cannot set
> the goal.[55]

For the political scientist such a posture of relativism implied

that the ideal of democratic liberalism and its underlying moral

principles could not receive absolute endorsement from science. In the

end, proponents of scientific methodology in political inquiry often had

to swallow hard and acknowledge that the implementation of democratic

principles as a final goal to be achieved could only be justified as

emanating from subjective preferences, not scientific knowledge.

Critics of the naturalist behavioral approach to the study of politics,

however, soon charged that such an orientation was nihilistic. The inability to discriminate, except in relative terms, between antagonistic hierarchies of values left the political scientist qua scientist with an allegedly inescapable ethical vacuum. Even proponents of an objective, scientific political science were cognizant of the concomitant relativism which ensued from their adherence to such an analytical posture. Yet acceptance of the inevitability of such an ethical void was the price extracted by the introduction of the method they viewed with such promise.[56]

The implications of the ethical rift opened up by the relativism entailed by scientific method became painfully clear when scholars in the United States were forced to confront the emergence and entrenchment of non-liberal ideologies in Europe and the Soviet Union. These political movements which abrogated the basic values constitutive of democratic liberalism heightened the consciousness of scientific impotency in the sphere of evaluative judgments. Consequently, these scholars soon recognized that, as ultimate ideals to be realized, the ideologies of fascism and communism, like the liberal democratic creed to which they were counterposed, could not be ushered into the court of science for consideration.[57]

Crisis of Democratic Politics

The inability to provide an absolute vindication of democratic principles was also coupled with other damaging challenges to assumptions undergirding the theory and practice of the liberal regime. Specifically called into question was the presupposition that autonomous, equal, informed, rational citizens were capable of

developing behavioral strategies so that they might maximize their interests within a framework of impartially applied laws and neutral institutions.

First, one prominent challenge to the liberal orthodoxy can be ascribed to a theoretical elaboration of societal power configurations which stressed the ubiquity of elite domination and control. Initially disseminated by Michels, Mosca, and Pareto, this theory cast into relief the illusory nature of governmental control by the people. Essentially, the basic motif underlying the writings of the elite theorists pointed to the fact that the strings of government were pulled by a small but powerful clique. Accordingly, policy was ineluctably the result of the machinations of the powerful few, and government predicated on a citizenry composed of people sharing equal influence was a chimera.[58]

Eventually this notion that political control was exercised by a select few who possessed a disproportionate amount of influence and power was given credence by the research of several scholars who espoused a more "scientific" approach to the study of socio-political phenomena. For example, in their study of Muncie, Indiana, Robert and Helen Lynd discovered that the social, economic, and political life of that mid-western city was dominated by a small, yet nonetheless influential group of individuals.[59] Some time later, V. O. Key in his analysis of American politics found that the opinion and politics of the masses were, in the final analysis, shaped and informed by a political elite.[60] Finally, in this regard, the theme of elite prepotency was probably most graphically sustained in the writings of Harold Lasswell. Of special importance here were two books published in the 1930s, World

Politics _and_ _Personal_ _Insecurity_ and _Politics:_ _Who_ _Gets_ _What,_ _When,_
How. Both of these works portrayed the socio-political order as
distinguished by an asymmetrical distribution of influence. And, as
Lasswell had it, the influential or "elite" of society maintained their
position of hegemony through an adroit manipulation of goods, symbols,
political practices, and techniques of coercion and violence.[61]

In general, this proposition of minority rule, when buttressed by
empirical research which purportedly corroborated elite dominion,
provided a forceful critique of a vital tenet of the accepted doctrine
of democratic liberalism. Inescapable rule by an upper strata of
society belied the affirmation of an egalitarian citizenry and
discredited the contention that participation was instrumental in the
formulation and control of public policy. The vision of a common, equal
man sharing power through political participation was depicted as a
sham. Such a turn of events had seemingly betrayed the promises endemic
to the American liberal democratic tradition. Furthermore, given a
reputed invariable tendency towards hierarchical social control,
prospects for a full realization of the American creed were not
promising. Popular control in the body politic, therefore, was at best
an elusive goal, an end to be promulgated, not attained.

Preponderance of elites was a damaging criticism of the prevailing
liberal democratic orthodoxy. But elite theory was not the sole
challenge confronting the democratic dogma. In addition, there was a
rising tide of criticism that called into question what many considered
to be the _sine_ _qua_ _non_ of democratic liberalism, that is, man's ability
to make meaningful, enlightened policy decisions within an impartially

administered juridical framework. Here several researchers who used
newly developed statistical and psychological techniques elicited
evidence which intimated that many Americans were simply not equipped,
either intellectually or emotionally, to meet the requirements imposed
on them by the practices of a democratic regime.

Initially, intelligence tests given to Army personnel prior to
World War I indicated that over thirty percent of those enrolled for
active duty were functionally illiterate. Since such tests were
presumed to be a representative sample of the American electorate, the
results appeared as a significant cause for alarm. As many critics
argued, democratic society could not tolerate such low intellectual
development. A citizenry unable to grasp politically relevant
information circulated throughout the body politic would precipitate the
demise of the republic, plunging it into chaos and possibly anarchy or
dictatorial rule.[62]

The conclusions of these intelligence tests were subsequently given
additional support by studies of public opinion, voting behavior, and
propaganda. First, Walter Lippmann in his work, Public Opinion, argued
that public decisions were rooted in an incomplete access to pertinent
facts, manipulated and distorted information, and prejudicial
"stereotypes" constructed so that the common citizen could manage the
complex stream of events he faced every day. The crux of his argument
seemed to undermine the liberal supposition which characterized homo
politicus as a rational, well-informed individual who fashioned
calculated and measured decisions in political affairs. Essentially,
his depiction of public opinion as a function of bias, ignorance, and

controlled and distorted information seemed to indicate that democracy,
as it was traditionally conceived, was an unrealizable goal.[63] Some
time later, Merriam and Gosnell, in their study of voting behavior in a
local election in Chicago, found that almost half the electorate failed
to vote because of "general indifference" or "some form of inertia."
Further, when it came down to specifics, several of those non-voters who
were interviewed indicated their failure to vote was a function of
"ignorance or timidity" regarding elections.[64] Finally, while Merriam
and Gosnell turned their attention to voting behavior, Lasswell
concentrated his interest on the use of propaganda in the formation of
attitudes and public opinion. What he discovered in his analysis of
propaganda during the First World War was that the "new dynamic of
society" was the creation of an artificial public consensus manufactured
through the conscious manipulation of "public symbols" by a select
few.[65]

Ostensibly, the general thrust of the above studies confuted the
traditionally accepted image of an active, informed citizenry that
controlled and directed the actions of its leaders. And this view was
given additional vindication through the emergence and impact of depth
psychology, especially as expounded in Freudian psychoanalytic theory.

Originally received with suspicion and even open hostility,
psychoanalytic psychology permeated and thus informed the social
sciences during the second and third decades of this century.
Generally, Freudian depth psychology was conceived as a scientific
enterprise; it offered a theory which purported to explain the
occurrence of random or incongruous mental events and psychic

disturbances not traceable to somatic disorders.[66] Further, when translated into principles of political psychology, Freudian theory entailed a pessimistic view of human nature. Seen from the perspective of psychoanalysis, homo politicus lacked the capacities for free, rational action which had been imputed to him by liberal political psychology. Though subject to a variety of emendations during the years it was being formulated, Freudian theory consistently held that psychological events were reducible to causal relationships. Furthermore, it also held that in many instances the etiology of mental aberrations and the antecedents that determined psychological events remained locked away in the deeper recesses of the mind, never granted unimpeded access to consciousness. According to this perspective, then, certain behavioral patterns were simply epiphenomenal manifestations of powerful but latent tensions. Thus, in contrast to the dominant view which underscored man's freedom and rationality, psychoanalysis stressed that man was encumbered by compelling and often undetectable psychogenetic forces. "Psychological research," Freud wrote, had therefore indicated to man "that he...[was] not even master in his own house."[67]

In disclosing the workings of the unconscious, then, psychoanalysis appeared to undermine the assumptions of liberal political psychology. At the very least, psychoanalytic theory indicated that man was unable to adjust objectively to his environment. Such a conclusion was graphically sustained in Freud's last and most widely disseminated elaboration of personality, the structural model of the mind.

Briefly, the structural model of the mind posited a tripartite division: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id was the seat of "the passions," and it was governed by the insatiable "pleasure principle." In contrast, the ego, which was analogous to "reason" or "common sense," had to cope with environmental constraints and was therefore guided by the dictates of the "reality principle." Using energy borrowed from the overbearing and stronger id, the ego endeavored "to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies." Yet the superior strength of the id often overwhelmed the ego, forcing it to transform "the id's will into action as if it were its own." Hence the dynamics of this structural relationship generally produced a rather debilitated ego. To further compound this problem, the superego, a kind of internal moral judge, restricted the ego's ability to satisfy many of the conflicting demands made upon it. In adjusting the id's claims to the environment, the ego was forced to abide by the strictures imposed by the superego. As a result, the ego postulated by psychoanalytic theory was forced to confront and satisfy a wide spectrum of demands, many of which were irreconcilable. Thus the ego seemed to be quite fragile, and man's ability to function effectively appeared to rest on a rather tenuous foundation. Freud bluntly highlighted the relative impotence of the ego when he wrote:

> [T]he ego, driven by the id, confined by the super-ego, repulsed by reality, struggles to master its economic task of bringing about harmony among the forces working in and upon it; and we can understand how it is that so often we cannot suppress a cry: "Life is not easy!"[68]

To be sure, not all political scientists were converted to the Freudian view of psychology. Nevertheless, there were many who were

more than willing to use the concepts of the "irrational" and
"unconscious" to explore the substratum of political behavior. As
Walter Shepard wrote with respect to the trends current in political
science during his time:

> Within the past decade[1925-1935]...the "psychological
> approach" has certainly provided the most active and aggressive
> interest in the entire field of political science. A group of
> brilliant young scholars...are introducing a realistic and
> objective element into the study of political phenomena. The
> clue to their studies may perhaps be discovered in the phrase
> "the non-rational factors in political behavior."[69]

Representative of those who turned to intensive studies of
personality to inform their understanding of political behavior was
Harold Lasswell. Relying on in-depth, protracted case studies of
selected political personalities, he reached the conclusion that the
individual was, in fact, a "poor judge of his own interest." As he saw
it, much behavior was motivated by non-rational factors. Further, in
his view politics was not a rational, temperate activity guaged to
resolve collective problems; rather, it served more as a tempestuous
arena in which an individual assuaged his own personal disorders by
displacing his "private affects" on "political symbols." Thus he wrote:
"...politics is the process by which the irrational bases of society are
brought out into the open."[70]

For those who turned to statistical and psychological methods so as
to develop a more accurate understanding of the determinants and
dynamics of human behavior, it appeared as though the traditional
conception of human nature underlying democratic liberalism needed to be
reassessed. From their perspective, the faith commonly placed in the
ratiocinative capacities of man was unfounded in reality. Neither the

people, nor the politicians, nor even the supposedly independent judges
or neutral bureaucrats who appealed to impartiality and rationality,
could be counted on to fulfill the tasks meted out to them by a liberal
democratic polity.[71]

Summary

In sum, conclusions reached by those who sought to foster a more
scientific understanding of socio-political processes raised vexing
questions about the traditional practices and assumptions of democratic
liberalism. Moreover, the emergence of dictatorial regimes out of the
political rabble which characterized much of Europe appeared to lend
substantial credence to their work. In addition, many political
scientists, in their zeal to be more objective and scientific had, as a
consequence of their adherence to scientific epistemology, conceived an
attitude of moral relativism. Such an attitude, rooted in the logic of
scientific inquiry, excluded the articulation of an absolute ethical
justification of democracy. Thus, in the final analysis, research had
challenged and not confirmed the convictions of those who promoted a
fuller realization of democratic principles.

Response to the Challenge

Though gathered facts seemed to spell an unpropitious future for
regimes which overestimated the average citizen's capacities, many
social scientists, cognizant of the criminality and terrors of
totalitarianism abroad as well as mounting levels of criticism directed
towards their own government -- which at that time was facing a severe
financial depression -- felt compelled to delineate an intellectual

position supportive of democratic politics. What was demanded was a
response capable of dispelling fears about the flaws imputed to
democracies and which, somehow, clearly attested to such a polity's
desirability when stacked against an enveloping order of
authoritarianism. Thus they felt pressured to address squarely the
problems of relativism and a mounting order of skepticism.[72]
Furthermore, in order to salvage their own enterprise such a position
needed to be drafted within the framework of a scientific political
science.

Of special relevance in this regard was the work of Harold
Lasswell. In a career which spanned over fifty years and included the
publication of more than three hundred and fifty books and articles,
Lasswell provided a number of evocative and pioneering insights which
enriched the scientific study of politics. Yet his writings, though
directed to a wide and variegated band of topics, betrayed a strong
concern for the practices and prospects of the American version of
democratic liberalism. Indeed, as Richard Merelman has written,
Lasswell's concern for democracy was the "central theme" in his
"oeuvre."[73] But there is something intriguing about this concern; for
as a proponent of a more systematic scientific political science,
Lasswell made significant contributions which precipitated a decline in
the belief and foundation of the orthodox liberal democratic ideology.
It is only necessary here to recall a few of his assertions to recognize
that Lasswell, like many of his colleagues, generated conclusions under
the auspices of an "objective," scientific methodology which tarnished
many of the presumed tenets of traditional democratic theory. For

example, his emphasis on neutrality in research, when coupled with scientific studies which reputedly demonstrated the existence of a society which was controlled by elites and populated by a mass of irrationally motivated citizens learned in spurious and manipulated information, buttressed an emerging skepticism of previously affirmed democratic principles.

Thus, in the final analysis, Lasswell's writings embody a fundamental ambivalence towards democracy. Like his contemporaries, he aimed to develop a political science which approached "objective," scientific exactitude. His efforts here, however, produced results which debunked or corroded many of the accepted tenets which supported democratic liberalism. Yet, at the same time, he wanted to eschew the hazards of an unchecked skepticism and relativism. As he saw it, democracy was unmistakably the most appropriate and beneficial form of political rule. Further, as David Easton and others have written in this regard, present in "embryonic" form in Lasswell's work was a defense of "the thesis that social science can indicate whether, for example, the ultimate goals embodied in the western tradition are superior to those of fascism or communism."[74]

In addressing the problems of skepticism and relativism, Lasswell also suggested that a developed science of politics could articulate and assess combinations of policy alternatives to be used in the obviation of fundamental deficiencies endemic to traditional democratic practices. An amplified science of politics, he surmised, could uncover networks of behavior and structural inadequacies within the polity which worked against the realization of the preferred democratic ideal. In addition,

he believed that such a science, if properly consulted, could supply
adequate correctives to the sources of societal tensions. In short, he
argued that without the information made accessible by a science of
politics, the democratic regime would be unable to fashion and implement
the reforms required to ensure its survival in the emerging and
inescapable confrontation with pernicious, non-liberal ideologies.

Lasswell, therefore, sustained an intellectual continuity with the
heritage of research epitomized by Merriam and his peers. From the
progressive tradition he inherited an implacable faith in the potential
of science. Like Merriam and others before him, he believed the mode of
inquiry elaborated in the laboratory would, when successfully translated
into axioms of political research, enhance man's ability to domesticate
the "jungle" of political life. Yet unlike many of those who had fallen
under the sway of forces animating progressivism and pragmatism,
Lasswell was compelled to grapple with the implications which ensued
from the posture of inquiry he both endorsed and pursued. Specifically,
his political science tried to at least partially address the
problematic nature of democracy as a desirable and a practicable form of
political control. And it is to a consideration of these matters to
which we will now turn. Such a course of investigation will first of
all underscore the tension between the rise of a science of politics and
democracy. Thus it will consider the challenges to democracy Lasswell
presented through his application of a naturalistic political science.
Furthermore, it will identify and assess Lasswell's response to the
problematic nature of democracy as both a practicable and desirable form
government. Finally, though this study does not purport to be an

exhaustive treatment of the maturation of a science of politics from the
1930s to the post-behavioral era, a study of Lasswell should help shed
light on some of the weaknesses and strengths, failures and
achievements, and inconsistencies and consistencies of political science
as it developed through much of this century. For, as Dwight Waldo once
noted:

> The development of Lasswell's thinking is important because in
> it are brought together the two strains of (a) increasing
> emphasis upon rigorous empirical research — behavioralism —
> and (b) the simultaneous increasing recognition of an emphasis
> upon policy problems. It is thus by virtue of the very fact
> that he is a leader that possible dilemmas, strains, and
> inconsistencies of contemporary political science are best
> revealed in his writings, which bring together two dominant
> currents. Whoever wishes to know both some of the most
> characteristic achievements and the methodological and
> philosophical problems of contemporary political science
> cannot do better than study Lasswell.[75]

NOTES

1. Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1959), p. 134; and Francis G. Wilson, The American Political Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), pp. 414-415. For a discussion of the evolution of American political science, see Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967); Dwight Waldo, "Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise," in Political Science: Scope and Theory, Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Vol. I, pp. 1-30; David Ricci: The Tragedy of Poltical Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1984); and Raymond Seidelman and Edward J. Harpham, Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884-1984 (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985).

2. For example, see Albert Shaw, "Presidential Address," American Political Science Review 1 (Feb. 1907), pp. 177-186; James Bryce, "The Relationship of Political Science to History and Practice," American Political Science Review 3 (Feb. 1909), pp. 1-19; A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Physiology of Politics," American Political Science Review 4 (Feb. 1910), pp. 1-15; Woodrow Wilson, "The Law and the Facts," American Political Science Review 5 (Feb. 1911), pp. 1-11; Jesse Macy, "The Scientific Spirit in Politics," American Political Science Review 11 (Feb. 1917), pp. 1-11; and Henry Jones Ford, "Present Tendencies in Politics," American Political Science Review 14 (Feb. 1920), pp. 1-13.

3. Lowell, "The Physiology of Politics," pp. 8, 15, 14; Bryce, "The Relationship of Political Science to History an Practice," pp. 2-3; and Wilson, "The Law and the Facts", p. 10.

4. During the 1930s, three conferences were held to assess the progress of scientific research in political science. Included in the discussion were attempts to outline possible avenues of inquiry which also required the cooperation of other social sciences, especially those disciplines with a heavy quantitative bias. See "Reports of the National Conference on the Science of Politics," American Political Science Review 19 (Feb. 1924), pp. 119-166; "Reports of the Second National Conference on the Science of Politics," American Political Science Review 19 (Feb. 1925), pp. 104-162; "Reports of the Third Conference on the Science of Politics," American Political Science Review 20 (Feb. 1926), pp. 124-170.

5. Charles E. Merriam, "The Present State of the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review 15 (May 1921), p. 181. See also Tang Tsou, "Fact and Value in Charles E. Merriam," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 36 (June 1955), pp. 9-26.

6. Arnold Bennett Hall, "The First Meeting of the National Conference on the Science of Politics," Journal of Social Forces 2

(March 1924), p. 374; and "Reports of the National Conference," pp. 120-122.

7.   Hall, "First Meeting," p. 374.

8.   Hall, "Reports of the National Conference," p. 120.

9.   Hall, "Reports of the Second Conference," p. 106.

10.   Richard Jensen, "History and the Political Scientist," in Politics and the Social Sciences, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 4-6.

11.   L. L. Thurstone, "Reports of the Second Conference," p. 112.

12.   A study indicative of this mode of inquiry was Harold Foote Gosnell's Getting Out the Vote (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927). See especially Chapter 2. This study summarizes the results of one of the first attempts to use controlled experimental techniques in political science research. In this work, Gosnell sought to measure the effects of "non-partisan appeals sent through the mails" on electoral behavior. See also Harold Foote Gosnell, "Statisticians and Political Scientists," American Political Science Review 27 (June 1933), pp. 392-403; Charles E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics, 3rd ed., enl. with a Foreword by Barry D. Karl (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 138-139, 206-209, 306-311; and Charles E. Merriam, "Progress Report of the Committee on Political Research," American Political Science Review 17 (May 1923), p. 289. Merriam was not unaware of the difficulties connected with the construction of a science of politics on a foundation of inquiry similar to that which was outlined by Thurstone; but he believed that only perseverance in the application of such methods, and not an a priori rejection of them, would yield an answer as to whether or not such research was possible. See "Progress," pp. 287-289.

13.   William Bennett Munro, "Physics and Politics," American Political Science Review 22 (Feb. 1928). p. 10.

14.   John Fairlie, "Political Developments and Tendencies," American Political Science Review 24 (Feb. 1930), p. 15; and Leonard White, "The Local Community Research Committee and the Social Science Research Building," in Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research, ed. T. V. Smith and Leonard White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 25.

15.   H. W. Dodds, "Reports of the National Conference," p. 141.

16.   Pittman Potter, "Reports of the Third Conference," p. 170.

17.   Merriam, New Aspects, pp. 306-307. It would be interesting to imagine Wilson's response to G. E. G. Catlin's almost unbelievable contention that "there is no more inherent impossibility in

experimenting with men than experimenting with pigs." "The Doctrine of Power and Party Conflict," American Political Science Review 19 (Nov. 1925), p. 718.

18. Merriam, "Progress in Political Research," American Political Science Review 20 (Feb. 1926), p. 9.

19. Merriam, "Progress Report," p. 312.

20. Leonard White offered an interesting discussion as to how the University of Chicago, through an interdisciplinary committee housed in a facility designed to stimulate and promote cross-disciplinary investigations, provided a conducive setting for an orientation in social research which aspired to be more comprehensive and more integrated. White, "The Local Community Research Committee and the Social Science Research Building," pp. 20-32.

21. Hall, "Reports of the Second Conference," p. 107. Again, Arnold Bennett Hall underscored the importance ascribed to these two disciplines in his own summary of the second conference. See "The Second National Conference on the Science of Politics," National Municipal Review 14 (March 1925), pp. 150-151.

22. Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, ed. Peter H. Odegard (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 200.

23. Gosnell, "Statisticians," p. 398; Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1928), pp. 3-5; and Harold Foote Gosnell, "Technique of Measurement," in Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research, ed. T. V. Smith and Leonard White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 90.

24. Merriam, New Aspects, pp. 213-216.

25. Martin Blumer, "Quantification and Chicago Social Science in the 1920s: A Neglected Tradition," Journal of the History of Behavioral Science 17 (July 1981), pp. 312-328.

26. Gosnell, Getting Out the Vote, Chapter 2.

27. Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1921), pp. 40-41; and Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913), pp. 32, 83-85.

28. Merriam, New Aspects, pp. 95-96; and Charles Merriam, "The Significance of Psychology for the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review 18 (August 1924), pp. 482-485.

29. Harold Foote Gosnell, "Some Practical Applications of Psychology in Government," American Journal of Sociology 28 (May 1923), p. 743.

30. Hall, "Reports of the National Conference," pp. 121-122; and "Reports of the Second Conference," p. 110.

31. Willard E. Atkins and Harold D. Lasswell, Labor Attitudes and Problems (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1924), p. 198.

32. Merriam, "Progress in Political Research," p. 13.

33. Henry S. Dennison, "The Need for the Development of Political Science Engineering," American Political Science Review 26 (April 1932), pp. 241-255. See also Arnold Bennett Hall, "The Third Conference on the Science of Politics," National Municipal Review 15 (Feb. 1926), pp. 122-127.

34. Hall, "Reports of the Second Conference," p. 110.

35. Merriam, Civic Education in the United States (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 43; and "Present State of the Study of Politics," p. 182. See also Glenn Schramm, "Progressivism and Political Science: The Case of Charles E. Merriam," Interpretation 8 (May 1980), pp. 174-187; Crick, American Science, pp. 142-151; and Seidelman and Harpham, Disenchanted Realists, Chapter 4.

36. Atkins and Lasswell, Labor Attitudes and Problems, pp. 504-505, v.

37. Such matters were given dutiful attention at the conferences on science and politics. See also Charles E. Merriam and Harold Foote Gosnell, Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), Chapter 10.

38. Merriam, New Aspects, Preface to 1st ed. and Chapter 9.

39. Merriam, Civic Education in the United States, p. 184.
Merriam's almost unqualified confidence in man's capacity to control and direct his worldly affairs has led Schramm to conclude that Merriam exemplified that current of gnosticism which was embedded in the tradition of American political thought characteristic of progressivism and pragmatism. See Schramm, "Progressivism and Political Science," pp. 174-187.
    In his "archaeological" analysis of the evolution of political theory in American political science, John G. Gunnell was able to discern a fairly strong intellectual sentiment which stressed the compatibility as well as the affinity of a scientific political science and democracy. His study of the decade prior to the outbreak of World War II led him to the following conclusion: "Substantively, as well as methodologically, the 1930s were years of affirmation: affirmation of science, democracy, and their complementarity." See "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Sub-field," Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983), pp. 8-10.

40. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1955). In this book, Hartz depicted the pervasiveness of the liberal consensus in the American regime. The philosophy undergirding the American polity, due to the absence of any vestiges of feudalism and socialism was, in essence, virtually an unqualified liberalism.

41. Fairlie, "Political Developments and Tendencies," p. 15. For a discussion of the liberal assumptions underlying the work of political scientists during this era see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1973), Chapter 3; Crick, American Science, Chapters 8-9; Seidelman and Harphan, Disenchanted Realists, Chapter 4; and Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, Chapter 3.

42. Waldo, "Political Science," p. 49.

43. Merriam, New Aspects, pp. 320-321, 330.

44. Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory, Chapters 1-6.

45. Robert Booth Fowler, Believing Skeptics (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1978), Chapters 1-2.

46. For summaries of the challenges to the assumptions of liberal orthodoxy see David Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971), Chapter 2; Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory, Chapters 1-6; Fowler, Believing Skeptics, Chapters 1-2; and Ricci, The Tragedy of Poltiical Science, Chapter 3.

47. Joergen Joergensen provides a discussion of the growth, elaboration, and dissemination of the basic tenets of logical positivism/empiricism in The Development of Logical Empiricism, International Enclyclopedia of Unified Sciences, vol. 11, no. 9 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). For an amplified articulation of the scientific attitude pervasive in logical positivism/empiricism see Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).
Though Weber's works on social research had initially been confined to the Continent, the massive influx of German emigres to American universities during the 1930's facilitated the transmission of his ideas to a burgeoning and generally receptive audience of social scientists. In fact, Robert Dahl believed the introduction of Weber's writings was an important factor in the rise of an early scientifically impelled political science. He believed Weber's ideas to be one of "six specific, interrelated quite powerful stimuli" which contributed to the growth of this emerging order in political inquiry. See "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review 55 (Dec. 1961), pp. 763-764.

48. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Chapter 3; and A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1946), pp. 71-87.

49. Purcell, Crisis of Democratic Theory, Chapter 4.

50. Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp.207-215. See also Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 62-63; and Don R. Bowen, "The Origins of the Behavioral Movement," in The Political Experience, ed. Michael Weinstein (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), pp. 135-136.

51. Brecht, Political Theory, pp. 27-116; and Herbert Feigl, "Operationism and Scientific Method," in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. H. Feigl and W. Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 498-509.

52. See, for example, A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, Chapter 6.

53. Max Weber, "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 20-23.

54. Brecht, Political Theory, pp. 117-118.

55. Ibid., pp. 124-125.

56. Ibid., especially Chapters 3-4. In addition, see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), Chapters 1-2; John Hallowell, "Politics and Ethics," American Political Science Review 38 (August 1944), pp. 639-655; and Gabriel A. Almond, Lewis A. Dexter, William F. Whyte, and John B. Hallowell, "Politics and Ethics -- a Symposium," American Political Science Review 40 (April 1946), pp. 283-312.

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63. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 18-20. For a concise overview of what democratic political theory expects from citizens, see Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," in Public Opinion and Communication, ed. Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 489-504.

64. Merriam and Gosnell, Non-Voting, pp. 183-194.

65. Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (London: Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd. 1927; reprint ed. Propaganda Technique in World War I, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971).

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67. Freud, Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 132.

68. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, vol. 19 (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), Chapters 2-3; and New Introductory Lectures, p. 78.

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70. Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930; reprint ed. with afterthoughts, New York: The Viking Press, 1960), pp. 194, 184.

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72. Brecht, "Beyond Relativism," pp. 470-488.

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CHAPTER II

GROWTH OF THE NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS

From the beginning of his career, Lasswell endorsed and promoted

the scientific posture in socio-political inquiry. His writings

introduced and explicated a variety of sophisticated methodological

principles, conceptual arrangements, and heuristic models to be used in

the prosecution of systematic empirical research. And the importance

ascribed to his many contributions to the waxing scientific propensity

in political analysis earned him a reputation as one of America's most

distinguished and respected social scientists.[1]

Besides evoking plaudits from his peers for fostering the

scientific bent in inquiry, Lasswell's contributions to socio-political

research clearly reveal his own orientation, especially in terms of

means and purposes, in political studies. Specifically, his writings

provide an indication of the particular vantage point which informed,

shaped, and determined his attitude towards the principles and practices

of the liberal democratic regime. Thus, in order to understand and

comprehend his critique of the institutional procedures and patterns of

behavior traditionally associated with the democratic polity, it is

first necessary to survey and assess the distinctive intellectual

perspective he assumed in the study of politics. Further, an analysis

of his conception of a science of politics should help lend clarity to

the contours and logic of the specific political science correctives he

developed for the vexing problems of democracy. Indeed, the specific socio-political palliative which he delineated, apart from being designed to compensate for the structural inadequacies and anticipated human foibles which marked democratic politics, emerged from his own interpretation of a science of politics.

Intellectual Milieu

It appears that Lasswell was amply equipped to make a major impact on the developing scientific study of socio-political relations. As a precocious high school student, he was introduced to the works of James Tufts, W. Windelband, John Dewey, Havelock Ellis and, most impressively, Freud and Marx. Also while in high school he was deeply influenced by his civics teacher, William Cornell Casey. Casey, who later studied at the London School of Economics and then joined the faculty at Columbia University, was a captivating man who possessed a wide and varied band of intellectual interests. And it was Casey who, at the end of Lasswell's high school years, directed him to the then intellectually challenging setting of academia, the University of Chicago.[2]

At the University of Chicago, Lasswell became familiar with the multi-disciplinary, empirical approach to socio-political investigation. As an undergraduate and graduate student at the University, he encountered an impressive group of seminal thinkers in several disciplines. Primarily, these scholars came from the social sciences, though a number of philosophers were involved, including people like John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and T. V. Smith. Of special importance for him in his pedagogical experiences was his exposure to the "Chicago School" of sociological analysis; his acquaintance with pragmatism; and,

finally, his introduction to the votary of the scientific orientation in political science, Charles E. Merriam.[3]

His familiarity with the sociology department, which by the time he arrived in 1919 had already reached the pinnacle of its development under the guidance of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, informed him of the importance of conducting research within a definite theoretical framework. At the same time, his interest in philosophy brought him into contact with John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, both dominant figures in the pragmatic movement. From Dewey he developed a sensitivity to the linkage between knowledge and policy, and from Mead he acquired an awareness of the distinctive lens provided by social psychology. But as critical as these contacts were for his intellectual growth, the most exceptional and informative experience for Lasswell during his stay at Chicago was his tutelage under Merriam. Under the direction of Merriam, he commenced to explore diverse research avenues in the study of politics. Initially he investigated the mechanics of propoganda, an item which was also of much interest to Merriam. Later he turned his attention to the study of the non-rational and unconscious determinants of political behavior. Such a course of inquiry, given Merriam's avowed interest in psychology, also appeared to coincide with his mentor's professed focus of concern.

In 1938, after the publication of several pathbreaking though unorthodox works on politics, Lasswell left a faculty position at the University of Chicago for an appointment at the Washington, D.C., School of Psychiatry. During his tenure there, he was reunited with his long-time friend and associate, Harry Stack Sullivan. Sullivan, an esteemed

psychiatrist and influential figure in the growth of post-Freudian
psychoanalytic theory in America, underscored the importance of adopting
a more sociological orientation in scientific psychiatry. The
significance he attached to defective interpersonal relations as the
source of psychic dysfunctions ostensibly impressed Lasswell who, as
will be shown later, borrowed much from the thrust of Sullivan's
position in his attempt to fill in the interstices of psychology and the
other social sciences.[4]

After a short stay at the school of psychiatry, and following a
brief stint as director of War Communications Research, Lasswell secured
an appointment as Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale
University in 1946, a position he held until his retirement in 1970.[5]
Finally, from 1971 until his death in 1978 he served as a Distinguished
Professor at the City University of New York. Thus Lasswell spent his
career engaged in social research; moreover, he remained in touch with a
variety of different currents of thought which fertilized and thereby
affected the shape and direction of his outlook on political science.
Equally important, his exposure to novel ideas and concepts, when
coupled with an extraordinary capacity to ferret out and synthesize a
variegated band of findings and theoretical formulations drawn from
other disciplines, left him more than well-equipped to participate in
the multifarious changes unfolding within the discipline, many of which
he himself had conceived and promoted.

Lasswell and Political Science:

Rejection of Formalism and "Brute Empiricism"

Like many of his associates, Lasswell disdained the methodology and scope of analysis associated with an earlier tradition of American political science. First of all, he charged that one strain of early political science had been entangled in an inordinate amount of philosophical reflection; indeed, one of its most prominent features was "metaphysical speculation hopelessly removed from empirical observation and control." And he concluded that this attachment to "metaphysical speculation" and the "genteel erudition" of political philosophy unfortunately diverted political scientists' attention away from behavioral manifestations of appreciable relevance for the political realm. Thus "saturated with sectarian pride" in "philosophical distinctions," they were "slow" when it came to "studying the manifestations of human nature in politics."[6]

At the same time, Lasswell also believed that the newly evolving order of empirical studies, since it emerged from an intellectual background marked by non-empirical, theoretically abstract concerns, had been inclined to overcompensate for its earlier deficiencies in research by excessively emphasizing data collection. In their zeal to get at the "facts," many of these scholars, he observed, "checked their theories with their coats and plunged into technical work." Unfortunately, this lack of concern for "theoretical models" which could be used to guide "empirical research" culminated in a generally uninformative "brute empiricism." For the most part, then, the results produced by these political scientists were "parochial and non-cumulative."[7] Such, he

believed, had been the case with the works of Bryce. Though he

considered Bryce's works to be an "admirable personal and practical

achievement," he nonetheless concluded that they were "especially

fragmentary and non-comparable."[8]

So that the inadequacies of political studies might be rectified,

Lasswell admonished political scientists to forge a working relationship

between theory and research. This desire to root out the separate and

ingrained tendencies towards speculation "hopelessly removed from

empirical observation" and "the gathering of 'facts' without a

corresponding elaboration of hypotheses" is discernible in the early

stages of his career. In one of his earliest, most influential works,

Psychopathology and Politics, he laid bare his concern for a study of

politics which linked theory construction with factual inquiry. There

he wrote: "The task of the hour is the development of a realistic

analysis of the political in relation to the social process, and this

depends upon the invention of abstract conceptions and upon the

prosecution of empirical research."[9]

For Lasswell, the advancement of scientific political studies was

ultimately connected to a successful reconciliation of theory and

empirical research. As he saw it, conceptual or theoretical frameworks

needed to be developed and elaborated so that the political scientist

could impose some kind of intellectually fruitful order on the massive

array of seemingly disconnected spatial and temporal events he

confronted while conducting his research. Seen from this perspective,

then, theory was important because it possessed heuristic value; that

is, it provided guidance in the "search for significant data."[10] Or, as

he more directly put it: "It is clear that any given body of <u>details</u> can rise to the dignity of a body of <u>facts</u> only when they bear directly upon definitely formulated theory."[11]

Even in his own early research, Lasswell emphasized the conjunction of theory and empirical inquiry. Admittedly, there were times when he himself veered toward "hyperfactualism." For example, in his first book, <u>Labor Attitudes and Problems</u>, Lasswell approached that form of "brute empiricism" which he repudiated. The book purported to provide an understanding of "the worker" through "an exhaustive survey of all the information available." Therefore it was "necessary to seek facts": "Information in text-books, the ideas of other people, personal observations, newspapers, articles, and a score of other sources exist. The student should be alert to grasp every opportunity."[12] At least on the surface, such an exhortation appeared to approximate that position of unsystematic empiricism which Lasswell had so forcefully criticized and spurned. Yet a perusal of some of his other early works clearly reveals that he understood the logical necessity to wed theory to empirical inquiry. In fact, his own admission that theory was logically prior to investigation was conveyed in some of his first endeavors to grasp and explicate the dynamics of the personality process.

In an effort to comprehend the psychodynamic process, Lasswell urged the adoption of an intellectual standpoint which would increase the probability that information, once uncovered and collated, would be translated into "dependable knowledge." One such theoretical orientation involved an interpretation of individual behavior as a manifestation of various latent tendencies.

Primarily, "the tendency style of speculation," "a type of psychological explanation" Lasswell associated with depth psychology, enabled the observer to manage what would otherwise be an overwhelming array of "phenomena." Specifically, the tendency interpretation of "human behavior" postulated "a relationship between two events, one of which is taken as the terminal situation and the other as an approximation" of that "terminal situation."[13] In Lasswell's mind, such a mode of analysis had been most judiciously applied by Freud; indeed, his psychoanalytic theory proceeded from "a few bold tendency simplifications." According to Lasswell, Freud profitably applied this orientation when, inter alia, he tried to link aberrant and normal sexual behavior to varied sequences of libidinal organization during the central stages of psychosexual development: the oral, anal, phallic and, finally, genital phases of organization.[14]

The benefits to be reaped as a result of the adoption of this attitude, Lasswell surmised, were unmistakably clear. The "tendency simplification" lent a clarity of focus to analysis by providing a framework which directed research and thereby promoted the quest for those "particular aspects of the whole which may be of predictive value." Thus he concluded:

> The principal reason why the tendency style of thinking is useful is that the phenomena which are discernible at any cross-section of the personality are inexhaustible. If the observer tried to enumerate all the body movements, all the electronic gyrations, all the nuances of social adjustment which are thinkable in such a cross-section, he is likely to become lost in aimless classification. Such an observer is quite likely to prove unable to discover hypotheses about the connections between one variable and another. The human mind is able to operate with a very small number of categories with which to introduce order into events, especially when these

are still defined in qualitative terms. Clarity of thought
demands economy in the orienting objects of thought.[15]

As indicated by the foregoing, Lasswell, at a very early stage in
his career, recognized the logical primacy of theory in empirical
inquiry. Clearly, unlike Bryce and the other early realists, he was
aware that only a previously postulated mediating framework could
provide "order," guidance and ultimately criteria of relevance in the
examination of the myriad of events constitutive of phenomenal reality.
Indeed, as his writings on the "tendency style of thinking" underscored,
he believed that without some theoretical orientation which could be
applied to introduce "order into events" the researcher would get "lost"
in the "aimless classification" of "inexhaustible" "phenomena." And
even though much of his early exposition on theoretical frameworks was
primarily intended for those interested in the study of the personality
process, later in his career he devoted no small amount of concern for
demonstrating how various conceptual schema might be applied so as to
sharpen and improve socio-political analysis. Ultimately, the results
he sought were to be something more than the "fragmentary and
non-comparable" findings produced by an earlier "brute empiricism."

Nature of the Political

Cognizant of the basic transformations unfolding within the
discipline, Lasswell anticipated that this new order of political
studies would have to accommodate itself to a more adaptable and
generally more expansive interpretation of its subject matter.
Specifically, he believed a science of politics could not remain
confined to an analysis of the conventionally defined governmental

structures of society. As he saw it, studies which equated the subject

matter of political science with the practices enveloped in formal

governmental structures missed a huge chunk of experience not without

relevance for a realistic analysis of socio-political life.

Determinants of behavior, important socio-economic decisions made

outside the legal framework of society, and a host of other elements,

though not without ramifications for the political process, fell beyond

the pale of inquiry of those who restricted their attention to tangible

institutions. From his perspective, then, this rather parochial concern

for formal institutions produced something of a void in the findings

which had been generated and accumulated. Ultimately, the failure to

traverse the boundaries defined by the formal juristic structures of

society culminated in something less than a true scientific

understanding of politics.

Hominocentric Politics

Basically, Lasswell's demarcation of the field of politics was

distinguished by the rather heavy emphasis given to human behavior as

the primary focus of analysis. Unlike his predecessors who directed

their attention to the mechanics of the institutions of the state,

dealing with the person only incidentally, Lasswell turned his interest

to human behavior. Thus he wrote: "Central throughout are persons and

their acts, not 'governments' and 'states.'" Further, in calling

attention to "persons and their acts" as the "fundamental units of the

political process," Lasswell adopted as a standpoint a perspective he

referred to as "hominocentric politics." According to Lasswell,

> ...as a science it [hominocentric politics] finds it subject
> matter in interpersonal relations, not abstract institutions
> or organizations; and it sees the person as a whole, in all of
> his aspects, not as the embodiment of this or that limited set
> of needs.[16]

Since he aimed to capture "the person as a whole," "in all of his

aspects" as opposed to "the embodiment of this or that limited set of

needs," it was not uncharacteristic for him to emphasize that political

science needed to revivify its concern for "human nature." Such a move,

he noted, had already been given impetus by Graham Wallas. And this

"humanizing and concretizing of political science," of which Wallas'

works were emblematic, was, he conjectured, a resuscitation of a

cardinal interest which drew the attention of many figures who formed

the venerable tradition of political inquiry.[17] Concern for human

nature, he asserted, had long intellectual roots, extending to the

"classical political tradition" where it manifested itself as an abiding

interest in the "connection between individual character and the body

politic."[18] In this regard, for example, he noted that Plato, "in

paragraphs that still astound the reader for their depth and ingenuity,"

provided an "insight into the dynamics of the human soul" that remained

unsurpassed "until Freud penetrated...the lurid depths of the

unconscious and brought to the surface once more 'the state within us.'"

Such "insight," in turn, enabled Plato to delineate a "comprehensive

account" of the "interplay" between "personality" and "constitutional

stability."[19] Similarly, Lasswell thought that Aristotle, though he

"left to one side or softened some of Plato's ideas," also pointed to

the correlation between "character and constitution." Indeed, as

Lasswell observed, it was Aristotle's sensitivity to this

"connection" which prompted him to stress education as the process by which the ruling order could inculcate in its citizens those excellences it presupposed and which, if ignored, would lead to the erosion of the regime's base of support.[20]

Lasswell also acknowledged that this perennial concern of antiquity had found expression in the more modern "classics" of political science. Theorists like Hobbes, for example, had given attention "to matters of psychology." Evolving a theory of politics from an articulated "theory of human nature," Hobbes was emblematic of a tradition of political inquiry which recognized that behavior, including that which was palpably political, was wrapped up with subjective desires and aversions.[21] Thus, in his own way, Hobbes emphasized that a clear understanding of the political arena demanded a corollary concern for the internal psychological springs which actuated human behavior.

Yet even though Hobbes and later writers on politics proceeded from an established body of psychological axioms, Lasswell surmised that much of what passed for their political psychology was inchoate and tendentious. First, he observed that much of their discussion had been conducted in "impersonal terms." Usually ignoring those unique congeries of "thoughts, feelings, and circumstances" which individuated human beings, they failed to provide insight into the personality as "a whole." In general, such writers neglected "direct contact with persons" and more often than not fixed their concentration on "traits" commonly ascribed to the species. As a result, they usually only enunciated theories of human nature which were the equivalent of detached, "impersonal" psychological aphorisms.[22]

Secondly, Lasswell contended that many of these writers only used their axioms of political psychology to buttress narrow partisan or intellectual goals. For them, interest in human nature was an ancillary concern; their primary aim was a self-interested vindication of a specific form of analysis or government. Thus, in several instances, theories of human psychology were only "drawn upon for general propositions about 'aggressiveness' or 'generosity' or some other trait of 'human nature'" for the sake of lending "support" to an "abstract analysis or polemic."[23]

In Lasswell's mind, the "hominocentric" perspective required that political scientists avoid such unbalanced or abridged treatments of human nature. Since it accented the uniqueness and manifold diversity of human existence and behavior, it challenged the scholar to push beyond the provincialism of a tradition of inquiry which dealt with human nature in an abstract and impressionistic way. Psychological inferences colored by partisan predilections and ethnocentric biases would not be tolerated. Rather, "hominocentric politics," because it aimed to take cognizance of the entire person, presupposed an exhaustive, impartial political psychology rooted in an understanding of those complex, even idiosyncratic, needs which actuated human behavior as it appeared in disparate societies.

Though intended to correct the deficiencies of a more parochial, constrictive science of politics, Lasswell's orientation towards the discipline's subject matter posed certain problems. Because it accented an understanding of persons as aggregations of multiple needs existing within a protean configuration marked by evolving interpersonal

relations, "hominocentric politics" obscured the boundaries which

defined the scope of political science. Furthermore, it presented

itself as an amorphous attitude of inquiry. Without further

amplification, the "hominocentric" perspective entailed a terrain of

political research which was, ostensibly, an amalgamation of the

interests of cognate fields of inquiry devoid of an orienting frame of

reference. This state of affairs, therefore, posed a vexing concern:

to justify its continuation as a distinctive field of inquiry and to

provide a structured orientation to research, it was first necessary to

identify and thereby isolate those characteristics of behavior which

constituted the purview of political science. In other words, it was

necessary to clarify the meaning of the "political" so as to establish a

vantage point which could be assumed in the analysis of interpersonal

conduct and which, furthermore, provided a credible argument in support

of a separate science of politics. Lasswell responded to this task by

assessing and explicating alternative conceptions of the political and

the criteria on which they were based.

Defining the Political: Conventionally and Functionally

In Psychopathology and Politics, Lasswell initially confronted the

question as to what was meant by the term "political." There he

observed that social science defined it in two different ways. These

two ways of defining the political, the "institutional" -- later

designated as "conventional" -- and the "functional" methods of

definition, resurface frequently in Lasswell's works. And, as Fred

Greenstein has observed, failure to discriminate between these two

definitions has engendered not a few misconceptions as to what Lasswell had to say about political motivation and the political process.[24]

Each of these definitions was tied to a peculiar conception of government. First, the "conventional" definition of politics was linked to a more traditional understanding which equated government with society's formal legal structures. In this view, the "subject matter" of political science was delimited by those institutions which in everyday parlance were referred to as the organs of government. That is, due to an underlying consensus or else "usage" in a "particular context," certain institutions of society are colloquially referred to as the government; and these structures, including their underlying processes and procedures, "defined" the "subject matter" of a political science which proceeded from the "conventional" stance. From the "conventional" view, then, a science of politics would include on its prospective research agenda things like assemblies, executive offices, and judicial branches. Thus, restricted to "what is called government in local usage," it would remain incurious to practices found, say, in economic or religious organizations.[25]

The other way to define and circumscribe the "subject matter" of political science was, Lasswell averred, to give government and hence politics a "functional" interpretation. Like the "conventional" definition, the "functional" conception of politics was wedded to a certain perspective of government. But it was an understanding which differed sharply from the one underlying the "conventional" view.[26] Government, "functionally speaking," was not just what was designated government "in a particular context." Rather, a "functional" definition

of government and hence politics isolated specific social practices or "functions" as constitutive of government. Thus, from the "functional viewpoint," government could encompass phenomena not "conventionally" designated governmental while excluding formal structures accepted by the community as comprising the institutions of government.[27]

Lasswell believed that a definition of government and politics in terms of "functions" would accommodate a more systematic appraisal of political life. This was due to the fact that a "conventional" understanding of government posed certain analytical difficulties; that is, governments so construed were not always amenable to comparison and study. Governments "conventionally" defined might bear a surface resemblance to one another; but, as Lasswell pointed out, such putative similarities might be formal and superficial. For example, in some societies the "conventional" organs of government might be engaged in activities X and Y; however, in different societies activities X and Y might be performed by institutions outside those "conventionally" designated governmental. A "functional" definition of government and politics, Lasswell suggested, would obviate problems posed by such an occurrence.[28] Like other "functional definitions," it was made to serve "scientific purposes"; therefore it had "in view all social contexts" and it defined terms in a way which suited "comparative" political analysis. In short, it provided a "valid basis" for the identification of those institutions in diverse cultures which were the "proper objects[s]" of study for a scientific study of politics.[29] Hence, as Lasswell saw it, a "functional" characterization facilitated comparability, enhanced inquiry, and furthered science. This, he

believed, stood in marked contrast to the "item-by-item comparison"

found in earlier studies of "government, law, and politics" where,

because "no criteria of comparison were consistently applied to

establish more than formalistic equivalencies among the phenomena

labelled with the same word," the results were "fundamentally

incomplete, even misleading."[30]

Functional Meaning of Government

Given Lasswell's penchant for a "functional" definition of

government and politics, it is necessary, so as to define the basic

thrust of "hominocentric politics," to explore and explicate the

"functional" meaning he ascribed to government and politics. Simply

put, he saw "the function of government" as equivalent to "power."

Therefore, he noted, "government, functionally speaking, comprises the

institutions of power."[31] By implication, then, political science

should focus on the social configurations of power. Consequently, "when

we speak of the science of politics," wrote Lasswell, "we mean the

science of power."[32] Or, as he and Abraham Kaplan put it in Power and

Society: "Political science is concerned with power in general, with

all the forms in which it occurs."[33]

This tendency to equate the institutions of power with government

and to delimit the domain of political science in light of such

characterizations, however, begs the question as to what is actually

meant by "power." An understanding of power, therefore, is necessary to

clarify Lasswell's "functional" perspective of government and politics.

Even though Lasswell believed "power" was probably the "most

fundamental" concept in political science, he also recognized that it

was not an unequivocal term. As he saw it, the term "power" connoted

many different things; indeed, it was covered by a "semantic coat of

many colors, not all of which are symbols of evil portent."[34] This,

however, made it a rather infelicitous concept for the purposes of

scientific inquiry. In his view, such equivocal "symbols" when applied

to the investigation of the political process only created "semantic

confusions" which "interfered with fruitful research." Yet, in the

final analysis, he believed semantic impurity and its consequences could

be avoided: "obscurity, vagueness, and ambiguity are not inherent in

the subject matter of political science; they are inescapable only when

no effort is made to escape them."[35]

Lasswell's concern for an explicit definition of "major terms" or

"symbols" used in inquiry was in no small way responsible for the effort

he gave to an explication of power. Originally, he introduced power as

a subdivision of the more generic concept "influence." Though his

conceptions of the two terms were not without affinities, they were not

wholly indistinguishable. As he saw it, "power" was a distinctive

subclass of the genus "influence." Specifically, it "is comprised under

influence," and it "is a form of influence"; hence, any "form of

influence" may be a "form of power," though it is "not necesarily

such."[36] Consequently, if "power" was seen by Lasswell as nothing more

than a distinctive manifestation of "influence," then an understanding

of influence is logically prior to an analysis of the "symbol" "power."

A. Influence

For Lasswell, "influence" was the equivalent of "value position and

potential." "Values," in turn, were those "situations," "preferred

events," or "relationships" that constituted "objects of

gratification."[37] Thus to say that person X valued object Y was to say

nothing more than "X acts so as to bring about the consummation of Y."[38]

Lasswell believed the predominant values of any community could

only be discovered through observation. Accepting the possibility that

the salience of "values varies from group to group, from person to

person, and from time to time in the history of any culture or

personality," he thought it inadvisable to posit "a priori"

generalizations "concerning the scale of values of all groups and

individuals." Rather, in his estimation the values "operative" in any

society could be "determined only by specific empirical inquiry."[39]

Furthermore, he expected such research could also unveil the relative

worth and aggregate distribution of "operative" values. Consequently,

by "listening to testimony" and "by watching what is done when

opportunity is afforded," he anticipated that it would be possible to

elicit information as to the nature of the values sought; the intensity

with which they were pursued; and, finally, the stratification of

society in terms of such values.[40]

Initially he conceived the "representative" or "available" values

to be "safety, income, and deference."[41] Later he reformulated his list

of "representative" values and also segregated them into two different

groups, namely, "welfare values" and "deference values." Possession of

"welfare values" constituted a "necessary condition" for "physical and

psychical integrity." "Deference values," on the other hand, were

those that involved being taken into "consideration by others."[42] The

four "welfare values" were: (1) well-being (health and safety);

(2) skill (proficiency in any practice); (3) wealth (income); and
(4) enlightenment (knowledge or insight). The four "deference values"
including the following: (1) power (participation in making decisions);
(2) respect (social class); (3) rectitude (morality); and (4) affection
(love, friendship, and sexual intimacy).[43]

Like his earlier inventory of values, Lasswell believed that these
values were not "exhaustive" but rather were "representative." Since
such a listing was not "definitive," it was theoretically possible that
this list, on the basis of empirical investigation, could be modified.
Values, therefore, could be added, eliminated or arranged in different
orders of preference. At the same time, however, he thought that the
"preferred events" he listed, though not always "assigned the same
significance nor held with the same intensity," generally emerged as
goals which actuated human behavior; thus, he wrote, "[i]n some form and
to some degree these values no doubt always play a role, and political
scientists, ancient and modern, have seen in them the element of
invariance which makes a political science possible."[44]

To exemplify this constancy in values, Lasswell pointed to two
different cases. Though in neither instance did he attempt to elucidate
the comparative worth of these values, he nevertheless adverted to these
cases as lending credibility to his contention that they indubitably
"play a role." First, he believed that the values he delineated as
being important were tightly interwoven into the fabric of the American
political tradition. Such values, ensconced in the earliest stages of
this country's heritage, were symbolically confirmed as well as
prescribed in the elliptical phraseology of the timeworn preamble to the

Declaration of Independence.[45] Secondly, though he saw such values

epitomized in the American experience, he also noted that they extended

beyond the contours of the American tradition, forming the basic core of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[46]

Now, as will be recalled, Lasswell defined influence as "value

position and potential." According to his proffered definition, then,

influence was a function of the possession or potential to procure

"welfare" and "deference" values. Moreover, those who acquired or had

the ability to cumulate values were the "influential" or "elite"; the

rest were the "mass" or "rank and file."[47] This social cleavage,

created by an asymmetrical distribution of values and value potential,

furthermore pointed to the interpersonal character of influence.

Lasswell observed that the acquisition, maintenance and exercise of

influence was not an autonomous activity. First, as he construed it,

"value position and potential" and thus influence presupposed

interpersonal situations. Quite simply, the procurement and possession

of these entailed exchange relationships between two or more

individuals. Consummate examples were furnished by "deference values"

which, he observed, "consist in such relations."[48] For instance, take

the value "affection." The value "affection" logically presumes a

relationship between people, since an isolated person could neither

evoke nor be the recipient of the sentiments of "affection." The

possession of "affection," then, depends on someone else to initiate and

sustain the positive, affective response. And this interpersonal facet

is no less manifest in cases of other "deference values" which consisted

"in being taken into consideration (in the acts of others and the

self)."[49] This dimension could also be found in "welfare values." Though ostensibly centered in the individual, these values also involved exchange relationships between persons. "The possession of a value...in general," he noted, "[is] an interpersonal relation; the conduct of persons active in the shaping and distribution of the value is essential to its possession (enjoyment)."[50] Thus, for example, the acquisition of wealth was contingent upon the existence of a pattern of relationships which were instrumental in its accumulation.

In addition, Lasswell discerned a second, analytically separable interpersonal dimension to influence. "Influence," he stated, "is a verb as well as a noun."[51] Having "influence" was an investiture in a "high position" with regard to socially significant values; however, "influence" was "exercised" when an individual, because of his respective value position, affected the behavior of "others than the self." More specifically, "influence is exercised when its possession affects the interpersonal relations of those (other than the self) active in the shaping and enjoyment of the values."[52]

Lasswell furthermore considered the possibility of breaking down this interpersonal "exercise of influence" into two analytically useful components: the "amount" and "base" of influence. The "amount" pertained to the magnitude of the effects of the exercise of influence; the "base" referred to those value conditions which determined the efficacy of such a relation.[53] The "amount of influence," in turn, could be classified according to its "weight," or the "degree" to which the policies of the influenced person were affected; its "domain," or the number of people whose policies were affected; and its "scope," the

kinds of values embodied in the affected policies. The "base," on the other hand, consisted of those values whose possession enabled the possessor to have an impact on the policies of another. Any of the desired values or admixture of those values, he added, could constitute the "base of influence."[54]

In general, the above discussion embodies the core of his attentiveness to influence. Consequently, it defines the more generic class of which power, the criterion which "functionally" defined the institutions of government and thereby narrowed the thrust of the "hominocentric" standpoint, was a part.

B. Power

As was mentioned earlier, Lasswell took "power" to be a "form of influence." Further, insofar as it was held to be a desirable "deference value," its possession allowed for the inclusion in elite circles of society. But, to reiterate, he believed power was not necessarily coterminous with influence. Indeed, influence and elite status could be a function of other values besides or in addition to power. Again, a lot depended on the intensity with which the different values were held and the importance assigned to them by members of various cultures.

Though Lasswell saw power as a subclass of "deference values" and thus influence, he gave it a special significance. For him, it was the peculiar "deference value" which distinguished government, "functionally" construed, from other social institutions. Thus, by implication, it marked the special province of political science. And, as the concept which sharpened the ambit of political science, "power"

was taken to "mean participation in or the ability to participate in the making of important decisions." Stated most concisely, "power is decision-making."[55] Its occurrence in concrete cases, moreover, can be illustrated as follows: "G has power over H with respect to values K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H."[56]

Power, as defined and illustrated above, however, points to the definiens, "decision-making." Thus, since "power" as he conceived it implicates "decision-making," an understanding of the concept "power" must be preceded by an elucidation of what he meant by "decision."

Lasswell saw "decision" as a form of "choice." And "choice," he noted, occurs when an individual or group "has at least the minimum degree of freedom" in the selection of goals and strategies.[57] Not all choices or policies, though, were, "speaking technically," "decisions." For example, he thought that choices "such as buying or selling in a competitive market" were not "true decisions."[58] He believed, rather, that it was "convenient to reserve the word decision" for a special kind of choice or policy. And for him, the differential which separated "decision" from other "choices" was the "expectation" that the "choice would be defended against any challenger (present or prospective) by inflicting extreme deprivations upon him." Understood in this way, then, a decision was simply a "policy" or "choice" which entailed severe privations for anyone who disregarded it.[59]

This threat of deprivation which characterized a decision, however, entailed a condition; namely, deprivations per se did not differentiate decisions from other choices or policies. Rather, integral to his

notion of a decision was the severity of the deprivations invoked.

Therefore it was the stringency of the deprivations which finally fixed

"true decisions" and, as a result, narrowed the conception of power by

theoretically eliminating "an enormous range of relationships in which a

breach is assumed to be of trivial importance." In addition, he

indicated the degree of restrictiveness essential to separate

"decisions" from other choices or policies could not be assessed or

determined a priori, but instead had to be defined in light of empirical

investigation.[60] This was true because deprivation, defined as a

"deterioration" in value position and potential," implicated values.[61]

And, as will be recalled, the presence and relative salience of values

could only be derived empirically. Hence since the severity of a

punitive measure was inextricably wedded to the significance of the

values affected, with the loss of more dearly held values constituting a

harsher deprivation, appeal to a posteriori judgment on this matter was

required. Moreover, one other point worthy of mention is that Lasswell

noted that deprivations need not be restricted to any specific value,

but rather could involve any of the values which composed a society's

value hierarchy. And because "any value" "may be at stake,"

deprivations could theoretically include instances like "when a business

is confiscated (wealth deprivation) or reputations are ruined (respect

deprivations)."[62]

Sanctions, then, could occur with respect to any value, and the

severity of sanctions, correlated with the relative worth of the value

or values implicated, could be discerned once the rank order of values

endemic to any society was revealed. Then and only then would it be

possible to locate the "true decisions" of any society. The impact of
all this can be gleaned from a rudimentary hypothetical account. Let us
assume the existence of two societies, X and Y. Members of X emphasize
"respect" while members of Y stress "income." Members of X, however,
care little for "income," and those of Y de-emphasize the significance
of "respect." The worth of these two values in X and Y is reversed.
Erosion of esteem in X would constitute a serious deprivation; but in Y
it would be a relatively innocuous sanction. In terms of money, the
converse would obtain. Consequently, choices which threaten challengers
of those choices in X with potential or actual losses of "respect" would
be decisions. The same would hold true for choices in Y which were
backed up by threats to "income." An analogous threat to "income" in X
and "respect" in Y, though, would not transform a choice into a
decision. The general upshot, therefore, is that members of X who make
choices backed by the threat of a loss of "respect" for obstructors of
those choices would be making decisions and therefore would be vested
with power. Likewise, the same would hold true in Y if instead of
"respect" "income" was the operative value.

Granted, the entire process is inherently more complex than the
above example purports. More values sought by a multitude of actors
with diverse levels of intensity are more than likely involved.
Society's ordering of values rarely culminates in such a clear-cut
dichotomy. But this example, though admittedly exaggerated, provides a
telling if superficial vignette as to what a decision and thus power
entails.

So construed, "power" pertains to "decisions" and "decision-making." Individuals who shared in choices or made policies which implemented or threatened harsh deprivations against actual or prospective offenders made decisions and thus had power. Conceived as "participation in the making of decisions," Lasswell furthermore observed that "power" was "defined relationally, not as a simple property." As "the making of decisions," power, he averred, "is an interpersonal relation." "It is," put simply, "cue-giving and cue-taking in a continuing spiral of interaction."[63] Disruption of this sequence, therefore, would bring a power relationship to a close. A decision would, at least in the technical sense, cease to be a decision when the policy was disregarded and conformity discontinued. In short, as Lasswell put it: "When statutes lapse into desuetude, they have ceased to be decisions in our sense of the word."[64]

As implied by the above, "those whose acts are affected" by a policy or choice can, "by conformity to or disregard of the policy," "help determine whether it is or is not in fact a decision." Thus to promulgate a policy which involved severe sanctions was a condition necessary but not sufficient to ensure the existence of a decision; for, in addition, compliance to the articulated policy had to ensue. Without such conformity, a decision would not obtain and, by implication, a power relation would not exist. In the final analysis, then, power, as Lasswell construed it, did not simply inhere in individuals. Rather, as he indicated,

> [p]ower is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are empowered... Even a casual inspection of human relations will

convince any competent observer that power is not a brick that
can be lugged from place to place, but a process that vanishes
when the supporting responses cease.[65]

In adverting to the interpersonal dimension undergirding the

possession of power, he also pointed to the interpersonal facet

characteristic of its exercise. When power is employed an individual

impacts on the policies of another by shaping those policies of that

other person through the threat or use of severe sanctions. Thus power

is exercised "if a participant demands certain conduct and 'thinks he

can get away with it' by threatening or actually inflicting severe

deprivations on anyone who deviates."[66] This exposition on the exercise

of power can be formulated in the following way: X exercises power over

Y if and only if X, by invoking or applying severe deprivations,

measured in terms of salience of values, can get Y to change Y's

policies. Seen in this way, the "exercise of power" is nothing but the

application of a "high degree of coerciveness."[67]

So conceived, the use of power consists in affecting and shaping

the policies of others. It is different "from influence in general,"

however, because policies are affected with the help "of (actual or

threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies

intended."[68] Yet even though power does not "necessarily coincide" with

the entire domain of influence exerted by a given action, any exercise

of influence which eventually initiated harsh sanctions could be

"converted into a power relation." And when that occurs, the relation

can be said to be "politicized."[69] Yet even though an influence

relation may in fact be "converted into a power relation," it

nevertheless remains a "form of influence," manifesting itself as "a

special case of the exercise of influence." Therefore, power, though

"comprised under influence," can, like "influence in general," be

classified and analyzed according to its respective amount and base.[70]

First, the amount of power or its magnitude can be specified

according to "weight," "scope," and "domain." The "weight" of the power

of any actor referred to how much impact that individual had on a

decision; the "scope" of power referred to those values affected through

the exercise of power; and, finally, the "domain" of power reflected

those "people affected by its use," the "persons over which power is

exercised."[71]

Secondly, Lasswell pointed to the distinction and ramifications of

the "base of power." In keeping with the logic undergirding his

discussion of the "base of influence," he noted that the "power base"

was that value or set of values which was a condition essential for

participation in any concrete decision. In short, it was that value

whose possession enabled an actor to partake in decision-making.[72] In

addition, he emphasized that the "power base" need not be restricted to

any one value, but rather might be constituted out of any of the

"welfare" or "deference" values or any admixture of such values. "If we

look into the bases on which power has been attained," he observed, "the

theme of diversity is amply supported." Given the right context, then,

a "favorable position with regard to any value" may eventuate in

power.[73]

Mindful of the two dimensions constitutive of any specific

configuration of power, Lasswell admonished others interested in the

phenomenon of power to keep the following in view: the value conditions

necessary for its exercise and the magnitude of the effects engendered by its use, with special attention directed to the "scope" or the actual values implicated. Only then would it be possible to avoid distorting and confusing the conception of power, and thus only then would it be possible to capture "the conditions and consequences of its exercise in various ways."[74]

To recapitulate, Lasswell believed that political science as an "empirical discipline" which focused on "interactions" between persons and groups was especially concerned with the "deference value" power, a "concept" which was "perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science." As he saw it, power was a "form of influence," though it was distinguished from other forms of influence by virtue of the fact that it was a decision, a policy or choice which invoked and applied severe deprivations to those who flouted or failed to comply with an articulated policy. Furthermore, when defined as "participation in the making of decisions," he underscored the interpersonal dimensions inherent to his conception of power. Decisions, he noted, do not obtain when a policy, though promulgated, does not produce the intended "course of action." Rather, they are contingent upon the evocation of certain responses. Consequently, by their actions those who respond to a policy backed up by severe deprivations as specified empower those who make a decision. In addition, he believed that the interpersonal exercise of power could be classified according to its "amount" and "base." Especially important for analysis were "scope" and "base," two axes which could be used to classify and thereby clarify the different manifestations of power in any peculiar socio-cultural setting. Though

in practice several forms of power may be "interdependent," with no one form as "basic to all the others," the introduction of such categories would lend clarity to analysis and thus expedite "inquiry into the conditions and consequences of...[the] exercise [of power]."[75]

Science of Power: Implications

As Lasswell saw it, when government and, by implication, political science were conceived in "functional" terms as power or decision-making, political scientists would be simultaneously liberated and enriched. They would be unencumbered by "any obligation to study the trivial" because it carried the conventional appellation of "government"; furthermore, they would be relieved from strictures which prohibited them "from inquiring into the important because it bears another name."[76] At the same time, they would be enabled to tap that vast reservoir of information collected by cognate fields of inquiry, such as economics, sociology, anthropology and social psychology, which, by virtue of their study of different decision-making processes, contributed to the accretion of knowledge of direct interest to political scientists. Thus he concluded:

> Political science is a _functional_ category, not a _conventional_ one.
> Whoever contributes to our knowledge of the decision process
> contributes to political science. To this extent he functions as a
> political scientist regardless of the conventional label. Another
> implication is that a scholar may carry the conventional label
> "political scientist" without in fact contributing to political
> science.[77]

As implied by the above, political scientists who adopted the "functional" perspective would travel the entire "institutional network of any community," extending their sweep of interests "beyond situations known in a community as 'governmental.'" Indeed, since "the identity of

institutions that exert power [could] only be determined by proper
investigation," political scientists, Lasswell asserted, would be
compelled to conduct an inclusive search of socio-cultural structures,
with their attention directed to "sanctioned choices." They would not
restrict their investigation to the ambit marked by the "county
courthouse," "the state legislature," and "Capitol Hill"; rather, they
would extend their inquiry to "private pressure organizations," to
"business," to "Wall Street," to the "industrial plant" and "local union
headquarters"; finally, their analysis would exhaust other institutions
and processes, pushing their search for "true decisions" so as to bring
within their purview "all the widely ramifying forms of cultural
activity -- religious, fraternal, scientific, educational."[78]

On the surface, at least, Lasswell's conceptualization of
government and politics as power and thus decision-making, since it was
designed to provide a "valid basis for identifying the institutions from
culture to culture which are the proper object of political scientific
study," defined the "scope" of the hominocentric orientation to inquiry
and, furthermore, created an intellectual frame of reference which would
expedite comparative scientific investigation. Moreover, when conceived
as an "empirical discipline" devoted to "the study of the shaping and
sharing of power," it not only dictated that political scientists extend
their analyses to other institutions not conventionally designated as
governmental, but it also invited political scientists to elicit insight
from those cognate fields of inquiry capable of shedding light on the
socio-cultural decision-making processes. Merriam's and his colleagues'
predilection for a working alliance with other disciplines in political

research, then, received expression and even justification in Lasswell's formulation of the concerns and hence range of political science; a science of politics could legitimately seek fertilization and enrichment from the methodologies and research findings accumulated by other fields which, in many cases, had surpassed the conceptual sophistication and inventiveness of political science.

At the same time, even though Lasswell believed political science should fix its attention on social configurations of power, he nonetheless concluded that the reciprocal relationship between power and other values implied that the "scope" of the discipline could never be "shaply differentiated from that of the other social sciences." Thus, observing that "events," unlike the "classical species," "merge into and react with one another," he wrote that the "power process" was, in the final analysis, inseparable from the large social process; it was, quite simply, but one aspect of an "interactive whole." And since an "adequate understanding" of power ultimately could not be derived in "abstraction" from the "other values operative" within the context of society, he suggested that a science of politics would have to demonstrate more than a passing interest in the "perpetual interactions" between the "shaping and sharing of power" and the "shaping and sharing of all the other values."[79] Specifically, as he saw it an "adequate understanding" of power first of all presumed an investigation into how the patterns of influence or value stratification and the corresponding social processes which affected the dispersion of these values conditioned the exercise and distribution of power. Secondly, it required an analysis of how power, in turn, impacted on the acquisition

of such values. Consequently, even after power had been introduced as

an orienting concept, his overall vision of "political analysis"

implied, as he himself sometimes admitted, an analytical perspective

that was tantamount to the "study of changes in the shape and

composition of the value patterns of society." Conceived in this way,

the study of politics was nothing but the "study of influence and the

influential"; indeed, it centered its attention on a "subject matter"

which, as Lasswell put it, "approaches that of the social sciences and

merges with it."[80]

In the final analysis, then, since political science was concerned

with value distribution and influence, with an interest in "all

variables entering significantly into situations and acts" under

consideration, the breadth of the discipline seems to have been pushed

to rather extensive, almost unmanageable proportions. In underscoring

political science's stature as an autonomous discipline, Lasswell

pointed out that "autonomy does not mean that it is independent of the

other social sciences, but rather that it cannot be circumscribed as a

part of any of them." Yet in light of his own admission that political

science was a discipline coextensive with the other social sciences and

which, moreover, took into consideration all "significant variables"

apposite to the "acts dealt with," the question of circumscription seems

to have been subtly reversed.[81]

Naturalistic Political Science

Writers of divergent persuasions in the approach to the study of

political life have frequently underscored the impact of Lasswell's

contribution to the evolution of a more exacting science of politics.

Though much of his own work has since been refined or eclipsed, he has been credited with shaping or foreshadowing much of the methodology, research agenda and vista of political science. Many scholars who have attempted to give reality to the vision of a rigorous, interdisciplinary political science sketched by Merriam and his associates have turned to Lasswell's corpus of writings where, as Heinz Eulau once wrote, "the only persistent and consistent discussion of methodology can be found."[82] The pivotal position he occupied in the discipline's transition to this "new orientation" was also alluded to when Bernard Crick observed that Lasswell "was the pupil who tried the hardest to fulfill his mentor's hopes for scientific studies"; and such a contention was subsequently reaffirmed when Dwaine Marvick wrote that he "was a key figure in the group of young scholars who made their reputations, individually and collectively, by giving effective expression to Charles Merriam's call for a 'new science of politics.'"[83]

Lasswell was not unaware that the peculiar version of a study of politics adumbrated by Merriam would meet natural resistance from the academy. He was, for instance, cognizant that certain corners of the discipline would mount "stout defensive maneuvers and counterattacks." Furthermore, he anticipated that others, having been converted to the "new approach," would, for the sake of expediency or out of lethargy, fail to enter the real laboratory of politics. "There has," he once acknowledged, "always been a struggle within the breast of the scholar between 'to wait and read' and 'to go and see'"; and, he continued, "when the scholar has a lecture room the temptation is to narrow his orbit between the library and the podium, resisting the centrifugal lure

of the great beyond."[84] But in Lasswell's mind the failure to penetrate "the great beyond" would only produce lacunae in political knowledge. He believed such chasms were discernible in much of the conventional literature on politics which defined the benchmark for political research. He noted, for instance, that the "standard treatises" on politics gave scant attention to the impact of "'personal' influences" and thus had little to say about the attributes and formative experiences of a wide array of political leaders. In addition, political biographies, though they shed some light on the underlying personal dimension, neglected or distorted "much of the intimate history of the individual which modern science has come to regard as important."[85]

Lasswell furthermore recognized that the shortcomings endemic to the accumulated findings of political scientists were not simply confined to the lack of attention given to the role of personality in politics. For example, he thought that the study of comparative politics, because it was more or less devoted to a "taxonomy of institutional practices," did little to illuminate how those in the ruling strata of different societies enlisted assorted techniques to dominate and control others for certain purposes. As a result, it was unable to generate information as to how various segments of the population were able to manipulate others and thereby sustain their hegemonic position; moreover, it failed to elucidate the consequences of such relationships, especially insofar as the distribution of social values was implicated.[86]

Politics as "Science"

To rectify these alleged deficiencies, Lasswell espoused a political science which followed the canons of scientific inquiry. He believed that political scientists should observe and describe the conditions and consequences of political behavior with the intention of ultimately uncovering regular sequences of events. Indeed, one of the scientist's goals was to "describe a typical series of events."[87] And so long as the behavioral sciences "conform to the logic common to all science," the political scientist had as one of his aims the discernment and articulation of "rules of naturalistic ('scientific') relationship." Thus, much like the psychiatrist who tried to discover the "causal interconnectedness of mental disease, the political scientist," Lasswell wrote, "searches for the causes of recurring forms of relationship. Such relations are the 'laws' or 'principles' of his science."[88] Consequently, when Lasswell observed that a "science of politics" was concerned with the statement of "conditions," he had in mind "conditions" of a specific variety, namely, behavioral regularities.

Lasswell also anticipated that the political scientist, as an individual whose work is chastened by the scientific pattern of thought, would rely on those laws which summarize past relations to predict the occurrence of analogous future events; indeed, the "scientific mind," he acknowledged, is "preoccupied" with "prediction."[89] In fact, two of his earliest publications underscored the significance he ascribed to prediction. In the previously mentioned study with Atkins, he declared that he sought correlations between "certain typical conditions" and

"certain kinds of methods and policies" so that it would be possible to "predict with some assurance" workers' behavior.[90] And in his consideration of the leadership-constituency dynamic underlying the "'boss system'" orchestrated by John ("Bathouse") Coughlin and Michael ("Hinky Dink") Kenna in Chicago's first ward during the 1920's, he wrote that "one aspect of the task of the systematic student of politics" is to adequately describe behavioral regularities so as "to make prediction useful as a preliminary to control."[91]

These predictions upon which the "scientific mind" was fixed, he believed, were grounded in empirical observation, and they were based on the assumption that those relationships which had been observed in the past would be repeated in the future. At the same time, however, he also acknowledged that any such kind of prognostication could only be proffered as a probabilistic assertion. Because the intervention of an unanticipated event might upset previous relationships and thereby produce wholly novel constellations of interrelated variables, he believed it was "impossible to abolish uncertainty" in future projections.[92] Thus he wrote:

> ...the laws formulated [by the behavioral sciences] at any given time may not continue to hold for future events. Our behavioral knowledge may appear to be partly falsified as a prediction of the future, thanks to the contribution that it makes to insight; the process of insight may shape the sequence in which conduct unfolds through the future.[93]

Consequently, even though political science as well as the other social sciences shared basic assumptions with the natural sciences, they were distinguished from the physical sciences through the existence of the self-fulfilling or self-denying prophecy.[94] Unlike events in the inanimate world, once people are apprised of certain regularities in

their daily behavior they have the capacity to alter or break out of
their previous behavioral patterns. Clearly, this was a "factor" which
Lasswell saw as "absent from predictions about non-human relations."[95]
Consequently, research such as that conducted in the social sciences
could never wholly duplicate the claims and the promises put forth by
the natural sciences. "The laws of society," he wrote, "are not to be
confused with the laws of physics, since the regularities of the social
equilibrium are subject to modification by insight."[96] Thus, for
example, even though the astronomer is firm in his conviction that once
he has plotted and announced to others how the stars "have moved in the
past" that they won't, on the basis of such information, deviate from
their charted courses, the political scientist, "by contrast," needed to
recognize that regularities in human behavior "confirmed by past
observation may be altered as a result of the reporting of this
intelligence." As a consequence of this difference, Lasswell concluded
that the laws of "social relations" formulated by disciplines like
political science should bear a caveat concerning their translation into
predictive statements, namely, that they were "subject to change with
insight."[97]

Even though he recognized that "the laws of society" neither did
nor could be expected to take on the "formidable properties which have
been ascribed to scientific laws," Lasswell nevertheless believed that
the methodology most suited for an understanding of political behavior
was that which was found in the "observational methods of science."[98]
With the exception of a principal methodological distinction entailed by
the existence of self-denying or self-fulfilling predictions, he

believed that the behavioral sciences rested on an epistemological

foundation congruous with that which supported the natural sciences;

indeed, a science of behavior featured a "logic common to all science."

In particular, political scientists in their role as scientists kept

"theory at the center of attention"; moreover, they constructed

theoretical models, confronted them with "observable 'reality'" and,

through the use of "empirical methods," gathered and processed their

data, all of which was done so as to meet their responsibility for

"explaining the phenomena" which engaged their peculiar interest.[99]

"Values" in Inquiry

In coming to grips with the infusion of the scientific style of

thinking in political research, Lasswell underscored the importance of

recognizing the "is--ought" dichotomy as an intellectual cornerstone of

political science. He recognized that existential propositions and

evaluative statements were logically heterogenous and thus needed to be

kept analytically separate. By implication, then, he concluded that

normative assertions or "judgments of value" "cannot be formally

derived" or "deduced" from empirical statements or "propositions of

fact."[100] Thus he reminded his readers to bear in mind that "in recent

decades" "specialists" have emphasized the "intellectual importance of

keeping 'ought' statements distinct from 'is' statements, and especially

of eschewing the error of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is.'"[101]

Lasswell believed that "the behavioral scientist," qua scientist,

was a specialist who endeavored to describe and explicate "human

interactions." Specifically, through the use of various observational

techniques and standpoints, the behavioral scientist aimed to produce

generalizations governing human behavior. Consequently, since he was
"preoccupied with the world of the probable" as opposed to the
"desirable," his skill was used for the discovery and elucidation of
naturalistic relationships, not for the elaboration and justification of
"preferences." "The matter-of-fact role of behavioral scientists,"
Lasswell therefore concluded, did not leave room for "them as scientists
to commit themselves on questions relating to the 'transempirical'
derivation of social values."[102] And when the thrust of this position
was applied to political science, he thought it would be possible to
give "full recognition" to without confusing "two distinct components in
political theory": empirical and evaluative propositions.[103] Thus,
mindful of these "two distinct components," he drew a sharp distinction
between the "science of politics" and the "philosophy of politics."
"The science of politics," he wrote, "states conditions"; the
"philosophy of politics," on the other hand, "justifies preferences."[104]
Seen from this perspective, "political philosophy" formulated "political
doctrine" and included the "logical analysis of both doctrine and
science."[105]

In the final analysis, Lasswell was cognizant that discussions
surrounding political affairs were reflective of the distinction between
facts and values embodied in scientific epistemology. Scientific or
naturalistic propositions were statements of a "science of politics";
evaluative discourse, on the other hand, belonged to the realm of a
"philosophy of politics." And even though he believed both kinds of
statements could be classified as propositions of "political theory," he
admonished his readers to eschew confusion of these logically disparate

"provinces," since failure to distinguish between the two "only does injury to both."[106]

In practice, however, Lasswell did not believe that a "science of politics" remained wholly untainted by valuational considerations. Granted, he acknowledged the differences which separated "propositions of political science," those statements which summarized political behavior, from formulations of "political doctrine," those assertions which elucidated and vindicated "what the state and society ought to be." Yet he also believed that statements of "conditions," though grounded in observation and susceptible to corroboration, were in a sense shaped and determined by the researcher's own valuational dispositions and preferences. That the political scientist's presentation of reality was unmistakably value-laden was a point he recognized very early in his career. In his early study of worker behavior, for example, he admitted that his search for the "facts" was guided by certain evaluative "preconceptions."[107] Some time later, this position was given clearer and more direct expression in a discussion of the "alleged value neutrality of science." There he wrote that it was "untenable to assert that scientific activities are neutral" when even "knowledge," one of the final aims of inquiry, "is itself a valued outcome."[108] Furthermore, in a revealing passage he paused to consider how values impinge on research, focusing on the extent to which science could really be considered as "value-free."

> Part of the connotation of the alleged value neutrality of science is acceptable. Surely the qualified scientist is a participant observer of events who tries to see things as they are. He demands of himself, and of anyone who purports to be a scientist, that he suppresses no relevant fact and that he holds all explanations tentatively, and therefore open to

revision if more adequate explanations are proposed. Such is
the exploratory, antidogmatic ideal image of the man of
knowledge. No matter how utterly sure a scientist may be of
the enduring truth of what he has found, the ideal image
requires him, when challenged, to reopen his mind to possible
change.

The ideal image says nothing about the ordinary passions of
man save that anyone worthy of the name scientist must be able
to struggle with considerable success against jealousy, envy,
bigotry, and any other attitude that interferes with clarity
of perception and judgment. The scientist is not without
passion. On the contrary, he utilizes his loves and hates to
fuel a motor whose results are subject to the continuing
referendum of his peers with regard to empirical validity and
formal elegance.[109]

These congeries of "loves and hates" which animated research

ensured that the political scientist, though interested in curtailing

biases and prejudices through appropriate methods and controls, could

never engage in research divorced from considerations of values and

preferences. In many respects, his position was representative of

Weber's notion of a _Wertfrei_ social science. Like Weber, he believed

that those segments of reality which were placed under the scientific

lens for analysis were generally chosen because of their "value

relevance." He would undoubtedly concur with Weber's assessment that

"the choice of the object of investigation and the extent or depth to

which this investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal

web are determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate the

investigator and his age"; and consequently that, in the final analysis,

there was "no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis of culture."[110]

This, however, should not be taken to mean that the political scientist

was given free rein in investigation; that is, he was not granted an

unlimited discretion which would allow his subjective predilections to

intrude in such a way so that they might distort or vitiate his

findings. Suppression of the facts, or an unrestrained obtrusion of preferences or "dishonest observation or reporting" could not be justified or condoned. Indeed, as he understood it, the scientist need not "sacrifice objectivity in the execution of a project." On the contrary, once the topic of investigation was determined, the scientist was bound to proceed "with maximum objectivity" and was constrained to "use all available methods" at his disposal.[111]

Lasswell, in short, was fully aware that a science of politics could never be wholly objective as long as objectivity was construed to mean complete freedom from an investigator's values. To be sure, he admonished others that violation of the strictures of scientific inquiry with an aim to advance parochial interests was an unwarranted incursion of values in inquiry and thus could not be tolerated. But, as was pointed out, adherence to the procedures governing inquiry did not guarantee immunity to values. In other words, it did not mean that the conclusions elicited by research would not be shaded to some degree by the scholar's subjective propensities. Rather, he believed that values would always be interjected into research, and that scientific generalizations, since they were interlarded with various evaluative presuppositions, would unavoidably bear, at least to some degree, the imprint of the scientist's "loves and hates." Thus, seen from this perspective,

> the functions of the scientist overlap and interact with those
> of the policy maker. As a citizen, as a moral person, the
> scientist has his own preferences, goals, values; and all his
> acts, including his acts of scientific inquiry, are subject to
> self-discipline by moral aims. And these aims, in turn,
> stimulate and fructify his science.[112]

Configurative Method

Lasswell, though aware of the logical disjunction subsisting between normative and empirical propositions, was fully cognizant that all research was conditioned by valuational considerations. He believed, however, that political science could accommodate the political scientist's desire for relevance as informed by his primary value judgments without forcing him to violate his obligations as a scientist. All of this, he anticipated, could be done within the methodological framework of "configurative analysis."[113] The "configurative method of analysis," in effect, provided an intellectual stance which simultaneously "distinguished" the "province of political doctrine" from that of "political science" while it "brought" them "into relation with one another."[114]

The configurative method was initially formulated and applied in World Politics and Personal Insecurity, a psychoanalytically informed work which focused on the dynamics of elite prepotency within the larger historical setting defined by revolutionary movements.[115] This method was to facilitate the "realistic analysis" of politics. Further, though it eschewed an unwarranted incursion of values in inquiry, it gave ample room to the researcher's desire for relevance as conditioned by those "loves and hates" which animated inquiry. And from the days of its inception, it emerged as a fundamental strategy of research in Lasswell's works for the next several decades.

As a mode of inquiry, the configurative method consisted of two conceptual devices which could be enlisted in the study of political phenomena. These two basic concepts he designated equilibrium and

developmental analysis. In addition, the configurative mode of thought

entailed the adoption of two different, though complementary, "attitudes

toward political change," namely, the contemplative and manipulative

standpoints.[116]

Equilibrium and Developmental Analysis

Lasswell believed that the equilibrium and developmental "modes of

analysis" were especially fruitful in that they were supposed to "lead

up to the statement of 'laws' or 'principles.'"[117] Further, since

political scientists were concerned with "changes in situations" as well

as "states of affairs," both of these conceptual devices needed to be

enlisted in the process of inquiry.[118]

A. Equilibrium Analysis

For Lasswell, equilibrium analysis was a heuristic device to be

used in empirical inquiry. Generally speaking, as an analytical

framework it served to highlight the interdependence of a variety of

different variables. As he put it: "From the equilibrium standpoint,

changes in any variable in a total situation involve substitutive

changes among the other variables (including the political variables)."

Consequently, equilibrium analysis attempted to present "change as a

function of a specified list of interacting variables."[119]

Basically, equilibrium analysis presupposed the existence of

interdependent variables. It further assumed that these operative

relationships could be discerned, isolated, and studied. Hence this

form of analysis aimed to sequester systems of interacting variables,

directing investigation to conditions of systemic maintenance as well as

disturbances which led "to a reestablishment of equilibrium or the disruption of the system."[120] In contrast to what Lasswell adverted to as the "'one-factor-one result' pattern of analysis," "a pattern of thinking" which determined "the goal of analysis" to be "the discovery of the necessary factor which determines a given outcome," equilibrium analysis implied a concern for "multiple correlations."[121]

Though Lasswell recognized that the equilibrium pattern of thought had met with spirited resistance from a coterie of scholars, he pointed out that it had been profitably applied in several disparate fields of inquiry, ranging from biology to physiology, "to say nothing of the 'closed systems' of physics"; moreover, it had penetrated "the social sciences as well, for instance in economic analysis."[122] Even Lasswell himself had on several occasions alluded to the significance of such an analytical pattern in the social sciences. In fact, in some of his discussions on the study of the personality he had spelled out in less than ambiguous terms the virtues associated with a systemic analysis of the psychodynamical process. Possibly reacting in part to those psychologists who, though acquainted with the "calculus of variations" appropriate for such a standpoint, neglected to study the interrelated fluctuations of the attributes of the personality induced by the larger environment, Lasswell advocated an approach to personality which generally reflected the equilibrium pattern of thought. Later he advanced the notion that a similar orientation could be engaged in the study of culture. By and large, he anticipated that mutually related "component traits" of different cultures could be discovered and their dynamic equilibria revealed.[123] But probably his most convincing

argument of the merit of the equilibrium pattern of analysis was

reserved for the study of the political realm. For instance, in World

Politics and Personal Insecurity be observed that changes in the

quantity and distribution of values were affected by "overt acts of

conscious striving, like fighting, negotiating, adjudicating,

persuading, boycotting, rewarding, or propagandizing." Such acts,

however, did not occur in a vacuum; rather, they were "modified" by the

peculiar array of "symbols with which they...[were] associated." These

"overt acts" were partially affected by the proliferation of "symbols of

identification" like "nation," "class," and "state." In addition, the

objects of what was sought under the guise of these "identifying

symbols" and the intensity with which they were subsequently pursued

were greatly determined by "demand" symbols like "security" and

"equality" and symbols of "expectation," such as that epitomized by the

proposed swift, inevitable "triumph of the Cross over the Crescent."

Furthermore, the acceptance or rejection of these advanced symbols which

affected these "overt acts" was closely connected to the prevailing

level of insecurity in society. And the "insecurity level," in turn,

was influenced by a variety of other factors, including changes in the

"division of labor," modifications of the "symbolic environment"

presented to the population's "focus of attention," or an alteration of

"the instrumentalities of violence in the environment," such as that

effected by the stationing of armed combat troops in a given area.[124]

In sketching out and engaging this pattern of thought, however,

Lasswell issued a caveat. Though he averred that the "student of

political change" was "constrained" to examine the dynamic

interdependence of such factors, he did not neglect to caution his

readers to avoid ascribing to any peculiar collection of variables an

unalterable sequential pattern of variation.

> There is no implacable sequence running from variations in the
> division of labor (a "material" change) or in the
> instrumentalities of violence or in the symbols cf expression
> to changes in the level of insecurity, the focus of attention,
> the nature of symbolization, or the acts of striving: the
> chain may be snapped or bent by intercurrent factors. Changes
> in the equilibrium which has been attained in any locality
> through a specific time interval may arise from changes in any
> factor.[125]

By itself, however, Lasswell noted that the pattern of thought

embodied in the equilibrium standpoint was insufficient. Focusing as it

did on "systems of equilibrium," this standpoint engendered only time-

bound snapshots of a relatively static political process; hence it did

not illuminate the more extensive dynamics of longitudinal political

change. Quite simply, in concentrating on patterns of interaction at a

separate point in time, equilibrium analysis failed to come to grips

with long-term transitions from one set of patterned interactions to the

next. Yet political science, Lasswell averred, was as much concerned

with developmental patterns as it was with "systems in equilibrium."[126]

Consequently, equilibrium analysis needed to be enlisted in conjuncticn

with a different, supplementary mode of analysis. This other analytical

framework, introduced by Lasswell as developmental analysis, was

designed to provide a more refined insight into the generally more

encompassing patterns of historical change.

B. Developmental Analysis

Primarily, developmental analysis was conceived as a conceptual

device which would lend historical orientation to the equilibrium

pattern of thought. It was, quite simply, applied to gain insight into "the plains, plateaus, and mountain chains of the continent of events comprising past, present, and future." And even though Lasswell acknowledged that "the [configurative] method calls for incessant cross-referencing between developmental and equilibrium terms," a perusal of his discussion of the configurative style of thinking leaves the impression that equilibrium analysis was clearly subordinated to its developmental counterpart.[127]

Developmental analysis, Lasswell affirmed, was directed to "patterns of succession of events." It underscored the "time-bound and space-bound" aspects of political situations, viewing them with reference to the distribution of the principal symbols and practices of political importance.[128] By giving a provisional sketch of the larger historical patterns of political development, this form of analysis allowed the researcher to determine or "estimate" his position in the "manifold of future as well as past events." In short, it provided a "means of orientation in time toward the most significant features of the total configuration of events."[129]

Developmental analysis was a critical tool in research in that it would prudently guide inquiry and the application of the equilibrium standpoint. Ultimately, Lasswell believed that developmental analysis, in providing some coherence to the dynamics of major diachronic political change, supplied the historical vantage necessary for theoretical relevance and accuracy in research. Thus he wrote: "Unless the salient features of the all inclusive whole are discerned, details

will be incorrectly located. Without the symbol of the total context the symbol of details cannot be data."[130]

Since the adequacy of political analysis, in Lasswell's mind, was unavoidably bound to "correct self-orientation" vis-a-vis the "continuum which embraces the past, present and future," it might be beneficial to inquire how the developmental perspective could illuminate those "salient features" of the "historical-prophetic whole." Generally, such an interest leads to the concrete application of this pattern of thought, primarily as it is crystallized in his own discussion of developmental constructs.

The "developmental construct" was the intended culmination of this pattern of thought which sought to throw "the time axis" "into relief." In a certain sense, developmental constructs are "tentative expectations about the course of history"; thus they bring within their purview past, present, and emerging historical patterns. By implication, then, they embody two different historial poles, with one end characterized by words which refer to "past events" and the other distinguished by words of "future events."[131] Stated most concisely, "the developmental construct is a provisional pattern of 'from what--toward what' relationships"; it characterizes "a possible sequence of events running from a selected cross-section of the past to a cross-section of the future."[132]

For a developmental construct, Lasswell took as his touchstone the emergence of the classless society postulated by Marx and Engels. With certain qualifications, he believed that the putative "laws" of socio-political transformation divulged by an analysis of history informed

from the vantage of dialectical materialism cohered to present an

example of a developmental construct. "Marx and Engels," he affirmed,

"remain the progenitors of the most influential hypotheses about the

'from what--toward what' of our historical epoch."[133] And, he would

later add, "their image of our epoch as in transition between capitalism

and socialism," "a sequence alleged to move from the primacy of the

bourgeois class to the classless society (via the proletarian society),"

was the "best publicized approximation to a developmental construct."[134]

Yet as the presence of words like "hypotheses," "alleged," and

"approximation" indicates, there were critical differences which

separated the deterministic account of the inexorable logic of history

offered by Marx and Engels from the more "tentative" version of change

which the developmental construct, as presented by Lasswell, ostensibly

embodied. And it was the existence of these apparent differences and

Lasswell's subsequent attention to them which most clearly revealed the

instrumental purposes of his construct while laying bare the dynamics of

its articulation.

Though sharing certain affinities with the vignette of change

delineated by Marxian dialectical and historical materialism, Lasswell's

version of the developmental construct differed from it markedly on one

substantive point. Orthodox Marxism purports to offer immutable

forecasts about the emergence of the "classless society" which are

"alleged to be justified by scientific validity." A "true construct,"

however, "makes no claim to the status of a scientific proposition,

since it puts forward no generalized hypothesis about invariant

relations among basic factors."[135] "Developmental constructions," he therefore concluded, "are not scientific laws."[136]

Lasswell clearly took exception to orthodox Marxism which, in advancing as "inevitable" the rise of a strictly classless society, apparently claimed to have exorcised unpredictability from its formulation of future developments. For Lasswell, the future was unavoidably indeterminate. At best, events could only be expected to conform to predictions with either a greater or a lesser degree of probability; in a world of contingency, chance could never be wholly eliminated, and human intervention in the course of events, in the shape of the self-fulfilling or self-denying prophecy, could radically upset the anticipated cycle of evolutionary development.[137] On a related note, Lasswell stressed that the "bourgeois-proletariat" construct did not deserve to be ranked as knowledge. Since he believed that the designation "knowledge" could only be applied to phenomena which had been observed, the Marxian formulation of projected though unwitnessed events could not be legitimately considered knowledge. Thus he wrote: "We have knowledge (and laws) only of elapsed events; developmental constructions include selected events of the future as well as the past."[138]

In short, the vision of an ineluctable historical progression to a society unencumbered by class distinctions, Lasswell concluded, was neither scientific nor knowledge. Because such declarations might be integral to propaganda and political mythology, he believed that they might affect the flow of historical events; but, as he consistently maintained, they could not fully capture or explain such events.[139] Yet

he was always careful to add that they were not without heuristic importance. Shorn of their deterministic components and relieved of their scientific pretensions, they epitomized developmental constructs; thus "if we strip such self-serving declarations from a theory of history and lay bare the developmental picture, what remains is the statement of hypotheses that may prove to be helpful guides to judging the period."[140]

Lasswell, then, criticized Marx and Engels for presenting what they claimed to be a "scientific," "inevitable" account of historical evolution. What they really proffered was a "hypothetical" though not unprofitable vision of development. In rejecting their assertions, however, he did not intend that such constructs were wholly devoid of scientific moorings; indeed, in driving home the point that such constructs were "not scientific knowledge" he also emphasized that he did not mean to "imply that available scientific knowledge is irrelevant." Specifically, he believed it would be a "mistake to assert that developmental constructs are undisciplined by historical and scientific knowledge," especially as such information was embodied in trend curves and "scientific propositions" on conditions.[141] But even though he believed that the creation of such constructs was conditioned by the existing body of scientific information, he averred that their formulation entailed something more than the enlistment and mechanical juxtaposition of corroborated knowledge. "The soundness of the result," he remarked, was "an act of creative orientation rather than of automatic projection." The "construct," therefore, "though disciplined by a careful consideration of the past," was, in the final analysis,

"frankly imaginative."[142] In building such a construct, then, knowledge
of prevailing trends and interacting relationships could not be ignored;
but by themselves they would not suffice, for such constructs implicated
creative imagination, trenchant insight and those "loves and hates"
which animated inquiry. In short, the "gradual creation of a sense of
wholeness, and of assurance in the discovery of interdetail connections
within the all-encompassing totality," required "new methods of formal
exposition."[143]

Lasswell's discussion of the articulation of developmental
constructs underscored the dynamic interplay between scientific
rationality and inventiveness, a cross-fertilization which was joined to
value relevance. In formulating such a construct, the researcher was
first of all well-advised to give heed to his own preferred position on
prospective outcomes. He needed, then, to clarify for himself those
things he wished to attain and which more or less stimulated his work.
Once that had been accomplished, the investigator could turn his
attention to a more systematic consideration of trends and conditioning
relationships. "Since trend curves summarize many features of the
past," Lasswell pointed out that "they must be carefully considered in
the preparation of every construct." Furthermore, because the
"correlation analysis of trend curves, coupled with the results of
experiment, may provide us with partial confirmation of many
propositions about social change," he acknowledged that "these results,
too, must be reviewed." Finally, when all such knowledge had been
"exhausted," he thought it only prudent to review other "less organized"
though nonetheless salient "information from expert sources." Thus in

addition to the "disciplined battalions of data" reflected in the
extrapolation of trends and the statement of conditions, it was
necessary to achieve "total exposure" to the "immediate and the recorded
past."[144]

On the basis of all such information which had been placed at the
"disposal of the thinker," he believed that the investigator could weigh
and assess conceivable future developments "considered as an interacting
whole."[145] The result would be "productive insight into the structure
of the whole manifold of events which includes the future as well as the
past."[146] Further, this "insight" into the "structure" of the entire
configuration or manifold of events, seen as an "act of creative
orientation," would be nothing short of a characterization of the epoch
as a movement of one constellation of events to another, in essence, a
developmental construct. And, he believed, as the base of information
continued to improve and expand, the researcher would be constrained to
"subject" the construct "to critical reconsideration." Moving between
the "contemplation of detail" and the "master configuration against
which details are construed," Lasswell noted that "each specific
interpretation is subject to redefinition as the structural
potentialities of the future become actualized in the past and present
of participant observers."[147]

Lasswell furthermore acknowledged that the researcher could evolve
more than one such construct. He believed, for instance, that several
formulations could be derived, though the "rational person" would most
likely "assign exponents of probability" to each one.[148] Consequently,

though all such constructs are tentative, not dogmatic forecasts, not all of them are equally plausible.

Once designed and employed, these developmental constructs, as noted earlier, would provide historical perspective for subsequent inquiry. Possessing knowledge of the past and expectations of the future, the researcher, Lasswell believed, would be well positioned to gather pertinent data and synchronize future observations. Apprised of his position on that larger continuum of past and future events, and thus given "correct orientation" in the "historical-prophetic whole," the scholar would, first of all, be better equipped to engage in a relevant, disciplined study of the past.[149] Such constructs, for example, were designed to bring a focus and "renewed interest in whatever past events are of greatest probable pertinence to the emerging future." Quite possibly, a construct which intimated the rise of a heavily bureaucratized society shorn of free market enterprise might provoke the researcher to consider and probe the past for any such phenomena which might shed some light on the emergence of such a state of affairs. Or, for that matter, it might encourage the investigator to take another, more careful look at earlier cultures and societies which were dominated by a bureaucratic caste; that is, through a consideration of antecedent systems which shared certain affinities with the anticipated course of events, it might be possible to ferret out relevant bits of information, "knowledge" which could provide a better apprehension of the growth and internal dynamics of a heavily bureaucratized polity.[150]

Besides directing research to selected features of the past,
Lasswell also believed that developmental constructs might also be used
to anticipate and thus prepare for a "planned observation of the
future." Thus as conceptual devices which outlined the shape of
probable sequences of events they were instrumental for the "timing of
scientific work."[151]

To recapitulate, developmental constructs were "speculative models"
or "hypotheses" which threw into relief the transition from a "selected
pattern" of past events to a "selected pattern" "imputed to the future."
Though grounded in scientific knowledge and collected information, they
were only tentative, "frankly imaginative" expectations concerning
sequences of development. They were not proffered as inevitable and
scientific propositions of change. Instead, they only highlighted
plausible sequences of development, with certain constructs assigned
greater exponents of probability than others. Their utility, though,
was clear. They were intended to provide historical perspective to
research, that "correct self-orientation" which ensured that "details"
were not "incorrectly located." They offered, therefore, a vantage from
which the information gathered via the more static equilibrium
standpoint could be more appropriately evaluated. Thus, though these
two modes of analysis had, in Lasswell's estimation, previously been so
"superfluously opposed to one another," in his mind they became
"supplementary," subject to "incessant cross-referencing." Just as
"developmental constructs" could be profitably reconsidered in light of
the "richer setting" provided by equilibrium analysis, the juxtaposition
of political variables as a pattern of systemic interaction could be

given significance and thus relevance when placed against the backdrop

of the "master configuration" entertained by the developmental

perspective.[152]

Contemplative and Manipulative Standpoints

The configurative mode of political analysis, Lasswell believed,

also entailed the adoption of two disparate stances toward change: the

contemplative and manipulative attitudes.[153] The use of these two

attitudes, he noted, was especially conducive for bringing the study of

politics in line with the "tradition in which politics and ethics have

always been closely associated" while "giving full recognition to the

existence of two distinct components in political theory," that is, the

normative and empirical.[154] These two "standpoints" toward change,

then, vented a wish for a more rigorous science of politics while paying

tribute to the researcher's preferences which were interlarded in the

conduct of empirical inquiry.[155]

A. Contemplative Attitude

Lasswell affirmed that contemplative analysis aimed to discover and

elaborate "laws" and "principles" which summarize regular patterns of

behavior and political change. In essence, the contemplative standpoint

was preoccupied with the discernment and verification of those "laws" of

interaction which could be used for explanation and prediction. Hence

it sought those "propositions" which express "the existence of

functional co-relations (in the form Y is a function of X)."[156]

In many respects, the contemplative standpoint was simply nothing

more than the application of the _modus operandi_ ordained by the joint

use of the equilibrium and developmental frameworks. Since the

simultaneous enlistment of these two conceptual devices was intended to

eventuate in the "statement of 'laws' or 'principles,'" the

contemplative attitude was but an "objective" approach to reality from

the perspective defined by a continued cross-referencing of equilibrium

and developmental analysis. Consequently, the "two forms of

contemplative analysis" were, Lasswell concluded, "the developmental and

equilibrium."[157]

B. Manipulative Attitude

Lasswell, however, believed that the terminus of contemplative

analysis, namely, the isolation of descriptive, explicatory and

predictive propositions, was, taken by itself, insufficient. He

maintained such action was ancillary to other purposes; it was, quite

simply, but a "preliminary to control."[158] In his estimation, "the

purely contemplative standpoint" neglected the application of research

to meet the "richest potentialities and most pressing needs of society,"

thus ignoring what he thought to be "sound about the emphasis on 'unity

of theory and practice'" embodied in pragmatism and "traditional"

Marxism. To complete his task, the student of scientific politics,

cognizant that the "purport of inquiry is not necessarily 'theoretical'

rather than 'practical,'" needed to adopt the manipulative attitude.[159]

According to Lasswell, the manipulative standpoint toward

political change enlisted " a more active attitude toward the

rearranging of reality," with attention given to the various "ways and

means of obtaining transformations in the familiar patterns of

reality."[160] From the manipulative perspective, inquiry provided

scientifically "warranted" statements on which an individual could rely
so as to "increase the probability of occurrence of a specified state of
affairs." Such statements could be formulated as follows: "To produce
Y (or: To make Y more likely to occur), do X!"[161]

In advocating the adoption of the manipulative attitude, it is
reasonable to assert that Lasswell gave oblique recognition to both the
impact of scientific inquiry, namely insight, and those inescapable
"loves and hates" or "moral aims" which impelled such inquiry.
Logically, insight or the capacity to bring to the level of
consciousness those interdependencies which obtained in the past, by
empowering the human actor to "shape the sequence in which conduct
unfolds in the future," made the manipulative stance a feasible
attitude. In addition, this standpoint accommodated the researcher's
inability to divest himself of those values which animated his inquiry.
The acceptance of the manipulative standpoint, however, did not mean
that Lasswell understood himself to be deprecating the tasks and
purposes of a science of politics. He did not intend that the political
scientist should share in the platform of the insurrectionist. Nor, for
that matter, did he believe that the political scientist should, as
pointed out earlier, be relieved of the mandated strictures of
scientific inquiry. Rather, the manipulative attitude was conceived to
give full expression to the scientist qua citizen or moral person. It
would not be too far off the mark to say that it satisfied his demands
as a person while vivifying him in his capacity as a scientist.

> [The manipulative approach] views events in order to discover
> ways and means of gaining goals. Such a standpoint does not
> necessarily call for overt participation in revolutionary or
> counterrevolutionary, reformist or counterreformist movements,

though it does bring the attitude of the analyst much closer
to that of the agitator-organizer. If events are viewed in
this perspective, a new sense of personal involvement may have
a vitalizing effect upon the thinker when he resumes the
contemplative attitude.[162]

Lasswell's introduction of the manipulative attitude, therefore,

evinced his concern that political inquiry could extend its purview

beyond the discernment of those forces producing socio-political change.

He believed it could have practical import. In fact, he would state his

case more strongly, affirming that the political scientist was

constrained by duty and responsibility to push his interests beyond the

contemplative stance. For, as he pointed out in his presidential

address to the American Political Science Association:

It is not our job to supply the working politician with what
he knows already, namely a bag of electoral and other
manipulative tricks. Our distinctive perspective is not that
of a trickster although we must be familiar with the
trickster's outlook and his repertory if we are to assess the
causes and consequences of his way of doing business for the
decision process as a whole in any context. Nor is our role
limited to reiterating and celebrating the ideal aspirations
of the body politic, and exhibiting how value goals can be
derived from fundamental postulates and principles. It is not
exhausted by reporting historical sequences to be found in the
rise, diffusion and restriction of myth and technique; or even
by the formalization and verification of descriptive models of
a scientific character. Part of our role, as the venerable
metaphor has it, is scanning the horizon of the unfolding
future with a view to defining in advance the probable import
of what is foreseeable for the navigators of the Ship of
State. It is our responsibility to flagellate our minds
toward creativity, toward bringing into the stream of emerging
events conceptions of future strategy that, if adopted, will
increase the probability that ideal aspirations will be more
approximately realized.[163]

Lasswell did not believe that such an attitude was startling or

without precedent. Political scientists, he remarked, had often emerged

as "innovators or critics of policy"; it was a "task" which many found

to be "most congenial."[164] Clearly, this attitude punctuated the

writings of his career. It was evidenced in the formative years of his

scholarly life, an "age" in which, Lasswell observed, it was not unusual

to "think in terms of extending man's conscious control over his

future."[165] In fact, his initial endeavors to explain the mechanics of

propaganda divulged his early concern for the manipulative standpoint.

The study of propaganda, he pointed out, could profitably impact on the

"future of social science," for it would "contrbiute [sic] to an

understanding of the possibilities and limitations of conscious

control."[166] This attitude also permeated his other early works,

extending from his study of worker behavior to his more renowned

psychoanalytically informed works centering on psychopathology in

politics and elite dominion and perpetuation.[167] And, eventually, this

attitude came to dominate much of his later writings which appeared

under the guise of the policy sciences, that is, the "social sciences"

seen from a "manipulative standpoint."[168]

In highlighting the practical policy significance of political

science, then, Lasswell revealed his affinity to that progressive,

pragmatic temper which pervaded and thus marked the circles of early

political science. In many respects, he saw this linkage of empirical

inquiry and policy relevance as a continuation or extension of the ideas

expressed by Dewey and other pragmatists.[169] Thus, infused with a

reformist spirit which animated the writings of political scientists

spanning from Woodrow Wilson to his own mentor, Charles Merriam,

Lasswell distinguished himself from subsequent scholars who, in

championing the "credo of behavioralism," accented the primacy of pure

as opposed to applied scientific theory.[170] Though he unmistakably

sought to advance the development of theory, he never lost sight of the fact that a systematic political science ultimately demonstrated its utility most clearly when it came to the application of knowledge to resolve social problems. In his view, a science of politics was a "problem-solving" activity with a "problem-solving frame of reference."

Robert Booth Fowler, observing that Lasswell's political science conveyed the "resonance" "of the reform-minded social science of the 1930's," a "route" not favored by "most postwar social scientists," remarked that his "status became that of an elder statesman."[171] In terms of accuracy, however, such an assessment is only partially correct. To be sure, much of his work bore the imprint of reformism which characterized the milieu of an earlier academic era; but, more importantly, it also presaged, advanced, and even contributed to the advent of a "post-behavioral revolution," a critical movement originated by some scholars who, though not unsympathetic to a more systematic science of politics, had grown estranged from the fundamental orientation purported by political science behavioralism.[172] In opposition to what was perceived as a restrictive interest in technique and theory development emanating from a foundation of scholarly quiescence, these neo-behavioralists embraced and preached a concern for relevance, policy articulation, and action. And Lasswell's own attempt to integrate the contemplative and manipulative attitudes under the guise of configurative thinking suggested that any similarities between his work and the ostensible interests of others who embarked on a journey to lend policy relevance to inquiry were not simply superficial. Consequently, it would probably be more accurate to conclude, as John

Gunnell did, that even though

> ...some of the work of Lasswell in the 1930s would recede as a
> matter of disciplinary concern,...his behavioral realism, as
> well as his emphasis on science and policy, would make a
> lasting impression on the aspirations of political science as
> a science.[173]

Consequences of the Configurative Attitude

In sum, Lasswell's use of configurative thinking placed him

squarely in that tradition of political science which affirmed that

realistic, empirical inquiry was but a preliminary to control and

reform. Yet embedded in such a notion is a problem concerning the

purposes for which such inquiry would be used. The manipulative

component of the configurative attitude logically engenders

prescription, and prescription, since it implicates norms and purposes,

is not neutral. It entails a prior commitment to certain goals. Thus

Lasswell's own position begs questions concerning the ends and aims for

which such a science of politics would be used. Postponing for now a

consideration of those goals which Lasswell endorsed and believed

desirable to pursue, it seems reasonable to pause and hence give some

reflection to the implications of his position. First, given his own

affirmation that a science of politics conformed to the logic of the

natural sciences and his own acceptance of the logical heterogeneity of

"facts" and "values," were all "moral aims" or "loves and hates" which

stimulated and fructified research equally desirable? Secondly, if some

purposes were deemed more worthy than others, to what extent and in what

way could his vision of a science of politics, as some scholars have

intimated, validate his claims? In conjunction with a sustained

consideration of those ends he thought political science and the policy

sciences should pursue, these kinds of questions will be raised and subsequently addressed.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of the importance of Lasswell's work, see the following: Leo Rosten, "Harold Lasswell: A Memoir," in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. Arnold Rogow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 1-13; Evron Kirkpatrick, "From Past to Present," in Foundation of Political Science, ed. Donald Freeman (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 26; Arnold Rogow, "Preface," in Politics, Personality, and Social Science, pp. vii-x; Bruce Lannes Smith, "The Mystifying Intellectual History of Harold D. Lasswell," in Politics, Personality, and Social Science, pp. 41-105; Daniel Lerner, "Harold Lasswell," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David Sills (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 405-410; Bernard Crick, American Science, pp. 170-209; and Robert Horowitz, "Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell," in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), pp. 225-304.

In addition, several surveys of political scientists and a cursory examination of their work have indicated a deep, quite impressive amount of professional respect for Lasswell's massive contribution to the discipline's growth over the past half century. According to these studies, his stature as a preeminent thinker was established years ago and even now remains uncontested. For example, see Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 63-76; Walter B. Roettger, "Strata and Stability: Reputations of American Political Scientists," PS 11 (Winter 1978), pp. 6-12; and John Robey, "Major Contributors to Public Policy Analysis," Policy Studies Journal 10 (March 1982), pp. 442-447. For additional evidence of the esteem with which Lasswell was held by his peers, see the statements prepared by several of his colleagues for his memorial services at the Yale Law School and at the New York Academy of Sciences, all of which were brought together and published in Harold Dwight Lasswell (New Haven: Yale Law School, 1979). See also Dwaine Marvick, "The Work of Harold D. Lasswell: His Approach, Concerns, and Influence," Political Behavior 2 (1980), pp. 219-229; and Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, "Harold Dwight Lasswell," American Journal of International Law 73 (Oct. 1979), pp. 655-660. For a discussion of Lasswell's relevance for today, see Hayward R. Alker, "An Orwellian Lasswell for 1984," unpublished paper delivered at the APSA convention, August 31, 1984.

2. The following brief account of Lasswell's life and intellectual career has been gleaned from the following sources: Current Biography, 1947 ed. s.v. "Lasswell, Harold Dwight," pp. 375-377; Bruce Lannes Smith, "Mystifying Intellectual History," pp. 41-105; Dwaine Marvick, "Introduction," in Harold D. Lasswell: On Political Sociology, ed. with intro. by Dwaine Marvick (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 1-72; and Derek McDougall, Harold D. Lasswell and The Study of International Relations (New York: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 1-18.

3. For an illuminating discussion of political science training at the University of Chicago during the early decades of this century see "Graduate Study and 'The Chicago School of Politics,'" an interview with Gabriel Almond conducted by Richard Brody and an interview with David Truman conducted by Donald Stokes, in News for Teachers of Political Science (Winter, 1981), pp. 1-11. See also in this regard Barry D. Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), Chapter 8.

4. For instance, see "Afterthoughts: Thirty Years Later," in Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1960), p. 288. This interpersonal perspective in the field of psychiatry was put forth in many of Sullivan's writings. See, for example, Harry Stack Sullivan, "A Note on the Implications of Psychiatry, the Study of Interpersonal Relations, for Investigations in the Social Sciences," American Journal of Sociology 44 (May 1937), pp. 848-861; "Towards a Psychiatry of Peoples," Psychiatry 11 (May 1948), pp. 105-116; and "The Meaning of Anxiety in Psychiatry and in Life," Psychiatry 11 (Feb. 1948), pp. 1-13. See also, Patrick Mullahy, "The Theories of H. S. Sullivan," in The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, ed. Patrick Mullahy (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), pp. 13-59; and Martin Birnbach, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy (Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 57-62, 97-101, 102-107.

5. On Lasswell's appointment to a chair at the Yale Law School, G. E. G. Catlin offer the following observation: "Rumour has it that he owed his post to an admirer who declined to transact business in the Law School until he was appointed." See For God's Sake, Go! (Buckingshamshire: Colin Smythe Limited Gerrards Cross, 1972), pp. 58-59.

6. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. x; and Psychopathology and Politics, p. 45.

7. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 45; Power and Society, p. 10; "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," in The Authoritarian Personality, ed. Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954, reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 20; and "Research in Politics, Government, and Law," in Trends in Social Science, ed. D. A. Ray (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961), p. 42.

8. Power and Society, p. x; "The Comparative Method of James Bryce," in Methods in Social Science: A Case Book, ed. Stuart Rice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 474. That Bryce epitomized such a "brute empiricism" might be reasonably concluded from the following statement: "You may ask: Are we then to study everything in the light of everything else? And, if so, what limit can be set to the investigation? That answer is: No limit. Every political organism, every political force, must be studied in and cannot be understood apart from the environment out of which it has grown.... Not

all the facts of that environment are relevant, but till you have examined them, you cannot pronounce any irrelevant." See "Relationship of Political Science," p. 6.

9. *Psychopathology and Politics*, p. 45.

10. "The Comparative Method of James Bryce," p. 474; and *Power and Society*, p. x.

11. "Research on the Distribution of Symbol Specialists," *Journalism Quarterly* 12 (June 1935), p. 148.

12. *Labor Attitudes and Problems*, pp. 25, 21.

13. See, for example, "The Personality System and Its Substitutive Reactions," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 24 (Jan.-Mar. 1930), pp. 433-440; "Psychoanalytic Interview as a Method of Research on Personalities," *Child's Emotions* (Feb. 1930), pp. 136-157; and *Psychopathology and Politics*, Chapter 12.

14. "The Personality System," pp. 438-439; *Psychopathology and Politics*, pp. 221-222; and "Psychoanalytic Interview," pp. 154-155.

15. "Psychoanalytic Interview," p. 154.

16. *Power and Society*, pp. 1, 3, xxiv. The accent given to interpersonal relations clearly punctuated much of his work. Generally, his interest in the interpersonal context as an analytical frame of reference, an intellectual orientation which, he believed, did much "to prune Freud's legacy of mistakes," was derived from the neo-Freudian school of psychoanalysis. Of special significance for Lasswell on this count was the exposition provided by Harry Stack Sullivan. His indebtedness to Sullivan can be at least partially captured in the following: "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," *Mental Health Publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, ed. Forrest Ray Moulton and Paul O. Kamora, no. 9 (Lancaster, PA: Science Press, 1939), pp. 269-271; "The Policy Orientation," in *Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, ed. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 8; and "Afterthoughts," in *Psychopathology and Politics*, pp. 286-288.

For the importance he ascribed to the interpersonal context see, in addition to the above, "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," in *The State of the Social Sciences*, ed. Leonard White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 93-95; "The Commonwealth of Science," in *Science, Philosophy, and Religion*, ed. Ruth N. Anshem (New York: Harcourt, Brace Inc., 1942), pp. 400-402; "What Psychiatrists and Political Scientists Can Learn from One Another," *Psychiatry* 1 (Feb. 1938), pp. 38-39; *Power and Personality* (New York: Viking Press, 1962), pp. 112-118, 162-164; and "Democratic Character," in *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), pp. 480-483.

For his sensitivity to the impact of industrialization on interpersonal relations see, for instance, Labor Attitudes and Problems.

17. Power and Society, p. 14.

18. Psychoanalytic Conceptions in Political Science," in Psychoanalysis and the Social Process, ed. Jules H. Masserman (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1961), pp. 62-63; "Democratic Character," p. 465; and "Political Constitution and Character," in Harold D. Lasswell: On Political Sociology, pp. 319-323, 334.

19. "Democratic Character," pp. 465-469; and "Political Constitution and Character," pp. 319-323.

20. "Democratic Character," pp. 465-468; "Political Constitution and Character," pp. 319-323; and "Psychoanalytic Conceptions in Political Science," p. 64.

21. "Democratic Character," p. 466; "Political Constitution and Character," pp. 323-324; and Power and Society, p. 14.

22. Power and Society, pp. 13-14.

23. Ibid., p. 14. Lasswell believed that an understanding of politics derived from such incomplete psychological maxims had untoward consequences for the theory and practice of politics. For example, he and Arnold Rogow once attributed the "malfunctioning" of American political institutions to an imprecise, myopic conception of human nature. As a legatee of a Christian heritage which underscored the omnipresence of human frailty and culpability, the American cultural tradition, they maintained, accented man´s more odious characteristics; for "modern liberals and democrats," as much as for the Founding Fathers, the "phrase ´human nature´ conjured up the beast and satyr." Human fallibility, then, was a cultural leitmotif, a theme which punctuated American political discourse. Its salience, they argued, was demonstrated by the almost unequivocal acceptance of Acton´s dictum on the corruptibility of power; such an apothegm emerged as a "mandatory article of faith in the public declarations of men of democratic action," including the "citizen at large" as well as the professional philosophers of democracy. And because most Americans stressed the iniquity of man, believing him to be flawed, even malevolent, they countenanced a political strategy which, by "balancing structure against structure at every level," would restrain transgressions of "authority." Thus to mitigate the effects of human venality, Americans created and perpetuated a government which divided and juxtaposed power. But, as the authors pointed out, this structure, though designed to curb anticipated abuses, in reality spawned incoherent public policy, entailed political stalemate, obfuscated responsibility, and created "administrative anarchy."
The "consequences" produced by the American´s operative political psychology, the authors concluded, were "grave," even "adverse." But, they added, such unpropitious effects could have been eschewed had

Americans been more critical in their outlook on human nature. That is, they averred that the generally accepted understanding of human psychology was dubious and could be reproached. They argued that it was the result of folklore and conjecture, not the culmination of rigorous, empirical research; "even Acton himself," they noted, had not explored "the behavioral context." Consequently, in the rest of their book they set out to examine and ultimately impugn the validity of such ironclad principles of political psychology. Generally, what they found was that man's capacity for evil, folly, and greed could not, as far as history goes, be confirmed; and they argued that in many respects this desire to amass power at the expense of the public weal was more often than not linked to context, "those various factor-combinations in personality and society." See Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell, Power, Corruption, and Rectitude (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

24. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 42. For example, see The Policy Orientation of Political Science (Agra 3, India: University of Patna, 1971), pp. 15-16. In addition, see Fred Greenstein, "Introduction," in Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1930; reprint ed., 1977), pp. xiv-xv.

25. "The Developing Science of Democracy," in The Analysis of Political Behaviour (Hammond, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), pp. 6-7; "The Immediate Future of Research Policy and Method in Political Science," American Political Science Review 45 (March 1951), p. 133; Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, p. 133; and Power and Personality, pp. 13-15.

26. As he once noted: "Many American students had identified their field of investigation as government, but they had failed to distinguish between the meaning of government as a local institution and government as a function of society." See "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 6.

27. "The Developing Science of Democracy," pp. 6-7; Power and Personality, pp. 13-15; and Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 42-48.

28. Power and Personality, pp. 13-14.

29. Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, p. 133; "Psychology and Political Science in the U.S.A.," in Contemporary Political Science: A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching (Paris: UNESCO, 1950), p. 534.

30. "The Future of the Comparative Method," Comparative Politics 1 (Oct. 1968), pp. 8-9.

31. "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 6; and Power and Personality, p. 14.

32. "The Language of Power," in <u>Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics</u>, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, et al. (New York: George Stewart, 1949; reprint ed., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), p. 8.

33. <u>Power and Society</u>, p. 85.

34. <u>Power and Personality</u>, p. 9.

35. <u>Power and Society</u>, p. xix. On this point he quoted Publius, <u>Federalist, No. 31</u>: "The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties." See p. xiv.

36. <u>Power and Society</u>, pp. 77, 84-85.

37. Ibid., pp. 55, 17; "The Policy Orientation," pp. 9-10; and "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," in <u>The Communication of Ideas</u>, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948), p. 43.

38. <u>Power and Society</u>, p. 16.

39. <u>Power and Personality</u>, p. 17; <u>Power and Society</u>, pp. 56-57. In addition, see "The Data of Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences," <u>American Journal of Psychoanalysis</u> 7 (1947), pp. 26-27; and "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," <u>Ethics</u> 67 (April 1957), pp. 3-7.

40. "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," p. 44.

41. <u>World Politics and Personal Insecurity</u>, p. 3; and <u>Who Gets What, When, How</u>, p. 13. See also Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, <u>World Revolutionary Propaganda</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 8. In light of the fact that his lists, including those drafted later, were not intended to be "exhaustive," the phrase "representative values" is probably more accurate than the phrase "available values" which was used in <u>Who Gets What, When, How</u>.

42. "The Data of Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences," p. 26; and <u>Power and Society</u>, pp. 55-56. Commenting on this transformation in his listing of values, Lasswell noted: "In my <u>Politics</u> (1936)...I spoke of safety, income and deference as 'representative' values. Safety can be treated as equivalent to well-being, income to wealth, and deference, if desired, to the sub-divided lists comprising power, respect, affection, rectitude." Curiously enough, he did not even hint at reasons for the inclusion of two new "welfare values," skill and enlightenment. See "Democratic Characater," p. 475.

43. "The Data of Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences," p. 26;
Power and Society, pp. 55-56; Power and Personality, pp. 10-19. For a
more thorough exposition see "Democratic Character," pp. 474-480.

44. Power and Society, p. 56.

45. "The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic
Policy Research," in World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive
Ideological Movements, ed. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), p. 42; "The Public Interest:
Proposing Principles of Content and Procedure," in The Public Interest,
ed. Carl Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), pp. 57-58.

46. The Policy Orientation of Political Science, pp. 45-46; and A
Pre-View of Policy Sciences (New York: American Elsevier, 1971),
pp. 42-43.

47. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 3; and Who Gets
What, When, How, p. 13. On this concept of elite Lasswell was
frequently ambiguous and even inconsistent. In Power and Society he
substituted "elect" for "elite" and divided the mass into "mid-elect"
and "reject," or those with the least influence. Then he reserved
"elite" for the "elect" in terms of power and "mass" for the "mid-elect"
and "reject." This was a deviation from World Politics and Personal
Insecurity and Who Gets What, When, How where he used "elite" as a
synonym for the "elect" and "mass" for the "mid-elect" and "reject."
Other places he used "elite" as a synonym for "elect" would include
World Revolutionary Propaganda, p. 8; and Harold D. Lasswell and Gabriel
Almond, "Aggressive Behavior by Clients Toward Public Relief
Administrators: A Configurative Analysis," American Political Science
Review 28 (August 1934), p. 644. Yet even after the publication of
Power and Society there were numerous instances when he used "elite" and
"mass" as substitutes for "elect," "mid-elect," and "reject." In fact,
this latter trichotomy appears more as an aberration than as a lasting
terminological distinction. For example, in "Introduction: The Study
of Political Elites," in World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in
Coercive Ideological Movements, ed. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), a work published fifteen years
after Power and Society, he observed that, "most simply, the elites are
the influential." He then expressed his recognition that "a great
variety of definitions...have been and doubtless will be given to the
elite category." Consequently, he surmised that "by this time most
scientific observers realize that any single definition for such a key
term as 'elite' is inadequate." To ensure consistency in use, then, he
believed the scholar was obligated to show by "specific indices" what he
"intended in concrete situations." See p. 4.
     In order to somewhat clarify this matter, the author will, whenever
it appears necessary, append the appropriate qualifications to his use
of these concepts. For a more detailed discussion of the problems
associated with this concept, see Merelman's "Harold D. Lasswell's
Political World," pp. 483-486; Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic
Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), Chapter 5; and Heinz

Eulau, "Elite Analysis and Democratic Theory: The Contribution of Harold D. Lasswell," in Elite Recruitment in Democratic Politics, ed. Heinz Eulau and Moshe M. Czudnowski (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 7-28.

48. Power and Society, p. 60.

49. Ibid., pp. 55-60; and "The Data of Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences," p. 26.

50. Power and Society, p. 60.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 71. In his discussion on power and influence, two concepts he treated as synonymous, Herbert Simon discarded "value position and potential" as alternative definitions of influence. In their place he adopted a definitional proposal which equated "influence and power" with Lasswell's notion of the "exercise of influence." See "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," Journal of Politics 15 (November 1953), pp. 500-504.

53. Power and Society, pp. 73, 83-84.

54. Ibid., pp. 73, 83. On those values which constituted the "influence base" he remarked: "Any of the values of influence of which we have spoken may serve as a base of influence...[and] in any given influence relation...there may be several base values; and no one of them is necessarily present in every case." See pp. 83-84.

55. Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest," in Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. 37; and "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 45.

56. Power and Society, p. 75.

57. "Current Studies of the Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity," The Western Political Quarterly 8 (Sept. 1955), p. 381.

58. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 37; "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 45-46; and "Current Studies of the Decision Process," p. 381.

59. "Legal Education and Public Policy," pp. 37-38; "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 46; Power and Society, p. 74; and "The Language of Power," p. 8.

60. Power and Society, p. 74; and Power and Personality, p. 12. "Severity or mildness" of sanctions, he observed, must be defined "in the light cf the entire panorama of relationships which are taken into account." It seems, then, that severity could be determined by arriving

at some notion of the operative public opinion, that is, a "considerable number of those in the community who are acquainted with such circumstances." So as to "exclude deprivational situations of a small consequence," he thought it prudent to specify a "high minimum" of persons "who must share the specified expectations." Power and Personality, p. 13; and "Psychology and Politics in the U.S.A.," p. 534.

61. Power and Society, p. 61.

62. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 46; and Power and Personality, pp. 18-19.

63. Power and Society, pp. 75-76; and Power and Personality, p. 10.

64. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 38.

65. Power and Society, pp. 74-75; and Power and Personality, p. 10.

66. Power and Personality, p. 16.

67. Power and Society, p. 98.

68. Ibid., p. 76.

69. Power and Personality, p. 16.

70. Power and Society, pp. 76, 85; and Power and Personality, p. 18.

71. Power and Society, pp. 76-77; and Power and Personality, p. 18.

72. Power and Society, pp. 83-84.

73. Power and Personality, p. 27; and Power and Society, p. 85.

74. Power and Society, p. 85. Lasswell believed that it was possible to designate various forms of power on the basis of base value and the scope of the values implicated. The result would be 64 different forms of influence or, if severe deprivations ensued, power relationships. Undoubtedly, they were "pure types," since in reality Lasswell acknowledged that they were often interdependent. In fact, he believed that each form of power always involves a number of others to degrees and in ways which must be separately determined, in principle, in each case. See pp. 87, 92-94.

75. Ibid., pp. 93, 94, 95.

76. "The Immediate Future of Research Policy and Method in Political Science," pp. 133-134.

77. The Policy Orientation of Political Science, p. 6. On a related note, Lasswell believed the study of decisions could be expedited by breaking them down into their component parts. To meet that end, he offered a taxonomy of the several different phases of the decision process. These phases included: (1) intelligence; (2) recommendation; (3) prescription; (4) invocation; (5) application; (6) appraisal; and (7) termination. For a more detailed consideration of these, see the following: "The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis," in Politics and Social Life, ed. Nelson Polsby et al. (Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 93-105; A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, pp. 28-30; and The Future of Political Science (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 15-16.

78. Power and Personality, pp. 13-14; "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 38; and "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 45-54. Though Lasswell was by no means clear in his initial formulation of a "functional" conception of politics, noting that "perhaps the governors can be identified by finding who it is who handles the coercion employed in defending or extending communal enterprises, though this criterion may from time to time fail to differentiate," even at this relatively early stage of his career he observed that politics extended beyond "government officials and parties." See Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 43-45.

79. Power and Society, pp. xxiv, xvii. See also The Policy Orientation in Political Science, Chapters 2-3.

80. "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 7; World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 3; and Who Gets What, When, How, p. 13.

81. Power and Society, p. xx. For a general critique of his view of politics as power see Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), pp. 119-124; and Larry Matheny, "Harold D. Lasswell and the Crisis of Liberalism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1969), pp. 45-48.

82. Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," Western Political Quarterly 11 (March 1958), p. 229.

83. Crick, American Science, p. 177; and Marvick, "Introduction," p. 69.

84. "Afterthoughts," p. 270; and "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 5.

85. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 1-3; and "The Study of the Ill as a Method of Reserach into Political Personalities," American Poltical Science Review 23 (Nov. 1929), pp. 996-997.

86. Who Gets What, When, How, p. 8.

87. "The Measurement of Public Opinion," American Political Science Review 25 (May 1931), p. 318.

88. "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," p. 38; and "What Psychiatrists and Political Scientists Can Learn from One Another," p. 34.

89. "The Measurement of Public Opinion," p. 318.

90. Labor Attitudes and Problems, p. 21.

91. "Chicago's Old First Ward," National Municipal Review 12 (March 1923), p. 127.

92. "Psychoanalyse and Socioanalyse," Imago 19 (1933), p. 377; "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 59; World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 13; and "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 34.

93. "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," p. 38.

94. See Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 136-139; and Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 12-14.

95. "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 33-34.

96. "Appraising the Effects of Technology," International Social Science Bulletin 4 (Summer 1952), p. 331.

97. "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 115. As he observed in this regard: "A new respect has arisen for the creativity displayed by the central processes of living forms, and especially for the informational and symbolic systems of human individuals and groups. These become 'intervening variables' that may alter the direction and the pattern of event-sequences." See "From Fragmentation to Configuration," Policy Sciences 2 (Dec. 1971), p. 443; "The Immediate Future of Research Policy and Method in Political Science," p. 140; and "Appraising the Effects of Technology," p. 331.

98. "The Commonwealth of Science," Science, Philosophy and Religion, ed. Ruth N. Anshem (New York: Harcourt, Brace Inc., 1942), pp. 398-405. In Power and Society he acknowledged his own standpoint was in harmony with much of the "thoroughgoing empiricist philosophy of the sciences" which stressed the "importance of relating scientific ideas to materials ultimately accessible to direct observation." See p. xiv. In addition, the selection of essays reprinted in The Analysis of Political Behaviour, which was appropriately subtitled An Empirical Approach, provides a good indication of his commitment to a more objective, scientific approach to the study of politics.

Though behavioralists in political science inquiry rarely evinced a common agreement as to what the specifics of their approach seemed to dictate, they more or less shared the assumption that political behavior

could be most appropriately studied by investigators who enlisted the techniques and outlook of the natural sciences. For example, see the following: Evron Kirkpatrick, "The Behavioral Revolution and Traditional Political Science," in Changing Perspectives in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. Howard Ball and Thomas P. Lauth (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), pp. 77-80; David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 21-25; David B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," in Behavioralism in Political Science, ed. Heinz Eulau (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 39; and Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science," pp. 766-768. In Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1975), John Gunnell argued that the epistemological foundation of behavioralism in political science came directly from the reconstructed version of science as articulated by logical positivism/empiricism. Therefore it gave little attention to science in use. See especially Chapter 1.

99. "Postscript," Who Gets What, When, How, pp. 188, 207, 187. Writing with Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lasswell noted: "The ideal of scientific method is to invent a theoretical model which enables one to predict what one will observe, then to make a critical observation, and to find what one predicted." See The Comparative Study of Symbols (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 64.

100. Power and Society, p. 22; and "The Future of the Comparative Method," p. 11.

101. "Psychoanalytic Conceptions in Political Science," p. 71.

102. "Skill Politics and Skill Revolution," in Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. 133; and "Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," p. 8.

103. Power and Society, p. xiii.

104. Who Gets What, When, How, p. 13.

105. Power and Society, p. xii.

106. Ibid., p. xi.

107. Labor Attitudes and Problems, p. 7. Lasswell argued that it was necessary to divulge those predilections which shaped the course of inquiry. The writer, he argued, must first "expose" himself to himself, and then candidly admit his "preconceptions" so that the reader has a basis for assessing those writings.

108. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 3.

109. Ibid.

110.   Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy,"
in <u>Methodology</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Social</u> <u>Sciences</u>, pp. 84, 72.

111.   "Research in Politics, Government, and Law," p. 28; and "The
Policy Orientation," p. 11.   Weber put this point quite squarely when he
wrote: "In the <u>method</u> of investigation, the guiding 'point of view' is
of great importance for the <u>construction</u> of the conceptual scheme which
will be used in the investigation.   In the mode of their <u>use</u>, however,
the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as
much here as elsewhere.   For scientific truth is precisely what is <u>valid</u>
for all who <u>seek</u> the truth."   See "'Objectivity' in Social Science and
Social Policy," p. 84.

112.   <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, p. xiii.

113.   Ibid.

114.   Ibid., p. xiv.

115.   See especially Chapter 1.

116.   Probably the most lucid and amplified discussion of the
configurative pattern of thinking can be found in <u>World</u> <u>Politics</u> <u>and</u>
<u>Personal</u> <u>Insecurity</u>, Chapter 1; and <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, pp. xi-xix.
Though his consideration of the various components of this mode of
analysis is also scattered elsewhere in his writings, these two works
succinctly and coherently delineate its basic tenets.

117.   <u>World</u> <u>Politics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Personal</u> <u>Insecurity</u>, p. 5.

118.   <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, p. xiv.

119.   "Aggressive Behavior by Clients Toward Public Relief
Administrators: A Configurative Analysis," p. 643; and "Skill Politics
and Skill Revolution," p. 137.

120.   <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, pp. xiv-xv.

121.   "General Framework: Person, Personality, Group, Culture," in
<u>Analysis</u> <u>of</u> <u>Political</u> <u>Behavior</u>, p. 209; and <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, p. xv.

122.   See, for example, "General Framework: Person, Personality,
Group, Culture," p. 209; and <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, p. xv.

123.   "General Framework: Person, Personality, Group, Culture,"
pp. 207-216.   On the application of this framework to the study of
personality, see, for example, "The Personality System," pp. 433-440.

124.   <u>World</u> <u>Politics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Personal</u> <u>Insecurity</u>, pp. 6-7.   The two
major sections of this book provide a consideration of the dynamic
interconnection existing between symbols of identification, demand, and

expectation and conditions of various kinds, including socio-economic, cultural, and personal factors.

125. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

126. Ibid., p. 4; and *Power and Society*, pp. xiv-xv.

127. *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, p. 12; "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 34; and Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," pp. 229-242.

128. *Power and Society*, p. xv; and "Aggressive Behavior by Clients Toward Public Relief Administrators: A Configurative Analysis," p. 644.

129. "Policy Sciences," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David Sills (New York: Free Press, 1969), vol. 12, p. 182; and "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," in *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, ed. S. P. Huntington (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), p. 52.

130. *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, p. 4.

131. *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, p. vi.

132. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 34.

133. "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites," in *Political Decision-Makers*, ed. Dwaine Marvick (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 266.

134. "Policy Sciences," p. 185.

135. Ibid.; and "Policy Orientation," p. 11.

136. *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, p. vi.

137. "Policy Orientation," p. 11.

138. *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, p. vi.

139. Ibid. As Lasswell noted in this regard: "They [Marx and Engels] made a mistake when they confused their developmental construct with a scientific law, imputing to it the 'inevitability' of a proposition that summarizes data of observation. An assertion about the 'inevitability' of future events is fused with scientific or developmental statements. The future cannot be known in advance; it can be estimated in terms of probability." See *Power and Personality*, p. 209.

140. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 34.

141. Ibid.; "Policy Sciences," p. 184; and The Comparative Study of Symbols, pp. 7-8.

142. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 13; and "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," in Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. 147. In addition, see Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," especially pp. 232-236.

143. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 12.

144. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 34; "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 147; and "Policy Sciences," p. 185.

145. "The World Revolutionary Situation," in Totalitarianism, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 360.

146. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 147.

147. "Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure," Inquiry 1 (1958), p. 95; and World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 13.

148. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 146. It appears, however, that at least one of these constructs had to be based on the assumption that no one intervenes to alter and thereby shape the future course of development. See, for example, "Research in Politics, Government, and Law," p. 50.

149. The importance he ascribed to developmental constructs in the scrutiny of elapsed events was given succinct, unequivocal expression when he wrote: "We cannot be right about the past unless we see it against the background of the larger pattern of which it is a constituent part, and this pattern is not directly given to us at a given time, since it includes the future as well as the past. Our quest for sound political analysis is ultimately a search for the symbol of the historical-prophetic whole in which we find ourselves." See "The Strategy of Revolutionary and War Propaganda," in Public Opinion and World Politics, ed. Quincy Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 196.

150. "The Garrison State and Specialists in Violence," p. 157; "Current Studies of the Decision Process," p. 392; and "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 37-38.

151. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," pp. 157, 147; and World Revolutionary Propaganda, p. vii.

152. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, pp. 12, 13.

153. See, for example, _Power_ _and_ _Society_, pp. xi-xiii; _World_ _Politics_ _and_ _Personal_ _Insecurity_, pp. 4-5; and _Who_ _Gets_ _What_, _When_, _How_, pp. 23-24.

154. _Power_ _and_ _Society_, p. xiii.

155. Ibid., p. xii.

156. _World_ _Politics_ _and_ _Personal_ _Insecurity_, p. 5; and _Power_ _and_ _Society_, p. xii.

157. "Skill Politics and Skill Revolution," p. 145.

158. "Chicago's Old First Ward," p. 127.

159. _Power_ _and_ _Society_, pp. xii, xi.

160. _World_ _Politics_ _and_ _Personal_ _Insecurity_, p. 5.

161. _Power_ _and_ _Society_, p. xii.

162. _Who_ _Gets_ _What_, _When_, _How_, p. 24. See also "Postscript," pp. 190-191.

163. "The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom," _American_ _Political_ _Science_ _Review_ 50 (Dec. 1956), p. 966.

164. _The_ _Future_ _of_ _Political_ _Science_, p. 4.

165. "The Function of the Propagandist," _International_ _Journal_ _of_ _Ethics_ 38 (April 1928), p. 268.

166. Ibid.

167. See, for example, _Labor_ _Attitudes_ _and_ _Problems_, Chapter 27; _Psychopathology_ _and_ _Politics_, pp. 173-204; and _World_ _Politics_ _and_ _Personal_ _Insecurity_, pp. 19-20, 181-217.

168. _Power_ _and_ _Society_, p. xii. For instance, see "The Policy Orientation"; _The_ _Policy_ _Orientation_ _of_ _Political_ _Science_; and _A_ _Pre-View_ _of_ _Policy_ _Sciences_. He was, however, quick to add that he did not intend that political science should simply serve the existing configurations of power in society. See, in this regard, "Must Science Serve Political Power," in _Propaganda_ _and_ _Communication_ _in_ _World_ _History_, 3 vols., ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speir (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980), vol. 3, pp. 3-15.

169. "The Policy Orientation," p. 12; and _Power_ _and_ _Society_, p. xii.

170. See David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 7.

171. Robert Booth Fowler, Believing Skeptics, p. 135.

172. In "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review 63 (Dec. 1969), David Easton tersely sums up the characteristics of this peculiar reaction to the behavioral orientation in political science. See pp. 1051-1052. Generally, he held that the "post-behavioral revolution" demanded that political science be more relevant, more humane, more action-oriented, and more concerned with the values which its findings service. Thus it should displace emphasis on technique and pure theory.

173. Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Subfield," p. 10.

CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM

Having examined Lasswell's distinctive approach to a scientific

study of politics, this chapter will focus on the results he derived via

the "contemplative" attitude towards political change. Especially

critical for our purposes here are the implications of his findings for

both the theory and conventional practice of democratic politics. Thus,

bearing that end in mind, this chapter will attempt to show the reasons

why he was such an ardent critic of the traditional procedures and

theory embodied in the politics of democracy.

I

Psychology and Politics

In A Preface to Politics, Walter Lippmann observed that the

focus of political thinking was moving from a "mechanical to a human

center." And this, he concluded, was "the most essential idea in modern

politics."[1] At the same time, however, he indicated that this renewed

concern for human nature was not unproblematic. Political phenomena, he

noted, were inherently complex; thus any attempt to excavate the field

of political psychology required a set of sophisticated analytical

techniques. But in his mind those kinds of tools had not yet been

developed and successfully applied. Hence, notwithstanding the efforts

of people like Graham Wallas, Lippmann concluded that the contemporary

study of political psychology was still too poorly developed to provide

sound information on the role of personality in politics. Moreover, though he looked with favor upon emerging trends in depth psychology, he admonished his readers to recognize that "for the complexities of politics it is not yet ready. It will take time and endless labor for a detailed study in the light of this growing knowledge."[2]

For the most part, when Lippmann wrote his Preface to Politics psychoanalytic psychology had not yet greatly affected the social sciences. Economists, for example, continued to spin their theories around a rational homo economicus.[3] Similarly, experts in industrial and public personnel management underscored the primacy of a calculating, egoistic worker motivated principally by material incentives and extrinsic satisfactions.[4] At the same time, sociologists viewed depth psychology with skepticism.[5] Finally, in political science itself psychoanalysis, though given intermittent attention by more daring scholars like Merriam, received scant consideration as one of the more serious analytical techniques.

Overall, this nascent psychoanalytic perspective made few inroads into the social sciences until the second decade of this century. In particular, the synthesis of politics and psychoanalysis did not really begin to unfold until Lasswell published Psychopathology and Politics in 1930. Though much of what was contained in that work was foreshadowed in a potpourri of previously published articles, Psychopathology and his next major work, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, constitute a historical watershed in the application of the techniques of psychoanalytic psychology to the study of political affairs.

Scientific Biography

Given Lasswell's avowed preference for a "hominocentric politics," his use of the psychopathological approach should not seem anomolous. In line with his more "humanized" perspective, he once observed that a political science shorn of biography was little more than "a form of taxidermy."[6] Though not readily apparent, his use of such a similitude is profoundly suggestive. In practicing his profession, the taxidermist seeks to preserve lifeless skeletal and skin structures. The putative aim of his craft is the restoration of an animal's formal characteristics. In effect, his product is not unlike a work of art. In like manner, the political scientist who delineates structural forms with minimal regard for human behavior develops something which is more like a product of art than science. He does not illuminate the dynamics of politics; rather, what he presents are but detailed sketches of governmental institutions shorn of those human elements which shape, invigorate and give them meaning. As Lasswell put it,

> When the tumultuous life of society is flayed into
> precedents and tanned into principles, the resulting
> abstractions suffer a strange fate. They are grouped and
> regrouped until the resulting mosaic may constitute a logical
> and aesthetic whole which has long ceased to bear any valid
> relation to the original reality.[7]

So that they might be better scientists, Lasswell advised political scientists to eschew taxidermy and become more accomplished biographers. By the same token, he did not intend that they should just peruse antiquated chronicles and narratives. On the contrary, he believed conventional methods of biographical inquiry needed to be augmented by a cluster of diverse research methodologies. This

reflected his own belief that a human life was a culmination of "formative factors of many kinds."[8] Thus, for example, even though he found that persons were conditioned by their "cultural milieu," he admitted they were never "completely defined" by their "culture." Quite simply, in some cases individuals with similar cultural backgrounds behaved quite differently. And, as he saw it, manifestation of incongruous forms of behavior within the same cultural setting might be a function of physiological and anatomical characteristics, neurological processes, physical pathologies and psychopathological syndromes. Hence he conceded that sound biographical work was the product of multi-disciplinary convergence; it was rooted in the "analysis and resynthesis of the significant features of the individual's total history."[9]

Since Lasswell believed that an accurate account of the individual was composed of an understanding of the myriad of diverse forces which impinged on the subject, he admonished biographers who wanted to highlight the "flesh and blood" elements of government to become acquainted with previously ignored fields of inquiry. In fact, in a brief review of personality studies given impetus at the University of Chicago during the first decades of this century, he lauded the efforts of those who scrutinized the socio-political actor from perspectives informed by multiple methodologies.[10] Moreover, writing a year later his own preferences in biographical work appeared as a recommendation which called for the creation of professional institutes devoted to the study of human biography. He felt a consolidation of knowledge and professional skills could elevate the quality of biographical interpretation; and he further concluded that the "development of such a

converging attack" was "imperative" "if the retrospective interpretation

of men's lives ... [was] to be kept abreast of specialized scientific

progress."[11]

Although Lasswell believed that systematic, interdisciplinary

biography was invaluable, he did not intend to convey the impression

that it was tantamount to an inventory of an individual's peculiar

traits and behavior. Rather, for him the quintessential biographical

work was a form of "natural history," a genre which highlighted only

"developmentally significant events." For instance, he pointed out that

a "natural history" of the world did not provide a comprehensive tally

of the multitude of events associated with temporal change; instead, it

only threw into relief epochal changes. Similarly, he believed that

scientific biography should not attempt to record the totality of an

individual's life experiences; rather, as a form of "natural history"

its basic purposes were a discernment of "principal epochs of

development" and the simultaneous identification of their "distinctive

patterns."[12]

Cast as a form of "natural history," scientific biography aimed to

capture and account for those critical, formative phases which marked

people's lives and thereby fitted them to the peculiar roles and

attitudes they would eventually assume. To be sure, Lasswell was aware

that varied propensities in behavior could be attributed to the impact

of different combinations of socio-economic, religious, ethnic and

racial factors. Yet as one who believed cultural forces were not wholly

determinative, he recognized that a research strategy which centered on

"developmentally significant" sociological facts was an inadequate basis

for a scientific biography which aspired to take the shape of a "natural history." As he saw it, such information could not indicate why persons who came from the same families acquired disparate ideological frameworks or resorted to diverse forms of political activity.[13]

To piece together puzzlements like the above, Lasswell acknowledged that something more was required. It was, he believed, instances like these which would demonstrate the significance of scientific biography. Especially important in this regard, he avowed, would be the addition of the tools of psychoanalysis. In essence, he anticipated that the study of individuals through the lens of psychoanalysis would ultimately reveal how different types of personalities were packaged. By focusing on ontogenetic questions and problems, he believed that such studies would provide sharper insight into the reasons as to why a person behaved in the world of politics as he did. Consequently, it should not seem strange that he assigned psychiatric thinking a position of central importance in systematic biographical research.[14]

It was, then, out of recognition of those "personality factors" which led people to "develop an inner bond with one type of role rather than another" that Lasswell turned to the techniques of psychoanalytic psychology.[15] Indeed, it was this matter that sent the student of politics "to the door of the psychiatrist." Hence, even though Lasswell admitted that political scientists were capable of discerning and elucidating the roles which different people assumed in the political realm, he recognized that they were not prepared to correlate roles with specific types of personalities.[16] To achieve that end, they were

"peculiarly dependent" upon the knowledge and "special methods" of the psychiatrist.[17]

The Freudian Contribution

Lasswell conceded that it was precisely at the "point" of role selection by different personality types that he found "Freud's innovations ... [to be] directly applicable to the study of human nature in politics."[18] Freud, he noted, had distinguished himself as an individual who emerged as an "epoch-making contributor of theory, method and data to our knowledge of man."[19] And, specifically as far as Freudian depth psychology was concerned, Lasswell found Freud's use of the insight interview and the "prolonged and complex" observational standpoint it entailed to be the "most abiding contribution" he made to psychology and cognate fields of research.[20] Thus, even though the psychoanalytic interview was initially conceived by "Dr. Freud in connection with treatment of mental disorders," it was soon discovered that it was "capable of wider application."[21]

For Lasswell, this novel "way of using the mind," a "technique of thinking" conventionally referred to as "free fantasy" or "free association," had manifold implications which extended far beyond the confines of the clinic. First, he believed it could be used to bring to conscious awareness those concealed biases or wishes which impaired the cognitive processes of otherwise psychically healthy individuals. Thus he thought scholars, political actors and even citizens could use it for the purpose of lending clarity and impartiality to their judgment.[22] Secondly, he figured social scientists might use it for the sake of augmenting and validating proposed hypotheses of human behavior.[23]

A. Prolonged Insight Interview

In general, Lasswell's characterization of the psychoanalytic interview roughly paralleled that of Freud's.[24] As he understood it, the psychoanalytic standpoint juxtaposed an observer, usually a trained analyst, and a subject. In the "orthodox interview" the analyst remained "passive"; hence the "initiative" was placed in "the hands of the subject."[25] Yet Lasswell acknowledged that even in the "orthodox interview" the therapist was "far from mute," for he took it upon himself to foster the subject's proficiency in self-analysis.[26] In Lasswell's estimation, the analyst met this obligation in several ways. First, the analyst provoked the subject to avow and acknowledge "those "aspects of himself" which, in the more normal course of events, were barred from the path to "full waking awareness." At the same time, he furthered self-inspection by intermittently suggesting plausible "interpretations" as to the unconscious meaning hidden beneath the disparate bits of information produced by the subject. Furthermore, the observer, aware of the subject's temptation to acquiesce to a proposed interpretation for the sake of curtailing an interrogation which evoked psychic discomfort, persistently challenged the adequacy of any accepted explanation.[27] Finally, and somewhat related to this last point, the analyst helped to mitigate anxiety associated with the emergence of disconcerting material in the course of an interview.[28]

As Lasswell envisioned it, then, the analyst served as a kind of intellectual midwife. Though he did not endeavor to implant ideas in the mind of the subject, the observer was "present to prevent the individual from dissipating his energy in musings which are quickly

forgotten."[29] Thus he functioned as a "prod to free associations and a spur to the critical consideration of the material" supplied by the subject.[30] Yet in the final analysis Lasswell admitted that the pivotal position belonged to the subject. Indeed, the ultimate success of this entire procedure was linked to the subject's capacity for self-scrutiny. Especially critical in this regard was the subject's aptitude for the use of the free fantasy technique which Freud had found to be so profitable.

B. "New Technique of Thinking"

In his discussion of this "new way of using the mind," Lasswell juxtaposed free fantasy and logical analysis. "Logic," he noted, "is a guided form of mental operation"; it advances by positing "a starting point," generally an idea which is nothing more than a rather nebulous "indication of the goal to be reached," and it "develops by the criticism of the material which appears in consciousness according to its relevance to the end in view."[31] Free fantasy thinking, on the other hand, encourages an extemporaneous use of the mind; hence it articulates "no specific definition of an objective" which controls and ultimately determines the relevance of material elevated to consciousness. Consequently, the individual who engaged this way of thinking made no effort to obstruct, canalize or soft pedal his thoughts; rather, he allowed his mind ample freedom "to run hither and thither."[32]

As Laswell made clear, free fantasy entails an "attitude of permissiveness." As a "method of self-discovery," the "technique," he wrote, "is to encourage every fantasy and mood to flit across the mind

without undergoing the censorship of a grammarian or a stylist or an ethicist."[33] At the same time, free fantasy thinking, because it ultimately hinges on an imperviousness towards standards, necessarily implicates a controlling principle. It requires a suspension of existing obligations and a corollary commitment to summon forth those psychic remnants which otherwise remain ensconced in the deeper crevices of an individual's own private space. This, according to Freud--with whom Lasswell concurred--was a "fundamental technical rule." And, as Freud took great care to emphasize, the "success" and "duration" of the interview was predicated on a "conscientious adherence" to this "fundamental maxim."[34]

Having sundered those restraints which under more normal conditions shackled his thinking, the subject was poised to embark on that introspective sojourn which constituted the core of the psychoanalytic interview. Occasionally prompted by an insistent analyst, the subject, Lasswell noted, remained "hospitable to everything which germinates in the mind," expending "no effort" to exclude "the trivial, the trite, the embarrassing, the filthy, the nonsensical." Thus the subject, constrained only by "negative efforts to avoid the molds of logic," did not intervene in "the flow of the material" so that it might be uttered as a coherent, fully intelligible whole with relevance for a predetermined end.[35] Furthermore, since he was permitted to dispense with a concern for social propriety, the subject was able to vent those "baudy, disloyal, mean and revengeful thoughts" without fear of "punishment" or ostracism.[36]

Lasswell, however, pointed out that abreaction did not constitute
the terminus of free fantasy. Like Freud, he recognized that the
ultimate aim of the "protracted interview series" was to provide the
subject with insight "into the impulses and the distinctive mechanism of
his own personality." Free-association, then, was enlisted to enlarge
the subject's "area of accurate self-knowledge."[37]

Generally speaking, Lasswell anticipated that the transition from
abreaction to self-knowledge was tinctured with manifold analytical
complexities. This procedure, especially as it was detailed by
Lasswell, implicates multiple acts of interrogation, conjecture and
interpretation. According to Lasswell, this quest for self-knowledge
originated with that potpourri of verbalizations which, as was mentioned
earlier, was unleashed during the course of the interview; and just how
such self-understanding could be gleaned from such expressions can be
more clearly elucidated by considering Lasswell's discussion of the
sequence of events as they unfolded from this initial abreaction.

First, it is important to note that he believed all pesons were
pressured by "more or less active and powerful" unconscious compulsions.
To some extent, such impulses were vestiges of the "Oedipus phase of
growth" inherent to "every personality."[38] Yet he also recognized that
ontogenetic experiences besides those associated with the resolution of
the Oedipus complex could precipitate pathology or destructive impulses.
Especially pertinent in this regard were certain affronts to the ego.
Included here would be rebuffs like the denial of affection and respect
or privation in terms of material benefits or personal rewards.[39]
Lasswell, therefore, found that individuals, "even people of good will,"

were affected by pertinacious yet "largely unconscious legacies,"
namely, the "obsessions and compulsions" emanating from the "unresolved
residues of developmental difficulties."[40]   And such a contention,
moreover, was particularly critical. Just as it had for Freud and other
exponents of psychoanalytic psychology, such a position provided him
with the rationale necessary to use statements of "the words and images"
which "come into the mind at random" for purposes of self-understanding.
He anticipated, in other words, that an extemporaneous verbalization of
thoughts which obtained after the severance of logical and moral
controls would furnish "a host of clues" as to the nature and magnitude
of those otherwise unrecognized past developmental experiences which
persisted in the form of powerful yet unconscious "obsessions and
compulsions." Hence he avowed that the subject, given "interpretative
assistance" by an analyst who helped him "to escape from his private
whirlpool of random communication," was enabled to reconstruct, "bit by
bit," a "subjective history" of his life.[41] The result was that

> ... old sores run anew, smoldering embers of jealousy and lust
> flame once more and ancient wounds yawn again. Reminiscence
> regilds the tapestries of the past and restores to the full
> glare of consciousness the cobwebs of the mind which house the
> spiders of malevolence and lechery. Primitive meanings, once
> appropriate to a situation, and later projected unintentionally
> into the adult world are recovered....[42]

According to Lasswell, this recapitulation of critical phases of
subjective history was penultimate to self-knowledge. Through
interpretation of material produced by abreaction, the subject was well-
positioned to recognize that many of his wishes and desires were but
carefully disguised remnants of his past. Moreover, the understanding
derived by this process provided a means of liberation. The subject, in

effect, was given the opportunity to disentangle himself "from the compulsive domination of many vestigial remains" of his "private" history. Thus, informed of the presence and impact of these "primitive psychological structures," he was vested with the capacity "to free his judgment" from their "distorting effects."[43]

Lasswell, however, recognized that such enhanced self-knowledge and its corollary, liberation, would not come easily. Usually the suspension of the accepted conventions of logical reasoning and the consideration of morally repugnant material quickened a stubborn resistance on the part of the subject. In short, "free association as a path of self-knowledge" was "often slow to get results." "Logical controls" were "released" ever "so gradually," and the offensive nature of the disclosed material only compounded further the problems of reaching self-knowledge, "for humiliating ideas, like skulking dogs, fear the lash"; thus it was necessary to "tread warily to see them all."[44] Yet even though Lasswell admitted this search for self-knowledge would be fraught with difficulties, he nonetheless argued that it was a journey which could not be forsaken. Without this preliminary self-scrutiny all attempts to derive an "objective view of reality" via the "processes of logical thought" were destined to fail. "Hidden meanings" ensconced in an individual's "private" past would continue to emerge and cut across his "ostensible criteria of judgment," thus operating "to bind and cripple the processes of logical thought."[45] People, for instance, would be left unaware as to why their emotions were "aroused" one way as opposed to another when they encountered "individuals of their own or the opposite sex who exhibited certain

traits." Similarly, in the examination of the "phraseology of law,

politics, and culture," they would continue to be burdened with "the

logically irrelevant private meanings which they read into it."[46]

Given the persistence and influence of these "hidden meanings,"

Lasswell avowed that diligence in instruction in the ways of logic was

insufficient. "In the march from the maternity ward through the nursery

school to the university," individuals, he noted, were systematically

treated to huge doses of logic. But, he continued, despite these

vigorous, pedantic "efforts to disseminate logicality," people still

managed to "think very clumsily," and they were "always letting their

prejudices run away with them," "good intentions" notwithstanding.[47]

The putative "limitations" he ascribed to logic, moreover, were not in

his mind simply the result of conjecture but rather were readily

confirmed by experience. As a result of some of his own investigations,

he discovered that some judges, individuals who supposedly were

inculcated with "ways of dealing with the world which subordinated whim

to principle," did not always restrict themselves to the impartial,

deductive process of legal derivation which characterized the

application of articulated rules to peculiar circumstances.[48] Rather,

he concluded that "the way ... judges ... solve the problems with which

they are presented" sometimes "depends ... upon ... the unconscious

(endogenous) factors to which they respond but do not attend."[49] And,

he added, such a contention was also buttressed by "American realists"

who were "cognizant" of the "interplay of unconscious factors in the

judicial process."[50] Elsewhere Lasswell found that administrators,

whose behavior was purportedly structured by a mosaic of rules

articulated for purposes of rationality and equity, were influenced by "unnoted biasses [sic]" which originated "in the earlier history of the person." Indeed, as he and Gabriel Almond discovered in their study of a group of public relief workers in Chicago during the depression years of 1932 and 1933, some administrative officials intermittently deviated from the "explicit set of rules" which allegedly structured conduct. And, after observing that other "possible sources of deviation" like "intimidation," "bribery" and "philosophy of administration" were "not significantly operative," they surmised that "the data" they amassed "vividly" underscored "the play of unconscious motives" in the observed discrepancy between "will and act."[51]

Phenomena such as the foregoing, in Lasswell's estimation, made inescapable the conclusion that logic, as an "isolated technique of using the mind," was "subject to very serious limitations." Palpable deficiencies in reasoning were symptomatic of obtrusive yet veiled mental forces, "a disease which logic" --even if diffused through "homeopathic doses of sermonizing" -- "by itself cannot cure."[52] This, in turn, implied that the mind was made a more effective "instrument for reality testing when both blades," free association as well as logic, were "sharpened." Free fantasy, because it provided salient information about the self, was "on a par with reflective thinking." Further, like the stricter methods of logical analysis it could be "deliberately cultivated"; indeed, until pedagogues grasped the import of "this fundamental proposition" they would continue to graduate prospective leaders, researchers, and citizens mired in their own "self-deception."[53] Given such a stand, it is not too difficult to understand

why Lasswell wanted educators to introduce students to free fantasy.
Clearly, he expected that socio-political leaders could profit from it;
adroitness in the use of such a technique would equip them to exercise
"a more realistic and beneficient form of leadership."[54] In the same
vein, he thought it might "be spread thoughout society"; hence he
anticipated that this "powerful tool of intelligence" might be used to
"diminish the role of caprice" in thinking "throughout society."[55]
Finally, he emphasized that self-scrutiny via free fantasy was
"indispensable" for social research. Because "inferences" about others
might "be warped by animosity or by an unwarranted appreciation of some
'feature, gesture, gait,'" he believed it was just as important for
persons whose business it was to observe and study behavior of people as
it was for political officials to engage that self-analysis which
cleared "the path to the correct appraisal of the other."[56]

As the above discussion indicates, Lasswell took the insight
interview and the novel way of using the mind which it entailed to be a
complex yet serious and profoundly important analytical tool. By way of
the information it produced, it facilitated insight into the unconscious
or "hidden meanings" which, if left undisturbed, vitiated logical
reflection. In a sense, then, it complemented logic and thereby
fostered a more "objective" view or understanding of reality.
Consequently, he expected that all individuals, spanning from the
average citizen to the social scientist and the political official,
could benefit from it. Yet, as was alluded to at the outset of this
discussion, Lasswell was aware that this new way of thinking discovered
by Freud could accommodate purposes besides individual self-

understanding. Like Freud, he thought it could be used to formulate,
test and refine hypotheses of human behavior. More importantly, his own
orientation to the realm of politics bore the imprint of his efforts to
graft this analytical technique onto the existing body of research
tools. In fact, some of his most acclaimed insights and contributions
to the study of politics emerged from his attempt to gauge this method
to the study of political behavior.

C. Application and Objectification of
   the Interview

According to Lasswell, his work in the domain of political
psychology took its bearings from Freud's "distinctive method of
observation" rather than his metapsychology.[57] As he took care to note,
when he set out to write Psychopathology and Politics he concluded that
an excogitation of a "comprehensive" psychoanalytic theory of politics
would be untimely. Thus, though he considered "making a systematic
exposition of the theory of psychoanalysis," with special attentiveness
to its "implications for politics," he deliberately decided against any
such effort because "the theory," as he found it, was in "rapid flux."[58]

Yet even though Lasswell avoided direct application of Freud's
metapsychological principles to the study of political life, such a
decision should not be construed to mean that he found Freud's
theoretical formulations inappropriate for his purposes. Indeed, even a
cursory review of his writings discloses a substantial debt to Freud.
What such a choice does reveal, though, was that he intended his own
work to be more than a simple extension of Freudian orthodoxy.
Important in this regard was his personal acquaintance with professional

analysts who reflected "divers standpoints in psychopathology."[59]
Especially critical here was his rapport with three pivotal figures in
the more sociologically oriented left-wing of the psychoanalytical
school, namely, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm.[60]
The magnitude of their impact on Lasswell can be gleaned from a
consideration of his belief that Freud created something of a cul de sac
when he emphasized the ineluctable tension between man's "biological
impulses" and the dictates of society. As he saw it, this contrariety,
which made it "almost unthinkable to imagine that men ... [could] ever
achieve high levels of enduring gratification," was illusory. Informed
by the cultural school of psychoanalysis which stressed that individuals
were modified by sociological factors and interpersonal relationships,
Lasswell avowed that Freud, by pitting solitary, appetitive man against
society, perpetuated what he thought to be a pessimistic and specious
dichotomy. Hence, "writing as one" who discovered that the
"'sociologizing' of psychoanalysis" extricated Freudian orthodoxy from
its "mistakes," he surmised it was "always a case of 'man in society'
versus (or with) 'men in society.'"[61]

Though the importance of the above will be discussed in greater
detail later, it is significant to note that Lasswell did not
unequivocally endorse that mosaic of suppositions and postulates which
constituted the Freudian system. At the same time, though, since he was
"more impressed by the observational procedures innovated by Freud than
by the theory or its then available results," the limitations of
Freudian orthodoxy which initially dissuaded him from offering a
systematic psychoanalytical interpretation of the basis of politics did

little to abridge his faith in the potential of Freud's technique of
free association.[62] Such confidence in the Freudian modus operandi was
in good measure a consequence of his own belief that "free associative
activity" would eventually remedy the excesses and mistakes of Freud's
psychoanalytical theory.

> So important is the method that the whole theoretical
> superstructure of Freud may some day be modified beyond
> recognition by the cumulative results obtained by making use
> of it. This is the sense in which I believe that
> psychoanalysis carries within itself the 'seeds of its own
> correction.'[63]

Quite clearly, then, though he found some of the theoretical
underpinnings of psychoanalysis to be problematic, Lasswell did not
betray a corresponding skepticism towards its distinctive mode of
observation. He expected that the application of its analytical
perspective would eventually deepen political scientists' understanding
of human nature, especially as it impacted on the political arena.
Thus it was with this in mind that he indicated his "primary purpose"
was to disseminate "provisional findings" elicited by the
"psychoanalytic method" for the sake of alerting his "political science
audience" to the "challenge" and potential of this "standpoint for the
study of human nature."[64]

Though confident of the benefits to be derived via the application
of such a standpoint, Lasswell was cognizant that it posed certain
difficulties which needed to be addressed. He believed, first of all,
it was necessary to cultivate an attitude in the discipline which was
predisposed to receive and work with the "unconventional" material
evoked by this technique. Secondly, he acknowledged that this method

needed to be refined and adjusted to meet the extensive needs and
scientific canons of political science.

With respect to the first point, Lasswell pointed out that some of
his earliest work, though "admittedly incomplete," was gauged to create
a tolerance for the aggregations of facts elicited through the technique
of free fantasy. Many of these findings, he wrote, were "not pretty,"
and they certainly were not suitable "topics for polite conversation."
Yet, he continued, "science" cannot be restricted to "the conventional."
For instance, he observed that "medical scientists" did not confine
their inquiry to the commonplace and inoffensive, since on certain
occasions their efforts to understand health and diagnose disease led
them "to dabble with the excretions of the human body." Political
scientists, likewise, had their own form of scatology; and, if they
wanted their discipline "to become more of a reality and less of a
pseudonym," Lasswell believed that they were obligated to deal
"objectively with every kind of fact," including disconcerting material
generated by free associative activity.[65] It was out of a regard for
both the importance of such facts and a concomitant professional
squeamishness which would most likely impede their acceptance that
Lasswell chose to publish his "provisional findings." Hence one of the
"positive advantages" of his own early work was the familiarization of
"professional students of government" with this novel observational
standpoint so that they would be better equipped to understand its
implications and appreciate its results.[66]

To be sure, the effort to cultivate a mindset which could be at
ease with such intensive interrogation and analysis was no small task;

but when such an endeavor was set against the more nettlesome
methodological problems entailed by the implementation of this technique
on a rather grand scale, its difficulty was greatly overshadowed.
Specifically, for the psychoanalytic technique to be of any value to
those concerned with extensive socio-political inquiry, it had to be
anchored in a solidly scientific foundation. Thus what was required
was the systematic collection of accurate, observable and objective
information which could be intersubjectively transmitted and
corroborated. Moreover, so as to realize the full potential of this
method, it was necessary to consider how such studies could amplify or
bring clarity to the generalizations sought by a science of politics.

In regard to the objectification and communicability of
psychoanalytic research, it should be noted that even during the
earliest stages of his career Lasswell adverted to inadequancies in
procedures for collecting and recording data uncovered in the context of
the psychoanalytic interview. "Very few efforts," he observed, had been
taken "to objectify the events" which elapsed during the course of an
interview. This, in turn, forced a "very large measure of confidence"
in the "discretion" of psychoanalysts. Furthermore, although he
admitted he did not mean to "imply" that the "breadth of this discretion
had been abused," he concluded that research into the dynamics of the
personality was "chiefly hampered" by psychoanalytic records which were
in a "very fragmentary and unsatisfactory state."[67] And, as he later
suggested, this dearth of uniform standards in the collection and
reporting of psychodynamic and physiological data retarded the

development, testing and modification of hypotheses related to an understanding of the processes of personality.[68]

Quite clearly, Lasswell recognized that deficiencies in the collection, storage and retrieval of data evoked through the insight interview depreciated its analytical utility. Hence even though he found the technique to be "especially well-adapted to the objective approach" common to American social science, primarily since the analyst was provided the opportunity "to make repeated observations of the behavior of subjects under comparatively stable conditions," he surmised that "this advantage" was vitiated and thus "lost to science insofar" as it was based on "methods of observing and reporting" which were "defective."[69] And it was with the foregoing in mind that Lasswell returned from his rendezvous with European psychoanalytic theorists "in 1929 fully confident of the importance of ´objectifying´" the psychoanalytic interview. In fact, so strong was this conviction that it received expression in a series of articles he published during the succeeding decade.[70]

As these articles indicate, Lasswell found the accumulation of comprehensive and accurate dialogical and physiological information as it emerged in the context of the analytical situation to be of special pertinence for the objectification of the interview. First, he emphasized the importance of acquiring verbatim transcripts of interviews. Derived by an unobtrusive stenographer or mechanical recording device, such documents precluded subjective excision or distortion frequently associated with a total reliance on the analyst´s reconstruction of what transpired during the interview. At the same

time, though he considered the "verbatim transcript of the interview" to be
"one of the most valuable contributions to an objective record," he was
aware that the value of these transcripts was negated unless a corollary
effort was undertaken to reduce the "vagueness" which appeared in the
comparison of recorded "symbolic productions" gleaned from disparate
interviews. Thus he lamented: "We may have verbatim records of all
that was said in the interview, but we have no common language for
comparing these transcripts with other transcripts."[71] As a consequence
of the recognition that researchers lacked a medium suitable for the
intersubjective exchange of their findings, Lasswell articulated
provisional classificatory schema which could be used to categorize
diverse verbal responses obtained in the interview. Though the peculiar
typologies he proposed remain beyond our purview here, it is important
to note that he believed it "possible to set up categories for the
comparison of words," with "the ideal" being nothing short of "the
discovery of ways of summarizing symbol data which will approximate the
exactness with which movements can be described." And such a
development, in turn, would facilitate an "orderly comparison" of
interview information.[72]

Even though Lasswell expected comparable verbatim accounts would
contribute to the objectification of the interview, he nonetheless
admonished his readers to recognize that such transcripts did not
include all "possible and useful information." For instance, they
excluded physiological responses which could amplify the interview
record. As he noted, "empirical phenomena" such as autonomic reactions
were signals to the subject's psychodynamic equilibrium; they were the

"externals" which made the "occurrence" of an isolated subjective state "clearly communicable to others." He observed that the "experienced interviewer" relied on "certain cues," rather "minute variations" in behavior, to assess his subject's "tension level." But, he added, it was frequently difficult to determine with precision the significance the interviewer ascribed to such "externals." Thus, if "interviewing" methods were to be given a "more communicable basis," these "cues" needed to be made more "explicit." This meant that physiological "cues" needed to be correlated with underlying psychodynamic shifts and submitted to some form of measurement which could be replicated and thus intersubjectively understood.[73] The "problem" for observers, like other social scientists "compelled to rely" on their "eyes," was to "standardize" their observations "so that objective results can be secured."[74]

It was with the above in mind that Lasswell, working in conjunction with, inter alios, Chester Darrow, a pioneer in psycho-physiology, conducted a set of experiments which enlisted mechanical devices to record the somatic correlates of the transition from unconscious tension to conscious affect. What he discovered was that certain patterned physiological responses were linked with disparate levels of unconscious tension and conscious affect. And this, in turn, left him convinced that a sustained effort to link terms of the psychoanalytic interview to concrete empirical indices would culminate in a professional dialogue disembarrassed of ambiguity. Quite simply, empirical grounding would inject greater specificity and clarity into communications and records; hence it would contribute to the articulation of that "common language"

which future comparative studies and scientific advancement presupposed.
As he suggested in this regard, eventually it would be feasible to
"validate the saying of the old physician ...: 'From him who has eyes to
see and ears to hear no mortal can hide his secret; he whose lips are
silent chatters with his fingertips and betrays himself through all his
pores.'"[75]

In short, Laswell harbored little doubt that the "prolonged
interview" could be standardized and thus applied to inquiry in a more
objective and systematic manner. He expected that if the appropriate
steps were taken the psychoanalytic method of analysis provided the
researcher with an analytically rigorous probe which could be used to
explore the event sequence of the "multi-personal manifold" within any
peculiar "time-space configuration."[76] At the same time, though, he
recognized that the highly concentrated observational point entailed by
the "interview situation" provided but a constricted view of the larger
"personality-culture manifold." Hence it needed to be joined to less
protracted, more "extensive techniques" of inquiry.

To clarify the above, it is first important to note that Lasswell
found the "thorny problem" of the "relation between research and the
individual and research upon society" to be based on a "fictitious
cleavage." As he saw it, inquiry into the "personality-culture
manifold" could not be segregated into two discrete, hermetically sealed
categories. Rather, he observed that

> it is evident that there are several different though
> interrelated starting points for exploring the manifold of
> events which comprise personality and culture.... Each set
> of observations is potentially related to those which are
> made from any other starting point. ... No matter what our
> point of departure, we may illuminate the entire manifold of

events, if we bring all of our data into the proper
interrelationship.[77]

Now, as he saw it, this "infinitely large number" of standpoints

formed a continuum, a "continuous gradation" whose two different poles

were distinguished according to "time relations" with the subject and

the complexity of the method used to record and process data.

Understandably, the psychoanalytic interview was the "most intensive

technique of observation." Therefore at the opposite end of the

spectrum the standpoints were more "cursory and simple." Included

there, he noted, were the sweeping, superficial starting points

implicated in the more orthodox patterns of macro-sociological research

reflected in the works of people like Marx, Engels, Robert Michels and

many of those currently engaged in survey research. Furthermore, he

added that between these two starting points was a medley of other

observational standpoints of varying magnitudes of intensity.[78]

In pointing out that the constellation of events could be viewed

from either extensive or intensive perspectives, however, Lasswell did

not intend to purport that these starting points were irreconcilable.

On the contrary, they existed in a "fruitful dialectical relationship."

It is a question solely of expediency and not of principle
whether the total configuration is approached extensively
or intensively by the individual observer, since either
starting point draws the investigator toward the opposite.
Indeed, the shift from extensive to intensive technique, and
back again, promises to add great fruitfulness to the modern
analysis of human relationships.[79]

In fact, not only did Lasswell point to the analytical "fruitfulness"

promised by the "correlative," dialectical use of diverse standpoints,

but he also cautioned that an excessive reliance on one perspective at

the expense of others would furnish only a truncated understanding of

the "personality-culture manifold." For instance, he observed that Marx and Engels, since they approached the configuration of events through "extensive means," failed to apprehend the full import of the "dialectics of personality" layered beneath the "facades of the class and skill struggle." And this neglect of the complex, diverse oscillations in the psychological factors intertwined in the transformation of the economic superstructure was in no small way responsible for the "errors" imputed to the seers of "imminent revolution."[80] Similarly, he believed that analogous flaws marred many other socio-political and ethnological studies conducted from more extensive observational stances. And, he subsequently pointed out, it was only with the advent of the psychoanalytic interview that these "previously ignored" "aspects of situations" were finally "brought to the notice of observers."[81] At the same time, however, he was not incognizant of the problems of studies which accented the primacy of the starting point entailed by the interview situation. He was aware that obvious constraints made it "impracticable" to apply the interrogation of the psychoanalytic interview to sufficient aggregations of individuals. In fact, it was not always feasible to "psychoanalyze" "even representative persons" of a "given group." Thus he affirmed the importance of supplementing this standpoint with more extensive techniques. Since he figured observations elicited via the protracted interview could be translated into observational "terms" associated with more extensive perspectives, he expected that extensive methods could be used to ascertain the overall distribution of details otherwise disclosed by intensive techniques. This "calibration" of standpoints,

in turn, would provide a way to circumvent the otherwise idiosyncratic results which such an intensive observational stance normally implied and it would, furthermore, provide additional illumination of a larger context of events.[82]

As the foregoing indicates, then, Lasswell stressed the complementarity of intensive and extensive observational standpoints in inquiry. The interview situation, once it was placed on firmer scientific footing, could be used in conjunction with more extensive techniques of observation. The juxtaposition of these observational standpoints, he surmised, would provide a more accomplished understanding of the "event manifold" under consideration. And, in Lasswell's case, it was the dialectical interplay of intensive and extensive perspectives within the equilibrium and developmental analytical frameworks of configurative thinking which led him to produce one of the most savage critiques of liberal democratic practices current in the American regime.

II

Political Psychology: The Intensive Perspective

Although Lasswell once confessed that he had "always kept one or two politicians in analysis all during their professional life," it was primarily during the earlier part of his career that he applied the techniques of the "psychoanalytic couch" to selected individuals.[83] Some of his early findings were portrayed in Psychopathology and Politics. Unfortunately, much of his clinical evidence was destroyed in a traffic accident and thus was never made available for public

consumption. Futhermore, his subsequent involvement with the War

Communications Research Division diverted his attention away from

intensive analysis and curtailed his efforts to increase the

accessibility of clinical data.[84] Thus, with the exception of _Power and_

Personality, which was published in 1948, Lasswell never directly turned

his attention back to the dissemination of material gleaned from

intensive interviews.

Initially, Lasswell suggested his application of the

psychopathological method was suited to scientific biography and its

distinctive product, "natural history." His aim was to unveil the

"significant" "developmental experiences" of those who appeared on the

"public stage." Moreover, he purported to show how "intensive

investigation" could "deepen" and enrich the "understanding" of events

as they transpired in the socio-political arena.[85]

Homo Politicus: The Construct

In his discussion of the use of "intensive investigation" in the

study of politics, Lasswell first set out to articulate a workable

"model" of _homo politicus_. The construct was built from clinical

evidence as well as other "personality models" elaborated by

psychologists. In addition, for the sake of greater refinement he

introduced a set of "subsidiary models" which, he believed, highlighted

the species distinctions encompassed within the genus of _homo_

politicus.[86]

For Lasswell, this model had heuristic import; hence, it could "be

used to guide research." Yet it was more than a "speculative"

construct. As he saw it, the model brought together the "data of

history, social science, psychology and medicine," and it had also been
"confirmed" by what was known about many "outstanding figures in the
history of political life." Furthermore, he always held open the
possibility that future empirical inquiry might yield revisions in his
construct. In contrast to his contemporaries in economics, whose
reified homo economicus "got in the way" of their study of actual market
variations, Lasswell, then, underlined the significance of promoting
greater correspondence between homo politicus and behavioral
realities.[87] Thus he wrote: "Our conception of the political type ...
must be checked and perfected as it is applied to selected situations
throughout the entire manifold of personality and culture."[88]

For the most part, Lasswell thought political man could be defined
in terms of three distinct yet pivotal relations. Simply, these three
relationships were designated as follows: nuclear relations, co-
relations and developmental relations.[89]

A. Nuclear Relations

In Lasswell's mind, the "nuclear relation" captured the linkage
between role and the "intense predispositions" of an entire personality.
For political man, Lasswell noted that the principal "nuclear relation"
was most aptly characterized by Eduard Spranger's conception of the
Machtmensch. Spranger, an educational psychologist at the University of
Berlin, reduced this relation to a desire to acquire and wield power.[90]
Accepting this basic formulation, Lasswell suggested this "nuclear
relation" of the "pure" type of political man could be fleshed out and
compendiously summarized in a sequence of postulates.

1. He demands power and seeks other values only as a basis of power.
2. He is insatiable in his demand for power.
3. He demands power for himself only, conceived as an ego separate from others.
4. His expectations are focused upon the past history and future possibilities affecting power.
5. He is sufficiently capable to acquire and supply the skills appropriate to his demands.[91]

As Lasswell noted, however, this peculiar "nuclear dimension" culminated in a condensation of _homo politicus_ which was but an "idealization." Rarely was such a figure "found in nature." Indeed, such a "conception" was "far out of line" with what was generally found in most cultures. As a result, even though this version of political man did occasionally serve "a certain scientific purpose by highlighting some historical and contemporary figures," such a model proved to be "unsuitable for the most comprehensive inquiries into the decision-making process." Consequently, it needed to be revised so that it might be "implemented" with observable data emanating "from any concrete situation."[92]

Although Lasswell admitted that the emendations and elaborations called for in this initial characterization of _homo politicus_ were "almost literally 'too numerous to mention,'" he nonetheless set out to revise the model so as to bring it closer to "concrete" situations. First, he dealt with the fifth postulate, namely, the capacity of _homo politicus_ to amass and "supply the skills" commensurate with his "demands." Pointing out that such a presupposition implied the "idea of success," he noted that the previously sketched model, if construed strictly, could only be "completely satisfied by a world ruler." But because no such "omnipotent" governor existed, this model could "be used

to investigate no known cases"; thus this axiom needed to be amended.

Instead of ascribing omnipotence or "omniscience" to the construct of

political man, he opted to stipulate a minimum threshold in skills of

power. All that was necessary, then, was that the individual possess

but a "minimum degree of mastery" which allowed for "some measure of

survival in the arena of power."[93]

Apart from the fifth postulate, Lasswell found the third axiom to

be especially problematic. This postulate, it will be recalled,

prescribed a "wholly egocentric personality," one whose "demands" were

advanced "solely for the expected enhancement of the primary ego."

Construed in this way, this version of homo politicus highlighted a

figure "wholly absorbed" with meeting the claims of the "sacred me."

More than willing to sacrifice "anyone and everyone at convenience,"

such a person neglected power as an instrument which could be wielded to

satisfy demands of "family, neighborhood, nation or any other group."

Understood in this way, homo politicus really began to approximate homo

lupus.[94] But, as he conceived it, a version of political man which bore

a close resemblance to "wolf man," though indicative of isolated

egocentrics such as the "mad Caesars," was too narrow to guide or

accommodate more comprehensive inquiries into decision-making processes.

Rather, a more accurate estimation would reduce homo lupus to a "special

pigeonhole" of a more realistic "picture of the political man."[95]

For the most part, Lasswell's objection to viewing homo politicus

as home lupus emerged from his affirmation of the cogency of the concept

of the "self" or "self-system." Drawing primarily on the works of Mead

and Sullivan, he surmised that the "primary ego," namely, the "'me,' the

´I´," was generally intertwined with symbols of other egos. This

incorporation of symbols of other egos, he added, constituted a person´s

"self." Seen in this way, "self" was more inclusive than the "me" or

"I" connoted by ego. That is, because the "symbol of the ego and the

symbols of all who are recognized as available for full or partial

equality of treatment with the ego" was constitutive of "self," the

"structure of the self" included family, neighbors, colleagues, "fellow

nationals" and possibly even "members of humanity as a whole." By

implication, those excluded from the "I-me-we system" of identifications

were sharply distinguished as "not-self."[96]

Like Mead and Sullivan, Lasswell saw the "self" as a social-

emergent. Initially, "subjective" life was marked by a "fusion" of

subjective and external experiences. This meant "ego references" and

references to "surrounding objects" were indistinguishable. Lasswell

likened this "imprecise relationship" to the "sense of cosmic

participation" evoked during deep psychic regression. Like the

regressive adult, the infant was "aware of no boundary between the ´I´

and the ´cosmos.´"[97] This indeterminacy, however, was short-lived. As

Lasswell indicated, once the "boundaries" defining the primary ego

crystallized, the individual was prepared to incorporate the symbols of

other egos so as to constitute a "self." Especially critical in this

regard were the initial years in the "primary circle." It was there

that the first conceptions of the "self" were actually derived. Later,

provided the quality of these neonatal relationships ensured at least

the minimum level of emotional support which could be assimilated in the

"primary ego" so as to constitute a positive "image of the self," the

individual was situated to develop a more elaborate version of the "self."[98] Lasswell intimated that the formation of the "self" was in good part conditioned by the labyrinthine pattern of socio-cultural relationships found in modern industrial societies. As a result of this broadened "range of exposure to new experience" fostered by the "interdependence" brought on by modern-day industrialization, "new people," he noted,

> are met ... [and] the individual ego develops more complex
> images of how other people feel and think (we say that he
> empathizes with them); he also perceives himself as
> resembling other people in various ways, thereby achieving
> a common identity (by including symbols that refer to others
> as part of the self.) He also achieves negative
> identification with others and exludes them from the primary
> ego. "They" are "foreigners"; "we" are "American."[99]

To be sure, Lasswell recognized that some individuals would develop a constricted, ego oriented "self-system." Yet he acknowledged that even the more egocentric personalities, if they were to gain even a minimal degree of success in politics, had to attain a relatively modest threshold of "socialization." As he saw it, individuals devoid of a positive "self" which extended beyond the primary ego were ill-equipped to enter into the communal activities which characterized political action. Individuals of this group emerged as the "solitary outlaw" or the "extreme neurotic (or psychotic)" who lost himself in reverie; they did not assume "politically significant roles."[100] Thus in the more normal course of events the person who joined the fray of the "political arena" did so "not as an ego but as a self," a "political ´we´" created by the "mechanism" of "identification." Similarly, such a person's demands and expectations would always be defined and subsequently advanced with regard to his "self." As a result, the actor

in the political arena generally moved beyond the mere "naked assertion

of will" and hence offered himself as an "exponent" of shared values.[101]

As the above discussion reveals, Lasswell expected that the

isolated power-seeker, conceived strictly as a primary ego devoid of a

"self-system," was a rarity, a figure "most closely approximated" by

"psychopaths." With the exception of a few marginal cases, even those

individuals bent on the acquisition of power were "linked" to others

through those "self-systems" which "bind men together." Therefore a

more realistic version of homo politicus had to encompass individuals

who possessed "self-systems" of varying degrees of comprehensiveness;

moreover, it had to allow for the possibility that power was sought for

all or at least some of the constituents of the "self" in addition to

the primary ego.[102]

Having considered the principal deficiencies which characterized

his initial "speculative model," Lasswell offered a revised model which

covered the primary nuclear correlates of homo politicus. Suited to the

"data of observation" uncovered in "any concrete situation," this

modified version of homo politicus, he wrote,

1. accentuates power
2. demands power (and other values) for the self (the
   primary ego plus incorporated symbols of other egos)
3. accentuates expectations concerning power
4. acquires at least a minimum proficiency in the skills of
   power [103]

As can be inferred from the above sequence of postulates, this

amended version of the political type exhausted but was not coterminous

with homo lupus. Not restricted to individuals who ruthlessly expended

energy to augment the power position of the "sacred me," this construct

did more than highlight the "mad Caesars." Moreover, it encompassed

persons who accentuated power "relative to others" of their culture and who, furthermore, had the capacity to exercise their power skills with "at least a minimum degree of effectiveness." Excluded, therefore, were only those persons who remained on the "sidelines swathed in delusions of public grandeur" as well as those individuals who, notwithstanding their placement in a position of power, attached "little importance to it" when compared to the "value-scale of other power holders."[104]

Having derived this revised conception of a political type, Lasswell, for the sake of greater clarity and precision, introduced a typology which facilitated the classification of the sundry roles towards which individuals were drawn. Again, it should be remembered that the propensity for power was the "basic characteristic" of Lasswell's homo politicus. But, at the same time, he recognized that persons enamored with power satisfied their craving in different ways. That is, although they satisified their demand through the adoption of a specific role on the public stage, those who were oriented to power were inclined to "play one political role rather than another" because an "inner demand" or an "inner tie" was "evolved" with "particular manifestations of political life" as well as with "power in general."[105] Consequently, those who accented power could be distinguished by their "inner tie with particular activities" and thus could be divided into different sub-categories.

At least initially, Lasswell, adhering to a path hewed by "modern political writers," delineated a typology which covered three kinds of public actors: the agitator, the boss and the responsible leader. Each one, he noted, engaged a peculiar functional activity. More

importantly, he pointed out that individuals who adopted any one of these public roles did so as a response to certain endogenous predilections or "temperamental qualities" which impelled an individual to play "one political part more successfully" than others.[106] Later, building upon this theme Lasswell elaborated a new classificatory scheme of sub-types. Again, he chose three types as representative; however, this time the typical characters were referred to as the administrator, the agitator and the theorist. He frankly admitted this typology was only intended to be "provisional." Thus he did not consider it to be invariant or exhaustive. Indeed, he frequently referred to a fourth type, namely, the man of violence. Yet, probably as a result of obvious constraints which made the study of the man of violence impracticable, such a type was never clearly investigated and detailed. Furthermore, although he thought a "long list" of other types possibly existed, he never seriously entertained any of them. Rather, believing he had collected "enough instances" to "sustain" his "initial characterization of various political 'types' (or, more conveniently, 'roles')," he remained content to proceed with this scheme pretty much intact.[107] Thus, even though this typology was first enunciated during the early stages of his career, it emerged as something of a hallmark in his writings on personality and politics. In fact, in an interview conducted roughly forty years after the initial publication of Psychopathology and Politics, he stated that, as far as "political types" were concerned, "there are three main types -- the administrator, the agitator and the theorist."[108]

First, as Lasswell saw it, the "high value" placed on the public's "emotional response" was the "essential mark" which distinguished the agitator. The agitator's principal aim was to evoke and maintain affective public sentiment supportive of what he thought were "superior claims of principle" and "desirable social policy." His primary assets were his literary and oratorical skills, techniques he assiduously cultivated and sharpened. Agitators, Lasswell noted, "live to shout and write," and "their consciences trouble them unless they have periodic orgies of moral fervor." Yet their penchant for the "magic of rhetoric" prevented them from finding satisfaction in public positions. Because they glorified "men who harry the dragons and stir the public conscience by exhortation, reiteration, and vituperation," agitators usually became "frustrated and confused" when they found themselves burdened by the rigidly defined, mundane chores of publicly accountable positions. Confronted by the structure and tedium of office, they frequently longed to "desert the official swivel for the roving freedom of the platform and the press."[109]

By way of contrast, Lasswell intimated that administrators were quite comfortable conducting their activities "within an officially prescribed frame." They were, then, "distinguished by the value" they placed on the coordination of the "relations" and efforts of "members" of their "own environment" in "continuing activity." Unencumbered by a "compulsion to 'get a rise out of' large numbers of the population," they generally found themselves "bound to particular individuals." Furthermore, as a consequence of their own desire to evade "responsibility," administrators embraced the opportunity to exculpate

themselves by invoking the protective shield afforded by a myriad of prescribed rules and regulations, even to the point that such conformity threatened the persistence of the authority which, at least on the surface, they "most punctiliously served."[110]

The final figure in Lasswell's triad of political types was the theorist. Although his discussion here was usually imprecise and elusive, he indicated that the theorist was primarily concerned with the elaboration of a philosophical defense of a peculiar order of political society. Like agitators, theorists dealt with abstract ideas and principles. Also, they generally expected their writings would have practical import. Therefore it was not uncharacteristic for theorists to court the "sentiments of their contemporaries" by putting their "speculative interests" at the service of "immediate ends."[111] Yet Lasswell believed critical differences separated theorists from agitators. Specifically, he indicated that theorists, unlike agitators, were usually not versed in the techniques of polemic and palaver. This, he noted, was generally the result of diffidence or else an overall lack of ability to adapt to traditional patterns of social exchange.[112] At the same time, however, he insinuated it was not simply the absence of skills in agitation which differentiated agitators from theorists; rather, what was even more important was the actual reason as to why dexterity in such techniques was never acquired. And it was here that his discussion of Marx as a theorist was especially instructive.

Marx, he noted, "craved the skill" of his adversary, Lassalle, who could ignite and direct the "emotions" of the public. But Marx subordinated this compulsion to what was an even more compelling

inclination: a desire to gain "unreserved admiration for the products
of his mind." Feeling, then, that he had to "exact submission to the
assertions of his mind, come what may," it was "more important" for Marx
"to attain theoretical completeness than to modify his techniques of
social intercourse."[113]

As Lasswell's assessment of Marx qua theorist indirectly suggests,
those who adopted the role of theorist wanted to impress themselves on
others. Yet they did not seek to do so through terse, inflammatory
appeals to the public. Instead, they were disposed to pique public
reaction by expounding abstract theoretical systems which either
assailed or else supported a peculiar form of regime. This role as
system builder, then, provided them a chance to secure public
approbation while it also gave them an opportunity to either mold or, if
they so desired, stem the forces of social change.

Having elaborated these three sub-types, Lasswell's discussion of
the nuclear correlates of homo politicus was brought to a close. To
reformulate, the propensity for power was the central nuclear
characteristic which distinguished the political type. At the same
time, the "evolved" "inner tie" to role allowed for subsidiary
distinctions to be made. Consequently, by discovering the "form of
activity which means the most to him," the person who emphasized the use
of power could be classified as a theorist, an administrator or an
agitator.[114]

B. Co-Relations

Once it had been distinguished according to its nuclear dimension,
the political type, as Lasswell had it, could be further amplified on

the basis of more extensive empirical investigation. In his estimation, greater elaboration and refinement would come through the isolation of "other traits" generally associated with those who manifested what was, when compared with other members of a given culture, a strong propensity for power. He believed, in other words, that a comparison between power-minded personalities and others of the same society would ultimately reveal that political types shared characteristics besides an interest in power which set them apart from other members of their culture. For instance, he hypothesized that, within any "given period," a "cross-sectional survey" might bring to the surface "other traits" which distinguished, say, "politicians" from "scientists." Thus although Lasswell recognized "politicians" desired power and "scientists" longed for enlightenment, he indicated that once this "central primary relation" had been delineated subsequent investigation would disclose an additional set of characteristics associated with the "nuclear ones." Indeed, he surmised that it might be found that "politicians" and "scientists" come from distinctively "different social strata and educational backgrounds." Or, for that matter, he suggested that it might also be shown that they "differ psychologically," such as in their "cognitive style," their "ability to tolerate ambiguity" and their overall "willingness to engage in interpersonal relations."[115] Moreover, he also believed that a similar approach could be followed when it came to the consideration of the various roles homo politicus adopted. That is, he anticipated such research could uncover the "traits" peculiar to each sub-type.[116]

Investigation of co-relations, then, was undertaken to amplify the
initial construct of homo politicus. Together, nuclear and co-
relational "traits" provided "instantaneous pictures" of the political
personality. Yet, taken by themselves, they did not show how such
personalities were actually "formed." For that, more was required. And
it was a recognition of this additional information which prompted him
to dwell on the significance of developmental relations.[117]

C. Developmental Relations

Of the three kinds of relations considered by Lasswell, those
pertaining to development were the most salient. By his own admission,
he was attracted to the "central problem" of detailing developmental
profiles associated with "different types of public characters."
Moreover, it was here that his own concern for construing a person's
"life-history" as a form of "natural history" was thrown into high
relief. For, as well shall see, such relations squarely focused on the
"significant" "developmental experiences" of those who performed "on the
public stage."[118]

As Lasswell indicated, co-relational data did not provide direct
answers to questions as to how a power-driven figure came into
existence. This, rather, was the "province of 'developmental'
typologies." Now, according to Lasswell, these relations or types
included two, temporally different kinds of behavioral data. One part
of the relation was based on a described "set of terminal, adult
reactions." For political scientists, the important "reactions" were
those gauged to satisfy an inner drive for power. The other variable of
the relationship centered on the "critical experiences" in the

"antecedent life" of the mature individual which predisposed him to adopt his peculiar role. What was significant for political scientists here was the isolation of those significant "predisposing factors" which "affected" an individual during the earlier stages of his life, ultimately setting the patterns which led him to emerge as a "performer of political roles."[119]

For the most part, the logic behind his concern with developmental relations was unusually clear. He believed political man was the culmination of a peculiar array of significant experiences undergone during certain stages of life. Thus he expected that through inquiry these developmental characteristics could be isolated and thrown into high relief. Further, he argued that eventually it would also be practicable to discern and elaborate those configurations of development which prompted individuals to evolve inner ties with the specific public roles they assumed. Ultimately, then, it would be possible to give an account of these factors which converged to produce, for instance, the agitators, administrators and theorists in a given society. And it was in this regard that Lasswell's interest in scientific life history, especially as it was disclosed via the methods of the psychoanalytic interview and further corroborated and augmented by other forms of observation, took on added relevance and importance. For it was here that his own inquiry purported to delineate the "links in the chain of causation by which some forms of personality are disposed to the pursuit of power"; indeed, it was here that his research ostensibly laid bare the "chain which leads to the choosing of one political role above another."[120]

Homo Politicus Investigated

In accord with his functional conception of government, Lasswell stated that the investigation and analysis of political personalities could generally extend its sweep "beyond the limits" of what was recognized as a "conventional institution" of government. Thus he cautioned prospective "students of political personalities" to be aware that they might actually discover their "most interesting objects of study in J. P. Morgan and Company, in the United States Steel Corporation, and among the clerical or educational or medical politicians." Conversely, he pointed out that, in certain instances, it would be legitimate to exclude certain actors found in what were conventional but not functional institutions of government.[121]

A. Background of Cases

In his investigation of the political personality, Lasswell collected and subsequently published data pertaining to "politically interesting" people subjected to "prolonged scrutiny" under "conditions of unusual intimacy." Some of this case material came from analytic situations overseen by "specialists"; the rest, however, came from his own intensive inquiries.[122] As far as his own observations were concerned, he pointed out that his findings were gained "directly by means of life-history interviews with politically active persons." The subjects, he noted, promised to abide by the "psychoanalytic rule" of full, uncensored disclosure, and they were given ample opportunity "to associate freely to dreams, slips of the tongue, gestures, gross body movements -- and to the interviewer."[123] Consequently, some of the interviews he carried on with subjects "elicited free associations"; and

these, he believed, culminated in a "body of material more amenable to 'depth' interpretation" than the information that was gathered through the more "traditional methods" of interrogation and observation.[124] Included within the scope of his studies were not only individuals who were "well" but also some who were "sick." Some of them were "volunteers" who "were aware of no serious pathology"; others, however, were drawn from a pool of patients engaged in therapy at selected "mental hospitals." Interestingly enough, this use of "abnormal" political subjects left Lasswell untroubled.[125] That he remained unbothered by the selection and study of such individuals can be traced to his own unsubstantiated conviction that the "boundary" which separated health from disease was indistinct; indeed, the "frontier" between the two looked more like a "gentle slope" than either a "cliff" or an "impassable chasm." Furthermore, since he believed "neurotic symptoms and traits ... [were] never entirely absent from any life history," he concluded that there was "little need to fear that case histories taken from the sick" would "differ too profoundly from the case histories taken from the well."[126] In fact, he even admitted that those who were afflicted with "mental maladies" were more convenient targets of study. Basically, he thought that "normality," because it was a complex "integration" of multiple tendencies, was sometimes "more difficult to understand than disease." The aberrant mind, on the other hand, was considered a different matter; it was similar to an "automobile with its control lever stuck in one gear." Unable to "shift," the pathological mind lacked the flexibility to accommodate itself to the shifting constraints imposed by reality. This

characteristic, however, made it a more intelligible object of study.
Whereas integration muted the tendencies of the normal mind, absence of
such integration in the abnormal mind threw the "constituent tendencies"
into "imposing relief." Thus the pathological mind as it was epitomized
in the "clinical caricature" was "invaluable" since it "revealed"
"certain tendencies of the normal" in exaggerated and, hence, more
readily discernible form; consequently, as long as "normality" was
enlisted as a "control on the pathological," studies of abnormal
personalities could be included for heuristic purposes.[127]

B. Case Material

The fragments of the intimate life-histories collected by Lasswell
were used to amplify the traits and developmental sequence
characteristic of the political type. Indeed, he believed that his
approach, if it was to be "worth the trouble," had to vindicate itself
by providing data about the maturation and character of the political
type which could not be adduced from less intensive standpoints. In
moving to his purported goal, however, he warned his readers early on
that it was not his intention to overwhelm them with an "unlimited
multiplication of 'little Willie stories'"; instead, for the sake of
clarity and comprehension he thought it only appropriate to divulge but
a "fraction" of those cases he had in his possession. Thus he informed
his readers in the "Preface" to Psychopathology and Politics that "only
enough cases have been abstracted to serve the purposes of exposition,
to supply a background for the theoretical materials."[128]

For the most part, Lasswell's case studies were heavily descriptive
and sometimes sexually graphic. Therefore it was not unusual for the

reader to come across vivid, sometimes lurid, references to a subject's

reveries on his sexual exploits, proclivities, and wishes. Granted,

when measured by today's standards such revelations would be considered

quite innocuous; but when set against the more austere canons of

propriety and relevance which guided and set the tone of much of the

literature of his time, it is not inconceivable that his discussion of

these things pricked the conscience of the more genteel reader.[129] Yet,

as will be recalled, Lasswell emphatically rejected the notion that

political science should eschew topics because they were repugnant to a

prevailing consensus or ethic. As was mentioned earlier, he believed

the purview of "science" went beyond the "conventional" and the

"limitations of banality." In effect, he felt that he and other

scientists were only obliged to adhere to the logic and procedures of

scientific inquiry; and that, in turn, meant he was willing to entertain

a complete, uninhibited discussion of all material considered pertinent

for the objective assessment of those conditions which converged to

spawn the political type.

Although a detailed discussion of Lasswell's clinical evidence

would make for some provocative reading, such an analysis is not central

to our purposes here. Rather, we are more interested in ascertaining

how and to what extent such evidence shaped his understanding of the

emergence of the political type. And for that end even a cursory review

of the case studies found in Psychopathology and Politics and Power and

Personality points to certain recorded phenomena and conclusions which

are instructive insofar as the evolution of the political man is

concerned.

Overall, Lasswell's "case fragments" of selected "politicians" threw into bold relief certain characteristics shared by his subjects. First of all, the information gained from this intensive interrogation revealed the distinctive imprint of early life as it was organized within the more intimate setting of the primary circle. Of especial importance here was the conglomeration of value indulgences and deprivations to which a person was subjected by other members of his family, most notably his parents.

To some extent, the life-histories reported by Lasswell reveal that his subjects were in good part reared in family environments which were less than fully indulgent. For instance, in certain cases he found that early deprivations to the person were traceable to the parents' application of rigid proscriptions against even the most innocent or banal expressions of sexuality. Specifically, what was most salient here was the way these prohibitions against sexuality were enacted and imposed, namely, through intercession on the part of paternal authority. As Lasswell once observed, paternal "interference" in the gratification of sexual drives generally obtained in a variety of deprivations, including rather subtle but efficacious means of control like "physical chastisement," "ridicule," "expostulation," and even the "withdrawal of affection."[130] He further believed that such paternal interposition, since it was almost always accomplished at the expense of certain cherished values, was an acute formative experience for some individuals. In fact, this was a theme common to many of the life-histories which he presented. Thus, compelled to renounce their sexual impulses, many of these subjects were left to feel deprived, insecure,

ambivalent towards the sanctioning parent, and guilty whenever these

importunate drives again demanded expression and satisfaction.[131] The

emotional harmony of these individuals, then, was disturbed at a fairly

early stage of their life.

Important as incidents like those discussed above were for setting

the tone of relationships in the primary circle, Lasswell also

recognized that other forces coalesced to create an environment in which

deprivations outweighed indulgences. Such a situation, for instance,

can be discerned in the case of Mr. H, a military official. Again, as

the case of H revealed, paternal obstruction of early sexual expression

was implicated. Yet intensive scrutiny of H soon indicated that his

father's negative appraisal of him while he was still a young man made a

"deep impression" on H, leaving him victimized by a nettling "sense of

insecurity and inadequacy."[132] Moreover, other cases conveyed incidents

which pointed in a similar direction. For example, some of these

"politicians" who subjected themselves to the routine of intensive

analysis eventually disclosed the persistence of the formative emotional

imprint left by egregious paternal and fraternal hegemony in the primary

circle. Likewise, others indicated they were still suffering with

certain emotional scars inflicted on them in early life. Indeed, as

many of these cases serve to underscore, painful remnants of early

development were oftentimes psychological residua stemming from

emotional traumata like parental diffidence, sibling rivalries,

illegitimate birth or an acrimonious and broken home life. The general

upshot of all this was that as a consequence of these early experiences

many of these people were left impaired by a nagging sense of self-

ambivalence or even a remarkably attenuated notion of self-worth.
Specifically, dearth of affection, praise, attention and emotional
support were frequently transmuted into feelings of "guilt,"
"inadequacy," "insecurity," and "inferiority." The result was a person
plagued by a dubious sense of value.[133] In this regard, a consideration
of one of the "case fragments" detailed in Power and Personality can be
seen as most instructive.

The case to be discussed here involved a dramatizing, agitational
justice.[134] According to Lasswell, this justice, henceforth referred to
as Judge Z, had developed a reputation as being a man of "keen
intellect." Among his peers he was believed to be "quite capable of
following the most involved argument." Yet like most agitational
personalities he seemed ill-suited for the pedantry of an official
position. He was distrustful of authority, "exceptionally
antigovernment" and even privately contemptuous of the law. Further,
his lack of scrupulousness in duty was a motif mirrored in the
"consensus among the older members of the bar." They intimated that he
was "erratic in judgment," and they also suggested that at times he was
even "wholly uninterested" in the "legal aspects" of the cases brought
before his court.[135]

Overall, Judge Z's behavior both on and off the bench was quite
curious. In the courtroom he occasionally "played to the gallery" by
resorting to some "sensational" legal action. Periodically he would
invoke some "ancient statute" and apply it "literally" to the question
at issue with the most "astonishing results." In short, he relished the
chance to demonstrate the "imbecialities of the law" in a public forum;

and to achieve that end he remained open to any legal argument which pointed to "startling consequences." Furthermore, Z´s behavior off the bench was consonant with his actions in the courtroom. During the time when his court was not in session, Judge Z was deliberately theatrical, both in dress and demeanor. The style of his clothes was "foppish," and his elocutionary skills ensured him a place as a "favorite orator" at patriotic festivities and celebrations. Indeed, his "mellifluous" voice was considered well-suited to the expression of "every nuance of emotion." And, while speaking before a large gathering of people, his "flowery" vocabulary was replete with "emotive language about morality, justice, love of home.and country." Especially memorable in this regard were Z´s celebrated and moving "perorations" delivered on the Fourth of July.[136]

As indicated by the foregoing, Judge Z was a showman. His behavior both on and off the bench was calculated to appeal to a wider audience. Quite clearly, he was, in Lasswell´s use of the term, an agitational type. This, however, brought to the fore the question as to what factors predisposed Z to seek and eventually play the role that he did. And, in Lasswell´s mind, the answer to such a query could be partially gleaned from an examination of Z´s "earlier history" as it was disclosed through the interview situation.[137]

In good part, the life-history of Z revealed he was reared in a family environment which was both indulgent and deprivational. His father was generally an "easygoing person" who bowed to the whims of his imperious wife. But although Z´s father rarely showed overt resentment at "having a strong executive in the house," he did occasionally betray

"signs of strain" under the pressures exerted by an overbearing wife who belabored the importance of social achievement. Thus Z's father would periodically get "drunk and abusive," or else he would stay "away longer than necessary on trips," leading the neighborhood gossips to insinuate he was "'running around with other women.'" And as far as Z was concerned these absences were not inconsequential, for they left him with the impression that he was "rejected and unloved." Similarly, the father's intermittent "outbursts of drunken rage" "terrorized" Z and also reinforced his own "doubts about being loved." On the other hand, Z's mother, though "strict," was "free with praise." Yet such maternal approbation, however lavish, was usually made contingent upon "striking achievement" by Z. Unfortunately, this conditional expression of love and admiration, when coupled with the deprecations of paternal mistreatment, only underscored Z's "doubts about himself" while it simultaneously served to crystallize "ambivalent attitudes toward authority."[138]

In general, this discussion of the "case fragments" of Z's early life-history created a portrait of a man who was buffetted by powerful emotional pressures in the interpersonal setting of the primary circle. Much like the rather unsanguine "politicians" described in Psychopathology and Politics, Z emerged from the family circle encumbered by a problematical sense of self-worth. On the whole, developments in the family circle converged to create an emotionally weakened and insecure person, an individual devoid of a firm and positive self-image. Again, Z, not unlike the others alluded to earlier, perceived himself to be contemptible, unloved and weak.

Now, in Lasswell's estimation, the frequency with which such a dubious sense of self-worth occurred among players on the public stage-- an attribute cast into bold relief in the life-history of Z and shared by other "politicians" who had undergone a similar form of intensive scrutiny--was more than just a coincidence. And it was this recognition which prompted him to conclude that the power-seeker could be at least partially "understood" as the end product of an intricate sequence of events. Put simply, he thought that, in certain respects, "politicians" were the culmination of a patterned relationship which originated in the "vicissitudes" of early existence in the primary circle.[139] For purposes of clarity this developmental sequence could be expressed as follows: (1) the character of early life in the "intimate circle" spawned an individual who possessed a dubious sense of self-worth; and (2) this person who perceived himself to be unloved, contemptible and insecure was, in turn, subsequently inclined towards the acquisition and exercise of power.

C. Power as Compensation

In his effort to explicate the dynamics underlying the emergence of the political type, Lasswell noted that, in the "broadest sense," the accentuation of power by a specific person within his cultural context was a "defense."[140] More specifically, his "key hypothesis" suggested that those who accentuated power did so as a "means" to compensate against "deprivation." Put into the form of a proposition, this "key hypothesis" reads as follows: "Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it [the self] functions."[141]

In general, although Lasswell's interpretation of the desire for power as a "defense" response has had significant impact on the study of political personality, it should be noted that he was not the original exponent of such a notion.[142] Rather, this conception is actually a more encompassing derivative of a proposition offered by Alfred Adler, one of the so-called "deviants" in the early circles of psychoanalytic theory. As Adler saw it, parental ridicule, diffidence and excoriation as well as certain organic deficiencies frequently produced an individual plagued by self-doubts and feelings of insecurity and weakness. To relieve these crippling tensions, many of these persons, Adler conjectured, behaved in ways which would augment their sense of self-worth. Thus they sought things like power, goals which would help them alleviate their perceived status of inferiority. And it was this peculiar compensatory dynamic which Lasswell enlisted and subsequently refined and expanded.[143]

For the most part, Laswell's discussion of the compensatory effect of power, though it did implicate a most elaborate chain of causation, was quite straight-forward. First of all, he stated that the accentuation of power was provoked by low conceptions of the self. Now, in Lasswell's mind, such low estimations of the self were precipitated by deprivations in terms of values. In this regard, however, he noted that the actual act of privation which led to a depreciation in value position was not sufficient to produce low self-estimates; rather, he averred that it was also necessary that the individual perceive himself as being deprived. Consequently, "perspectives of the individual" were critical on this count.[144] Furthermore, he conjectured that such

deprivations may actually implicate "any value," though he admitted that
incurred losses of "deference values" were probably of the "greatest
significance." In addition, he admitted that such deprivations need not
be restricted to the "primary ego"; thus "any component" of the person's
"self-structure" might actually be "involved."[145]

According to Lasswell, this depreciation in values was a critical
ontogenetic experience because it left the person with a problematical
sense of self-worth. Thus as he saw it a person's own sense of worth or
value was ultimately the product of the attitudes and behavior of those
around him. In effect, self-devaluation was induced by negative
appraisals rendered by others. The dynamics here were quite simple.
Deprivations in values were "deprivational appraisals" which the
individual incorporated and hence applied to himself. As far as
deference values were concerned, the process was uncomplicated and
direct. For instance, the act of withholding affection could
conceivably lead a person to feel that he was unloved or unwanted. In
the case of welfare values, however, the process was somewhat more
indirect and complex. Ostensibly, such deprivations here were salient
when they were preceived to be "involved in deference responses." Hence
they took on significance when they either provoked or were thought to
lead to derision, loss of affection and so forth. They were, then,
important insofar as they occurred within a "context of guilt, ridicule,
or loss of love."[146] As Lasswell noted on this count, no more
"flagrant" example could be found to illustrate the dialectic between
deprivations in welfare values and "deference responses" than in the
"attitude" espoused by societies where workers, through no fault of

their own, were brutally wrenched from their jobs as a result of the
massive economic collapse witnessed during the depression. For, as he
observed in this regard, even though most of "those who were squeezed
out of the process of production" were ultimately "given enough to keep
breath in their bodies," many members of society

> ...were not sensitive to the fact that men who are thrown out
> of employment are also thrown out of respect. We added
> insult to injury by stigmatizing these millions as
> "unemployed," by treating them as a burden on their fellow-
> men, a dead weight on the taxpayer, a mass of humanity for
> whom there was no longer a respected place in society. We
> kept them from dying, it is true, but we gave them no reason
> to live.[147]

In Lasswell's mind, these deprivations and concomitant low self-
estimates were especially critical because they triggered the accretion
of an almost intolerable concentration of anxiety. This rise in
feelings of anxiousness, in turn, was fundamental since anxiety was
responsible for tripping the compensatory power response. And, in
Lasswell's estimation, the reasons as to why this was the case became
more readily intelligible once the concept of anxiety was clearly
understood.

First of all, Lasswell observed that anxiety was an "acutely
dysphoric state." It, however, connoted "something different from
fear." As he saw it, anxiety was really more akin to what Harry Stack
Sullivan, in "The Meaning of Anxiety in Psychiatry and in Life,"
referred to as "'uncanny emotion, chilly crawly sensations and the
like.'" Thus, in contrast to "fear," anxiety more closely approximated
psychic states of being conveyed by words like "awe," "dread,"
"loathing," and "horror."[148] Because it entailed psychically
discomforting feelings evoked by words like "awe," "dread," "horror,"

and "loathing," Lasswell believed that anxiety was something which the
human organism would try to avert. He further implied that the
psychological mechanism which could be used to circumvent or escape
anxiety was almost self-evident; that is, if deprivations provoked inner
tensions of anxiety, then, conversely, indulgences could assuage
feelings of anxiousness. Logically, this seems to make a great deal of
sense. In effect, if deprivations in values were "deprivational
appraisals" which diminished self-worth, then, by implication,
indulgences had to be positive appraisals which enhanced self-esteem.
In fact, such a phenomenon was so apparent that it could be taken as a
fundamental premise of human behavior.

> Our basic postulate in examining human activity is that the
> "maximization principle" applies in accordance with which the
> tendency is to maximize the indulgences of the system as a
> whole. It is evident why the reduction and avoidance of
> anxiety (an acutely dysphoric state of events) occupies such
> a pivotal position in the evolution of the personality.[149]

Put somewhat differently, the threat or presence of anxiety in most
instances indubitably prompted individuals to maximize indulgences over
deprivations for both the primary ego and other components of the self-
system. Seen in this way, then, behavior was predicted on the
assumption that a peculiar response would produce an advantageous
indulgence to deprivation (I:D) ratio for the "identified self." Such
action, he further added, need not be a conscious response to the
current train of events.[150]

As the foregoing suggests, Lasswell generally expected that anxiety
would motivate individuals to safeguard their emotional integrity
through compensatory responses. Still, at one point he admitted that
not all those who were subjected to deprivations engaged "active

defense." This, he believed, happened because the antecedent

deprivations had been so utterly "overwhelming" that the deprived

persons or groups no longer considered themselves capable of enhancing

their own I:D ratios through "active measures." In short, where "self-

confidence" had been "destroyed" deprivations and hence low self-

estimates were not met by "compensatory strivings." Usually exposure to

"overwhelming" deprivations brought "withdrawal" or "resignation" from

"active participation" in most kinds of human relationships. In the

case of individuals, "withdrawal" might come in the form of autistic

reverie or, quite possibly, even suicide; and for groups, if the "blows

of fortune" appeared "too hard to bear," the result might be complete

assimilation or extinction.[151]

According to Lasswell, then, not all people were able to withstand

the "blows of fortune." But, he noted, many were, and some, the

political personalities, were able to do so through the acquisition and

exercise of power. The presence of such individuals, however, brings to

the fore the question as to why power was selected as the response to

poor I:D ratios, low self-estimates and high levels of anxiety.

Conceivably, other responses might be just as efficacious. Even

Lasswell admitted as much when he pointed out that "when efforts at

defense are active, they are not necessarily in terms of power."[152]

Consequently, as such an admission intimates, low self-esteem, anxiety

and at least a scintilla of optimism with regard to the efficacy of

defense responses were, taken by themselves, insufficient to trip a

compensatory response in terms of power. In other words, as he saw it

something else was also necessary; and he thought this other condition

necessary for such a compensation to occur could be stated thusly:

"Compensation by the use of power is facilitated when it is expected to

yield more net values than can be obtained by the use of other

alternatives." Furthermore, since he was cognizant that "favorable

expectations" about the use of power were, for the most part,

conditioned by previous success when it was used, he offered the

following corollary hypothesis: "The chances of invoking power are

increased if success followed the use of power under similar

circumstances (especially in the past.)"[153]

In light of the above consideration, namely, that the resort to

power promised to mitigate deprivations and low self-esteem, the

conditions propitious for the emergence of the political type could be

roughly summed up in the following sequence of development: (1) a

person perceived the self as suffering deprivations; (2) these

deprivations, since they were closely linked to deference responses of

others, were subsequently internalized as negative appraisals which the

person then applied to himself; (3) this incorporation of "deprivational

appraisals," in turn, produced low self-estimates and, consequently,

piqued feelings of anxiousness and insecurity; (4) this person, feeling

pressured by that most "uncanny emotion," anxiety, wanted to secure

indulgences and hence positive appraisals which would enhance his own

conception of self-worth, thereby assuaging his feelings of anxiousness;

(5) the person anticipated that these deprivations could be surmounted

through indulgences secured through the exercise of power; and (6) such

a person obtained and used power with at least a modicum of success.[154]

And it was, moreover, this peculiar sequence of development which

apparently was at the core of what became his "famous," "often cited" notational statement of the phylogeny of homo politicus. First proffered by Lasswell in Psychopathology and Politics, this equation also appeared in several of his other works, reading as

$$p \} d \} r = P,$$

where: p = "private motives"; d = "displacement onto a public object"; r = "rationalization in terms of public interest"; P = "political man"; and } = "transformed into."[155]

In light of the foregoing discussion, the general meaning of this formula should be somewhat clear. As a reformulation, the first concept of this symbolization, "private motives," referred to the "emphatic demand for deference" which was "both accentuated and unsatisfied" within the setting of the intimate circle. The second aspect of this equation, namely, displacement, pertained to the compensatory response in terms of power.[156] Finally, the idea of rationalization was included to indicate that the enlistment of power was frequently an unconscious response to "deprivational appraisal." That is, the idea of rationalization or justification was intended to underscore the fact that

> ... the private motives may be entirely lost from the
> consciousness of the political man, and he may succeed in
> achieving a high degree of objective validation for his point
> of view. In the "ideal" case this has gone so far that the
> private motives which led to the original commitment are of
> feeble current importance.[157]

Although the above formulation pretty well captured Lasswell's account of the emergence of the political type, two other points should be mentioned. First, even though Lasswell stressed the importance of deprivations in the primary circle, he also recognized that deprivations

later in life might provoke a compensatory response in terms of power. There were, he noted, "famous cases in which severe deprivation relatively late in life has led to furious concentration upon power." One such example was the "revolutionary emperor," Joseph II of Austria, who "was transformed into the grim figure of his later days not only by the untimely death of his beloved wife but also by the shattering humilation of the discovery that his wife had not loved him."[158] Secondly, given the elliptical character of his formulation, it again needs to be emphasized that when Lasswell discussed deprivations experienced by the person he intended to include more than just negative appraisals applied to the primary ego. "The deprivation," he believed, "may be experienced by oneself or by the larger symbols with which one identifies: family, friends, professional or business associates, and ethnic, religious, or national group."[159] Thus, especially in later life, low estimates accorded to other components of the self-system could be just as critical as those applied to the primary ego.

Now, bearing in mind much of what has previously been discussed, Lasswell's case studies gain a great deal of clarity. As will be recalled, in that score of studies which he presented the findings signified that individuals were confronted by what were perceived to be "deprivational appraisals" rendered by others, especially those in the primary circle. This, in turn, created a problematical conception of self-worth. The result was a craving for positive deference responses from others, an importunate demand which eventually culminated in the drive for power. Moreover, he surmised that this correlation of events was not simply unique to the personality configuration revealed by his

own case studies. Rather, "modern empirical research" also seemed to point in a similar direction.[160] Furthermore, he concluded that a perusal of biographical interpretations of several noted political figures uncovered bits of evidence which ostensibly lent some credibility to his contention. Although such works did indeed rely on information gathered through less intensive and hence more conventional research techniques, they nonetheless indicated that the drive to power was preceded by deprivations and low self-esteem. Politicians who appeared to exemplify the peculiar dynamic inherent to Lasswell's explication of the rise of the political type included figures like Horace Greely, Woodrow Wilson, Fredrick the Great, Peter the Great, Ghengis Kahn, Napoleon Bonaparte and several others, including a myriad of political bosses he referred to as "game politicians."[161] These political figures, he observed, were subjected to deprivations, either to themselves or other components of their self-systems. Further, developing low self-estimates they subsequently pursued the path to power as a way to succor their lack of self-esteem, usually justifying their actions in terms of "collective values" or a "public interest." Especially poignant in this regard was his vignette of Napoleon.

For Napoleon, Lasswell wrote, the "picture of an inferior self, against which he struggled, was ever with him." At a fairly early age, his contentiousness complicated his early adjustments to the intimate circle. His parents, hoping to "curb his truculence," sent him to an all girls' school at the age of five. This, however, was to no avail, since his teachers and classmates "tolerated the eccentricities of the only boy among them." Also, during his early years his strong fixation

on the "mother imago" precipitated strong resentment towards his

perceived rival, his older brother Joseph. Furthermore, his years at

the military school in Brienne left him feeling "hopelessly inferior"

among his companions. "He was taunted as poor and Corsican," and his

diminutive stature only augmented his feelings of inadequacy. In

addition, he developed a private fear "lest his sexual organs were

atrophied," and this private worry no doubt contributed to his

problematic sense of masculinity. Finally, "throughout his life

Napoleon was subject to moods of melancholy and to reveries of

inferiority and isolation." Thus, Lasswell concluded,

> in fundamental respects Napoleon was very close to the true
> political type. With his insatiable craving for gestures of
> deference to his ego from fellow men, he had no durable
> interests in the objective processes of nature or the
> conditions of beauty. He sought the balm of success for his
> wounded ego, and he was forever licking his self-inflicted
> mutilations.[162]

As the above indicates, Lasswell surmised that historical evidence

as well as the data uncovered by others who used the intensive methods

of "modern empirical research" seemed to be in harmony with the findings

extracted from his own case studies. In this regard, then, he believed

that the intuitive plausibility of his compensatory thesis possessed

some foundation in reality. Seen in light of his discussion of the

phylogeny of homo politicus, the acquisition and use of power could not

be simply reduced to a conscious, rational response to the flow of

events in the public arena. Or, as Lasswell put it, "when we discover

the private basis of public acts," our "conventional schemes of

'political motivation' seem curiously aloof from the manifold reality of

human life."[163] And, without question, the ramifications of such a

conclusion, especially insofar as liberal democratic regimes are involved, are not insubstantial and without import. Yet before we attempt to examine Lasswell's frank and profoundly important discussion of these consequences, we need to finally consider how his psychopathological method laid bare the sequence which led the power oriented person to choose one specific role as opposed to another.

D. Role Selection

Whereas Lasswell's discussion as to why certain individuals were predisposed to power was undeniably straight-forward, his effort to highlight the sequence which prompted a person to evolve an "inner tie" with one specific role as opposed to another was unnecessarily elusive. As Richard Merelman has observed in this regard, Lasswell, despite intentions to the contrary, obscured or left enigmatic the dialectic of personality as it manifested itself in the selection of specific roles in the public arena. "The problem," wrote Merelman, "is that despite his meticulous case studies, Lasswell discovers no single difference between any two of these three types [administrator, agitator, theorist]. Instead, similar experiences are found among all these types."[164]

In the main, Merelman's criticism of Lasswell here was not without foundation. To be sure, Lasswell believed that the espoused role through which the compensatory power response would be effected was ultimately set by syndromes of psychological predispositions, namely, "character patterns." As he noted in this regard, two "character types" were of "special utility in accounting for specializations of the political type." These two types were the "compulsive character" and

the "dramatizing character." The "compulsive character" could be

identified by the degree to which he resorted to "rigid, obsessive ways

of handling human relations." The "dramatizing character," in contrast,

was distinguished by the "demand for immediate affective responses in

others."[165] Not surprisingly, the former emerged as administrators; the

latter, as agitators.[166]

Unfortunately, although Lasswell surmised that these "character

patterns" impacted upon role selection, he never systematically detailed

those early experiences which converged to produce either character.

Furthermore, his delineation of the linkage between character and role

choice was never made fully explicit; nor, for that matter, was it

demonstrated empirically. His discussion of this dynamic, then, was

generally rooted in intuition, and it was, for the most part,

unfortunately desultory and vague. In fact, he himself obliquely

admitted as much when he acknowledged that his "overschematic and over-

brief" case studies provided but an "inkling" of what was actually

"involved in looking into the developmental links between character

type, political type and political role."[167]

Overall, the absence of a sharply defined psychoanalytic

characterology, when coupled with an imprecise discussion of the

connection between character and role selection, culminated in a

presentation which was contradictory and incomplete. For instance, the

"character patterns" which prompted an individual to engage the role of

theorist were never clearly defined. Moreover, some of the individuals

he described were, for the most part, "compulsive" types; yet as his

discussion of them began to unfold, it soon became apparent that they

were not administrators.[168] Thus, whereas his discussion of the

developmental sequence which spawned the power centered personality was

lucid and explicit, his presentation of the psychodynamic basis of role

selection was set upon a most tenuous foundation, mired in ambiguities

and inconsistencies.

Implications of the Intensive Perspective

Having elaborated Lasswell's conception of the political

personality, it is only appropriate to take cognizance of the

ramifications which flow from such a notion. First, it is critical that

we not overstate, by way of sweeping conclusions, what Lasswell actually

intended here. Clearly, on the basis of the preceding discussion it is,

for instance, logically impermissible to infer that all those who sought

or held power were animated by a craving to alleviate the psychological

tensions associated with a lowered sense of self-esteem. In other

words, a glance behind the robes of the emperor would not always reveal

the compensatory dynamic. Even Lasswell, at a fairly early stage in his

career, was apprised of the fact that power most probably implicated a

"psychological complex of many elements."[169] Thus, even though he

believed that the propensity for power might be a compensatory reaction

taken to assuage depreciated estimates of the self, he acknowledged that

"it does not follow that power is never sought in absence of

deprivation." Instead, as he saw it, other things and concerns might

actually be involved.[170] Similarly, as was observed previously, he did

not expect that deprivations necessarily entailed a proclivity for power

responses. Sometimes the privation would be so "overwhelming" that

"resignation," as opposed to the drive for power, followed. Also, as

was mentioned earlier, he conceived that the defensive reaction did not always appear in the semblance of power. Theoretically, an individual could augment his self-esteem by concentrating on other, non-power related activities. Finally, another point which deserves to be reiterated is that Lasswell, in keeping with his "functional" conception of government, was not unaware that power centered personalities might gravitate to social institutions besides those which were the conventionally designated organs of government. Hence, depending on the existing configurations of power in society, he surmised that such persons might be found in "business, the church, and the universities."[171]

Yet, notwithstanding Lasswell's admission that power-seekers were a diverse lot, oftentimes motivated by a complex array of inclinations, the fact still remains that many who fell into this category were animated by an innate compulsion for deference. And the existence of such types of persons placed an undeniable strain on liberal democratic regimes. Such persons, bent on working out their emotional insecurities in the public arena by seeking to impose their will on others could not, in Lasswell's estimation, be automatically relied on to convert their exercise of power into publicly beneficent acts. They were hardly equipped to rule because, in the final analysis, they were puerile. As he saw it, their behavior was regressive, differing little from that of the infant who, as a result of interference in his actions in the "primary circle," sought indulgences by responding with "all the means at his disposal for inflicting deprivations upon the environment." Indeed, "it is not too far fetched to say that everyone is born a

<u>politician, and most of us outgrow it</u>." Consequently, it should come as
no surprise to discover that

> the ascendency ... of many so-called natural leaders turn out
> to be that of the successful delinquent. No one can look at
> the psychological structure of the recent tyrannies of world
> politics without recognizing that such political leadership is
> juvenile delinquency on a collossal scale. In the immediate
> struggle for power, one set of delinquents fights it out with
> another set, and with one another individually; and the
> balance of power is tipped by the weight of the psychic-
> castrates whom the successful delinquent is able to intimidate
> into accepting him as a hero.[172]

Clearly, then, persons whose accentuation of power was but an

irrational, epiphenomenal manifestation of latent subjective cravings

for deference could not be counted on to respond to posed difficulties

and crises with the objectivity and equanimity required of those who

deliberate and decide questions pertinent to the interests and needs of

citizens in a liberal democratic regime. In entering the fray of the

public arena such types took with them no rationally grounded set of

principles as to how public life should be ordered. The perspectives

they brought to positions of decision-making in a world beset by growing

social and economic dislocation and waxing international tension were

not defined by processes of rationality; such perspectives were, rather,

rationalized derivatives of their own psychic disequilibria. Further,

such persons, blinded by their desire for power, lacked the

psychological controls necessary to safeguard communal as well as

private interests and values. Frequently they dehumanized and hence

grossly objectified those they were engaged to serve. For them, human

beings could easily be reduced to mere "opportunities" to be manipulated

to service their own claims for power.[173] Also, it was not

inconceivable that when such persons captured the reins of government

that they would redefine the contours of public debate and action to
suit the standards which ensued from their own power calculus. In
short, then, it should come as no surprise that these types would show
themselves to be inimical to the democratic regime; they were, in
Lasswell's estimation, exemplars of those kinds of people who
"imperiled" the "integrity of common life" embodied by the democratic
order.[174]

On a more optimistic note, however, Lasswell conjectured that, at
least theoretically, these immature political types would have an
arduous time rising to many of the higher positions of power in stable
democratic regimes. In certain respects, the recruitment process in
such societies would either work to filter some of these people out or
else it would serve to mute their accentuation of power.[175] Yet, even
with that in mind, he found little room for solace, since he expected
that power oriented types would "continue to probe the soft spots in the
dinosaurian structures of the modern globe." Some would still have
recourse to a world of business, where they could "hope to consolidate a
monopolistic position" and thus "domineer over others." Moreover,
others would find openings in lower levels of government where the
selection process was not nearly as stringent or revealing. As a
result, some would penetrate local political machines, where even during
times of tranquility at home and abroad "the demand to coerce" as well
as the aspiration to gain access to a "position where it is possible to
impose one's will upon others" were "far from dead." Similarly, he
fully anticipated that positions in law enforcement and the military
would provide such persons an opportunity to proceed on the "way up."[176]

Finally, as many of Lasswell's own case stuides underscore, such types
would continue to infiltrate administrative offices as well as positions
on the bench. And, as his own studies highlight, the presence of such
types, even at these lower and middle tiers of government, could prove
to be disconcerting. Especially in the bureaucratic and judicial organs
of government, the appearance of such types was unpalatable for an
American regime which promised impartial and equitable treatment of its
citizens.[177] In addition, given the accretion of power, control and
independence of governmental bureaucracies in the modern industrial
state, it scarcely needs to be mentioned that such types would have
ample opportunity to distort or impair the collective processes of
social life.

Although Lasswell acknowledged that open, democratic societies like
the United States were probably best suited to mitigate, even if they
could not wholly eschew, the baneful rule of political personalities, he
nonetheless indicated that even the ability of such societies to succeed
in this regard rested on a most tenuous foundation. Specifically, he
expected that even in such societies there would be times when people
would be inclined to submit to the "power oriented person." And this
was especially true when adverse or deprivational conditions prevailed.
Though a more detailed discussion of the dynamics and consequences
touched off by adversity will be taken up shortly, it is sufficient to
note here that he believed "sharp changes in the I:D ratio" increased
the overall levels of tension and anxiety in society, creating demands
for some form of "corrective action." In instances such as these he
thought it was not inconceivable that the "anxiety ridden, helpless

citizen" would "attach" himself to a domineering leader. By identifying

with such a leader, the "helpless citizen," Lasswell noted, could

diminish his own anxiousness and ameliorate his feelings of

helplessness.[178] In fact, he believed that it was this peculiar

phenomenon which was operative in the successes of the Nazis in Germany,

a country where the "conventionalities of orderly government" had been

"swept aside." In this case, Hitler, who "offered himself as the hero,"

supplied the people with "overt" and "magical acts," a move which

"assuaged the emotional conflicts of the lower bourgeoise" and "renewed"

their "self-confidence" when set against the "rough deprivations of

daily life." Consequently, through an identification with Hitler many

aggrieved persons were enabled to restore their own sense of self-

worth.[179] And it was instances like Germany and Italy--where the

people, "utterly disillusioned about the prospects of salvation by

discussion," "submitted blindly to the ʽleaderʼ"--which led Lasswell to

posit that the freedom of men everywhere would be in jeopardy until

regimes were relieved of "social anxiety."

> The appearance of a tyrant is an extreme sign of mass demands
> for the devalued self to depend upon someone else. So long as
> these dependency demands are generated in the lives of men,
> the masses will force themselves upon potential tyrants, even
> though at first glance it looks as though the tyrants were
> forcing themselves on the masses.[180]

In effect, what this meant was that the survival of liberal

democracy was contingent upon the regimeʼs structural capacity to

respond to acute tensions endemic to society with at least a modest

amount of effectiveness. But as many of Lasswellʼs own writings

indicate, there was good reason to believe that traditional procedures

constitutive of democratic politics compounded rather than dissipated

levels of stress in society. In general, he believed that democracy, as
it was usually conceived and implemented, imposed unrealistic demands on
the populace. Further, he maintained that the lack of realism inherent
to democratic orthodoxy could be traced to its fanciful presuppositions
and its impractical techniques of procedure.

Now, according to Lasswell, democratic orthodoxy presumed that the
citizen, acting within a framework of representative institutions, was
primarily a free, rational, calculating individual who was capable of
making policy choices to advance his own interests as he understood
them. It furthermore posited that the individual "should be consulted"
in the creation and articulation of public policy, especially if that
policy impinged on his interests. This, in turn, meant that the
fundamental procedures of democracy had to be tailored to expedite the
expression, exchange, and negotiation of citizens' concerns and demands,
thereby leaving the "coast clear for bargain and compromise, or for
creative invention and integration."[181]

As Lasswell understood it, however, this vision of democracy
propounded by the orthodox democrat was problematic. First, he believed
that its most basic premise, namely, that "each man is the best judge of
his own interest," was not inviolable. In this regard a simple
recollection of his discussion of the limits he ascribed to logical
thinking reveals why he found such a presupposition to be the product
more of romanticism than reality. As long as individuals remained
encumbered by subjective compulsions shrouded from waking consciousness,
their vision and assessment of the world would, as was made clear in our
discussion of free-fantasy, suffer at least some distortion. With his

ratiocinative capacities bound and crippled by obtrusive yet disguised meanings, it therefore had to be admitted that oftentimes the individual was really a "poor judge of his own interest."[182] And, furthermore, such a state of affairs would only be exacerbated in times of adversity when "bruises to the ego" were "most prevalent," and the "task of using the mind" became "most complex."[183]

As Lasswell saw it, this inability to see the world objectively meant that frequently an individual was not the best judge of his own interests. Often a person who selected a "policy as a symbol of his wants" was usually only "trying to relieve his own disorders by irrelevant palliatives." Further investigation would more than likely show that a person's conception of "his own interests" was actually "far removed from the course of procedure" which would facilitate his adjustment and happiness. The general upshot of all this, moreover, was that the demands which were to be expressed and consulted in a democratic polity were but of "limited relevance to social needs" or "changes" which would bring about "permanent reductions in the tension level of society."[184] Consequently, the solution which was oftentimes advocated and adopted to rectify problems of collective life was not the "rationally best" solution, but rather it was the most "emotionally satisfactory one." And as long as the "rational and dialectical phases of politics" were "subsidiary to the process of redefining an emotional consensus," Lasswell concluded that

> [i]t should not be hastily assumed that because a particular
> set of controversies passes out of the public mind that the
> implied problems were solved in any fundamental sense. Quite
> often the solution is a magical solution which changes nothing
> in the tension level of the community .... The number of
> statutes which pass the legislature, or the number of decrees

which are handed down by the executive, but which change
nothing in the permanent practices of society, is a rough
index of the role of magic in politics.[185]

Once it was acknowledged that the individual was hardly equipped to
discern his best interest with regard to the determination of policy, it
is not necessary to look very far to find the reason as to why Lasswell
considered that the basic procedure of democratic orthodoxy, debate, was
a mechanism inappropriate to service the interests of the public weal.
Spirited debate by people ignorant of their true interests would not
produce a tempered, rational response to social afflictions. Rather,
"discussion" in many respects intensified "social difficulties," since
debate by "far-flung interests" frequently aroused a "psychology of
conflict" which produced "obstructive, fictitious, and irrelevant
values." Ultimately, public discourse became the medium through which
"the irrational bases of society" were brought out into the open,
yielding "modifications in social practices which complicate social
problems."[186] Little wonder, then, that Lasswell would find that the
existing mechanism of "collective deliberation may be susceptible to
improvement," or even that he would further conclude that "the time has
come to abandon the assumption that the problem of politics is the
problem of promoting discussion among all interests concerned in a given
problem."[187]

As long as he understood "politics" to be the "arena of the
irrational" or the "sphere of conflict" that brought "out all the vanity
and venom, the narcissism and aggression of the contending parties," it
should not at all seem curious or odd that Lasswell would periodically
betray his belief that the survival of liberal democracy, as it was

conventionally understood and put into practice, was anything but
assured. Indeed, a democratic society fraught with adversities which
were propitious for the "seizure of power" by power centered types was
not only not well-equipped to deal with its misfortunes, but it in fact
only worked to compound them.[188]

III

The Extensive Perspective

As Lasswell saw it, then, the liberal democratic regime possessed a
most precarious fate. This, he conjectured, was as true for the
American polity as it was for other liberal democratic orders. Moreover,
it is with regard to the prospective fragility of democracy in the
United States that a consideration of Lasswell's dialectical move from
the intensive to the extensive vantage point within the equilibrium and
developmental standpoints constitutive of configurative analysis can be
most illuminating and telling.

Elites

In adhering to his professed claim that a naturalistic political
science centered on the shaping and allocation of power and influence in
any given society, Lasswell, in espousing a more extensive standpoint
vis-a-vis the larger configuration of events, directed his attention to
the phenomenon of value stratification. In other words, in what has now
become the rather well-known Lasswellian parlance, he focused directly
on the question of "who gets what, when, and how."

A. The Character of Elites

Overall, Lasswell expected that an examination of the composition and shape of values within any social collectivity would ultimately reveal that some persons were more proficient at getting what there was to get; thus he observed that in any community at a given time the geometrical "distribution" of predominant societal values approximated a "pyramid." Further, those who were at the apex of the "pyramid" were the elite; the rest were the "rank and file" or the "mass."[189]

Although Lasswell believed that, at least historically, most societies were characterized by an asymmetrical distribution of values, his discussion of the elite-mass dichotomy indicated that this two-tiered relationship could take on additional complexities as it manifested itself empirically. Thus he admonished his readers to be apprised that when it comes to the analysis of elites "we can expect no static certainty," while he also warned them that the configuration of elites at any given time must be "discovered by research and not settled by arbitrary definition."[190]

First, in this regard, he noted that the elite-mass phenomenon was not immutable; it was, rather, a dynamic, evolving relationship. Basic changes in the prevailing social equilibrium, he surmised, almost always brought a concomitant transformation in the character of the elite stratum. On this point, he approvingly quoted the prominent elite theorist, Geatano Mosca, who wrote that the "'ruling classes decline inevitably ... when their talents and the services they render lose in importance in the social environment in which they live.'" Most simply, what this meant was that in any given context certain skills would be

considered more crucial than others, meaning that people who possessed

such skills would have more than ample opportunity to replace people

whose abilities no longer corresponded to the exigencies of the social

situation. This, he pointed out, is what happened historically when

elites of the feudal era, those who were skilled in fighting, were

eventually displaced by those who were adept in organization, an

ability considered so "essential to the consolidation of the national

monarchies." It also happened during the era of industrialization, when

proficiency in "bargaining brought the plutocrat into his own."

Finally, Lasswell thought that there were strong indications that a new

elite transformation was beginning to take hold. The acceleration of

industrialization, which encouraged differentiation, specialization and

interdependence in the work-force, when coupled with rapid technological

advances and the emergence of a new world order, produced, in Lasswell's

mind, a modified environment hospitable to people skilled in

management, coordination and communication. Included within this

incipient aggregate of elites were those who possessed highly

specialized and technical knowledge, namely, the intelligentsia. This

"intellectual class" surely included, though it was not restricted to,

specialists in analysis, propaganda, administration, party and labor

organization, and even the new masters of violence. And, as Lasswell

was quick to point out, it was this so-called "middle-income skill

group" which was emerging to challenge the hegemony of the plutocrats

and the entrepreneurs.[191]

Apart from stressing the dynanism and fluidity of the elite-mass

relationship, Lasswell also observed that, at least theoretically,

elites in any particular society did not necessarily constitute a
monolithic group. Rather, he believed that within any community or
social environment there might actually be a plurality of elites, with
each specific aggregate of individuals corresponding to a different
value and the network of social institutions which shaped it. It was,
then, conceivable that elites in regard to one value outcome could be
differentiated from the elites who managed to control other value
outcomes. Thus with respect to the study of elites "different results"
might be "obtained by using different values."[192]

Yet even though he granted the possibility of the existence of a
plurality of elite groupings, he himself admitted more than once that,
in fact, such pluralism was really quite exceptional. To be sure, he
acknowledged, for instance, that a peculiar "individual may have a
considerable amount of power without other forms of influence";
nonetheless, he also maintained that it was "clear on reflection" that
people who garnered a "top position with respect to one value" usually
held "corresponding favorable positions with respect to other
values."[193] Conversely, those who occupied a relatively low position
with respect to one value would more than likely approximate a similar
position with regard to the other values as well. This empirical
correspondence of value magnitudes, he further added, was known as
"value agglutination."[194]

As Lasswell understood it, then, most social collectivities were
distinguished by an elite-mass dichotomy. Thus, by implication, within
any social environment power was allocated in an asymmetrical manner;
indeed, it was an "empirical property of the power distribution that it

ordinarily has a low distribution index." Therefore the "discovery that

in all large scale societies the decisions at any given time are

typically in the hands of a small number of people" should not seem

anomolous, for it only "affirms a basic fact." And this was as true for

a republic as it was for an autocracy, since even "the citizens of a

republic are not all equally active in their participation in the

process of decision-making; a few exercise a relatively great weight of

power, and many exercise comparatively little."[195] Consequently, as far

as power was concerned the elite-mass dualism was "universal."[196]

Moreover, given the "empirical correspondence" between value patterns,

those vested with the greatest share of power, as witnessed by the

phenomenon of "value agglutination," were usually the elite with regard

to control over the rest of the values. Hence, Laswell wrote,

> in large-scale societies we are accustomed to assume that
> values are unequally distributed,.... Income figures amply
> bear out the expectation of inequality, and although the
> correspondence is far from perfect, it is not far wide of the
> mark to assert that in most modern states inequalities of
> economic income are roughly paralleled by inequalities of
> power, well-being, and all other values.[197]

With respect to pertinent values, elites by definition possessed a

most favorable I:D ratio. And given that man sought to maximize his

indulgences and minimize his deprivations it should come as no surprise

to learn that members of the elite stratum of society would resort to

various machinations to perpetuate their position of eminence. Any

elite, Laswell noted, sought to preserve its advantageous position on

the hierarchy of values through "manipulation of the environment." Even

more to the point, he conjectured that, in the final analysis, the

"fate" of any elite aggregate was "profoundly affected" by the medley of

techniques it relied on to control its milieu. Especially critical on
this count, Lasswell added, were the ways elites manipulated the
allocation of goods and services, institutional practices, instruments
of violence, and symbols.[198]

B. Modes of Domination

1. Control of Goods and Services. Elite stability, Lasswell
wrote, was "peculiarly bound up" with the "oscillations of economic
life"; and, he added, when its actions failed to "coincide with
prosperity" it was vulnerable to "domestic attack."[199]

When it came to the navigation of economic currents, elites, he
wrote, had two principal means of control: rationing and pricing.
Rationing of goods and services was especially suited to deal with
market scarcities and inequities. Its primary disadvantage was that it
clearly fixed responsibility; thus "slow, clumsy, or ill-advised action"
frequently worked to "undermine respect for constituted authority." The
pricing or free-market system, in contrast, obscured responsibility for
the apportionment of goods and services. Its outcomes appeared to be
the result of a "depersonalized procedure for which no one seemed
responsible." This, in turn, helped to at least partially shield
elites from obloquy and popular reprisal. Yet pricing, too, was not
without its weaknesses. When left to its own devices, the free-market
system lacked stability and continuity, and it oftentimes produced
unconscionable levels of inequity, scarcity and dislocation. Left
unchecked, it frequently became a source of mass discontent.[200]

As Lasswell saw it, elite survival was predicated on the
implementation of an apt mixture of these two systems. This meant that

"pricing," though it was the "safest device of 'smooth water' sailing," required a "supplement of rationing when the breakers of discontent" were "at hand." Both methods were "available to any elite, whether in Soviet Russia or in the United States." And, he added, elites of these two countries had, at different junctures in their economic development, resorted to various combinations of these two forms of distribution.[201] In any event, regardless as to the nature of the country of the elite, Lasswell believed that the task of finding the best means for the allocation of goods and services, because it was so critical for elite preservation, required a great deal of the elite's attention. This was especially true when it was understood that such a task had to be effected within an increasingly interdependent yet highly competitive world economic order, where the elites of all nations concerned sought both domestic and international advantages.

2. Control of Practices. The strength and continuity of any specific elite, Lasswell observed, "partially depends" on its success in the manipulation of the practices of governance. Observing that practices were "changeable details within a changing whole," Lasswell first of all noted that elites could perpetuate their hegemony by adjusting the existing order of institutional arrangements so as to accommodate levels of social tension and stress. Such a modification was useful because it served a cathartic function. Indeed, he surmised that many twentieth century elites of capitalist countries demonstrated how the manipulation of practices could dissipate levels of discontent. By placing questions of democratic procedures and education on the public agenda, they were able to divert or contain hostility

precipitated by an inequitable distribution of property. In effect,
those elites "drained" animosity and dissatisfaction "into crusades for
universal suffrage, proportional representation, and free public
education." This, he added, allowed them to stave off "revolutionary
upset."[202]

Though cognizant of the cathartic effects of minor adjustments in
the existing arrangement of practices, Lasswell suggested that a
periodic release of societal tension effected by subtle modifications in
procedures and habits would not suffice to ensure elite stability.
Rather, as he understood it, occasionally more drastic action would be
required. And, he added, in cases such as these, where more significant
changes in the prevailing constellation of practices were demanded,
elite preservation ultimately became a function of an elite's ability to
find and implement those mixtures of practices which corresponded to
different junctures presented by an ever "changing whole." Elites,
therefore, generally found it unprofitable to "consider any practice
apart from the principal features of the context in which it operates."
As Lasswell made unmistakably clear, self-interested elites were more
than ready to make concessions to expediency at the expense of some
greater principle when it came to putting practices into effect.
Generally, elites resolved questions on matters such as the devolution
of authority, forms of representation, toleration of dissent and the
character of individuals recruited not by appeals to objective
standards; rather, such issues were decided by elites according to very
provincial, self-serving interests.[203]

3. Control of Violence. Without question, the most obvious way an elite preserved its position of dominance was through a manipulation of the techniques of coercion. As Lasswell made clear, "control over the instruments of violence" was at least a "necessary" even if it was not a "sufficient condition" for elite continuity and strength. Consequently, it should come as no surprise to find that elite prerogatives with regard to violence were "most tenaciously held" or that they were, moreover, rarely "subject to concessions."[204]

The historical reliance on measures of coercion for elite protection with regard to foreign attack and domestic insurrection was, as Lasswell carefully detailed, a well-known fact. But he also observed that rarely did a stable elite use just brute force to sustain its position. Especially in a domestic setting it was the threat and control of violence as opposed to its actual application which was most critical. In short, successful elites used coercion sparingly and judiciously, and even then they generally subordinated it to other mechanisms of control; indeed, the "exercise of violence" was more an indication of an elite's weakness as opposed to an index of its strength. Thus he wrote: "[An] elite depends predominantly on the exercise of violence only when first established or just before collapse." This point was also affirmed when he approvingly quoted Merriam who, in his book, Political Power, remarked: "'Power is not strongest when it uses violence, but weakest.... Rape is not evidence of irresistible power in politics or sex.'"[205]

4. Control of Symbols. Of the four primary modes of elite domination considered by Lasswell, probably none was given more

attention than the phenomenon of symbol manipulation. Although a
complete discussion of Lasswell's copious studies of the relationship
between symbols and politics would be most evocative, such a treatment
remains outside our scope of concerns here. Rather, our interests
remain confined to his attention to symbol manipulation as a species of
elite control.

According to Lasswell, the direction of goods, practices, and
violence was insufficient to ensure elite hegemony. It was, he
believed, also necessary for them to convert their "might to right," to
transform their power into authority. Their possession and exercise of
power and influence, in other words, needed to be perceived as
legitimate, that is, as "just and proper." Rousseau, Lasswell noted,
was keenly aware of this matter when he declared: "'The strongest man
is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his
power into right and obedience into duty'"; and, he quickly added,
Hobbes indicated the same with even greater concision when he bluntly
observed: "'Even the tyrant must sleep.'"[206]

In Lasswell's estimation, "might" was tantamount to "right" when
the elite and their corresponding activities gained subjective
foundation in the community at large; indeed, the "ruling order" was
"protected when certain loyalties, demands and expectations" were "taken
for granted." Such "attitudes," moreover, were usually "nonrationally
accepted." Thus they were like the "noble lies" of Plato, the "myths"
of Sorel, the "ideology" of Marx, and the "ideology" and "utopia" of
Mannheim. Yet, notwithstanding the possibility that they might be non-
rational or even spurious, the persistence of these "attitudes" could

not be taken lightly. Such beliefs conferred authority and legitimacy on the "ruling order" and, as a result, fortified its position within the larger collectivity.[207]

Traditionally, such beliefs which supported the status and actions of the ruling few were forged out of the "bonds of personal loyalty and affection." But, Lasswell noted, when the democratic epoch came to fruition, ushering in the "idolatry of the individual," the "ties of automatic allegiance" which "bound a man to his chief" were "dissolved." To fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of fidelity, elites found it necessary to manufacture a new consensus or myth which would allow them to transform their "might" into "right." In moving to that end, they rediscovered the import of the "passions" in social life, and they soon recognized the efficacy "of words, of news, of opinion" in the direction and manipulation of those passions. And so, observed Lasswell, propaganda was conceived; hence as long as the masses would "not love, honour and obey" they could "not expect to escape seduction."[208]

"Propaganda," as Lasswell understood it in its "broadest sense," was the "manipulation of representations" for the alleged purpose of shaping or affecting human attitudes and behavior.[209] Later, elaborating the concept in more specific terms, he wrote that propaganda, when it was construed as a "form of social control," referred to the "management of collective attitudes" through the use of "significant symbols."[210] These "significant symbols," in turn, encompassed "words" and "word substitutes"—pictures, gestures, icons and so forth—which purported "meaning or significance in any sense."[211]

In Lasswell´s estimation, the use of propaganda by elites was "ever present." Furthermore, he believed it would "most surely" continue unabated. As he saw it, elites everywhere asserted and defended themselves in the "name of symbols" of a "common destiny." By invoking "sanctioned words and gestures" they found it possible to "elicit blood, work, taxes, applause from the masses."[212] And, he added, propaganda demonstrated its utility in both open and closed societies; indeed, he found America´s debt to propaganda to be "very great." "With the democratization of the suffrage and the westward bulge of the nation, America," he wrote,

> developed remarkable devices of electoral propaganda.
> Torchlight processions, barbecues, and all the para-
> phernalia of popular excitement stirred the rank and file of
> the American people to a virile sense of participation in
> the great decisions of the hour.... In war ... propaganda
> rallied the energies of the nation. Great humanitarian
> causes--educational, recreational, curative--depended upon
> skillful appeals for gifts.[213]

Consequently, Lasswell did not believe that propaganda was the special weapon of the autocrats. It was, rather, a tool to be wielded by rulers of all kinds of regimes. Indeed, Lasswell observed: "Any well-knit way of life molds human behavior into its own design. The individualism of bourgeois society like the communism of a socialized state must be inculcated from the nursery to the grave."[214]

In understanding the importance Lasswell attached to propaganda for open, advanced societies, it is first of all critical to recall that he believed the current epoch was witnessing a robust growth of a "new self-will" which corroded the loyalties and allegiances sanctioned by antiquity. "Impersonality," in other words, had "supplanted loyalty to leaders." This tempest of "willfulness," moreover, coincided with and

was further reinforced by the advent of momentous technological achievements. When applied to the means of production, this "modern technology" spawned a "multiplicity of special environments." Hence, not only did it fracture current patterns of human relationships, but it also created a more diverse and complex social milieu.[215] When set against this backdrop, it soon becomes apparent why Lasswell would find that the "modern world" was "peculiarly dependent" upon propaganda. As long as conditions of "willfulness" and social heterogeneity prevailed, "concerted action" in "large scale 'normal operations'" and "crisis" situations required the "coordination of atomized components" which could best be accomplished by "skillfully guiding the minds of men" through "symbolic manipulation," a "means of mass mobilization" which was "cheaper" than other forms of control. Consequently, although democracy had "proclaimed the dictatorship of palaver," propaganda had risen to "eminence" as the "technique of dictating to the dictator."[216] Probably at no other time was this more evident than during periods of international conflict. Crisis situations made the "management of opinion" "unescapable." Absence of traditional perceptions of obligation, when coupled with increasing social heterogeneity made it no longer practicable, Lasswell averred,

> ... to fuse the waywardness of individuals in the furnace of
> the war dance; a new and subtler instrument must weld
> thousands and even millions of human beings into one
> amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope. A new flame must
> burn out the canker of dissent and temper the steel of
> bellicose enthusiasm. The name of this new hammer and anvil
> of social solidarity is propaganda. Talk must take the place
> of drill; print must supplant the dance.[217]

So conceived, propaganda was the means which could be used to blend together diffuse social elements in support of collective action. The

demise of traditional patterns of loyalty, when coupled with an
unprecedented growth of social heterogeneity, made it invaluable for
elite stability. Yet an acknowledgement of the salience of propaganda
in the modern context does not answer the question as to why Lasswell
thought it was such an efficacious means of control. Here the reasons
why he believed it was so effective can only be found in his discussion
of the actual mechanics of propaganda.

Now, as far as the operation of propaganda was concerned, Lasswell
first of all observed that elites who sought to perpetuate their
position by warding off foreign and domestic challenges through the
manipulation of symbols approached the "will of the people" not with
"reverence" but rather with "candor and hard thinking." "Like the
modern psychologist," those who engaged propaganda were acutely aware
that individuals were "often poor judges of their own interests." In
their estimation, the masses could be both vacillatory and obdurate; the
people either moved from one "alternative to the next without solid
reason" or else they stubbornly adhered to the "fragments of some mossy
rock of ages." In short, in the minds of those who resorted to
propaganda the "will of the people" was strictly a "matter of fact," not
something which was sacrosanct. And since they conceived of it as
purely a "matter of fact," they believed that, within certain limits, it
could be molded to suit their own designs.[218]

In approaching the people's will with a hard-headed realism, those
who engaged propaganda had a distinctive purpose in mind. Their
intentions were, first, to inculcate and reinforce dispositions
supportive of their position and aims, and, second, to neutralize

attitudes antagonistic to their goals. Quite simply, they were concerned with the defense and dissemination of that ideology or myth which sustained "existing methods" used to gain values and which, furthermore, sanctioned the current distribution of values in society.[219]

Now, according to Lasswell, elites who relied on propaganda gauged their symbolic appeals to the emotional needs of the "rank and file." This was made possible because symbols, with their "reference points" far removed from the "daily experiences of the masses," were inherently equivocal.[220] Such ambiguity, in turn, made it easy for the "rank and file" to impute their own private meanings to symbols invoked by the elite. Thus such symbols easily became repositories of the masses' fears, hopes, animosities and loves. This, Lasswell made quite clear, was not an uncommon occurrence, since historically "nations," "classes," "tribes" and so forth "have been treated as collective symbols in the name of which the individual may indulge his elementary urges for supreme power, for omniscience, for amorality, for security."[221] And propagandists, cognizant that "symbols" were so "intertwined with the whole personality integration of an individual," presented symbols in a manner which would assuage the emotional stresses and insecurities provoked by deprivational practices. In short, they provided representations which could "answer the psychic necessities of the masses." Thus, for instance, the desire for power among members of the "rank and file," though "not gratified in immediate reality," could be vicariously satisfied by symbols which facilitated identification with a "secondary self" which was "bigger, wiser, and greater." Likewise, "emotional stress" associated with other unsatisfied desires could be

discharged in a similar way. Consequently, "affectionate impulses," if they were not wholly "exhausted in the world of immediate reality," could find expression in "submissive devotions to common leaders, emblems, rituals, and tasks." Moreover, impulses to "despise the puny self" could be "projected upon the common enemy"; he could be "treated as weak," for his defeat was considered to be imminent. Finally, "impulses to condemn the 'immoral' tendencies of the self" could be appeased by facilitating their projection "upon others"; hence "not the self" but rather the "world outside" could be treated as "conspirative, treasonable, and immoral."[222]

Through a dexterous management of symbols, therefore, an elite, without effecting fundamental changes in practices or value distribution, could provide a cathartic release of dangerously high levels of social tension which, if left unchecked, would otherwise be corrosive of its subjective foundation in the community at large. Furthermore, by providing this kind of psychological release, elites not only deflected prospective challenges but they also cleverly exploited the subjective cravings of the masses in a way which worked to fortify their position. Hostile impulses could be directed to symbols of domestic and foreign adversaries, and the fulfillment of ungratified cravings for things like power, rectitude, respect, affection and so forth could be skillfully wedded to the collective symbols woven into that ideology which supported the existing elite. Thus with the emergence of propaganda the "rulers of yesterday who depended on bread, circuses, and wars to protect them from domestic disturbances" had given way to an elite "adept at diverting, distracting, confusing, and

dissipating the insecurities of the mass by the circulation of efficacious symbols."[223]

Elite Transformation

In the final analysis, Lasswell's writings on elites coalesced to form a most formidable challenge to the basic assumptions and tenets of democratic liberalism. Indeed, as long as political control was vested in a self-serving elite who possessed a disproportionate amount of influence and power, government predicated on the existence of a citizenry composed of people sharing equal influence was only an illusion. This discovery of elite prepotency, moreover, not only discredited the fundamental notion of egalitarianism, but it also vitiated the belief that through participation citizens played an active role in the articulation and control of public policy.

To be sure, Lasswell's discovery of elite dominion ostensibly undermined much of what had passed for liberal democratic orthodoxy. Yet, the severity of such a challenge notwithstanding, what was probably even more ominous and damaging was his analysis of the elite phenomena within the encompassing framework provided by linking the developmental perspective to the more static mode of equilibrium analysis.

A. Elite Change

As much of the foregoing suggests, Lasswell harbored little doubt that elites, because of their control over goods and services, practices, instruments of coercion, and symbols, were "well-situated" to manipulate the environment in ways which supported their aims. At the same time, he conceded that any particular elite's position with respect

to the allocation of societal values could prove to be quite tenuous;

indeed, the chronicles of history were "replete with instances of the

loss of peaceful ascendancy by ruling elites in war and revolution."[224]

Essentially, Lasswell thought the propensity for individuals to oppose

the ruling order and the melange of symbols it propagated was ultimately

a function of a low degree of "value actualization and realization" by

the masses; thus among an "embittered and restless people" the

practices and operative myth of the "established order" were in

"peril."[225] And in his view the reasons as to why the "ruling order"

was endangered here were by no means difficult to grasp once the

dialectics of personality underlying value deprivations was adequately

understood.

As has been noted, Lasswell surmised that value deprivations, since

they entailed supervening blows to self-respect, worked to augment

"emotional tension" and "anxiety." He further believed that this

accretion of "emotional insecurity" usually prompted an individual to

seek a compensatory response which would relieve his anxiety. This was

very much in line with what was referred to earlier as the "maximization

principle." To be sure, some of these individuals, by selecting one

"neurotic alternative or another," would try to resolve their emotional

difficulties in a wholly "private way." Yet, he added, "most people"

would not be inclined to adopt such an egocentric posture. In fact, he

believed a majority would offset deprivations and concomitant anxieties

through abnegation of affection for symbols disseminated by the ruling

order. Moreover, he expected such persons would complete their

adjustment by substituting a "new set" of indulgent "collective symbols"

for those linked with the elite responsible for their suffering. Thus, insofar as the deprived individual was concerned, the sequence of events most likely proceeded as follows: "[I]f I can no longer love the king, I can love mankind; if I can no longer love God, I can love the nation; if I can no longer love the country, I can love the proletariat."[226]

Generally speaking, Lasswell believed that under adverse, deprivational conditions it would not be unusual to find that people easily fell for the remonstrances of those who condemned the "system." Understandably, "revolutionary" protests, forged out of an allegiance to some novel, unifying and putatively more indulgent "utopian symbol," worked to mitigate emotional insecurities and tensions by turning "collective aggressions against the patterns formerly held in esteem" while holding out the promise of a qualitatively better way of life.[227] This, in fact, was what he and Dorothy Blumenstock uncovered in their investigation of the collective attitudes and behavior which obtained in Chicago during the earliest, least indulgent years of the depression. Specifically, their study revealed that this period of economic convulsion was distinguished by the recrudescence and proliferation of "revolutionary symbols" and actions directed against the "ruling elite of the United States."[228]

In general, the full significance of Lasswell's discussion of the elite-mass dialectic can be brought into sharper focus when it is construed within the more encompassing context defined by his understanding of the "internal evolution" of "technoscientific societies," especially those which, like the United States, manifested themselves as capitalistic, liberal democratic regimes. Especially

relevant for our purposes here was his suggestion that the regimen of

the modern industrial economy found in a liberal bourgeois society like

the United States worked to foment mass insecurity and dissatisfaction,

thereby leaving the "ruling elite" with a rather tenuous grip on their

position of dominance.

For the most part, Lasswell conjectured that the "internal

evolution" of modern capitalistic societies created problems for elites

because it engendered high levels of mass deprivation and anxiety.

This, he concluded, came about in two different ways. The first was

related to the internal, domestic consequences of capitalistic

development; the second, to its external effects in the international

environment.

With regard to the domestic implications of bourgeois capitalism, he

first of all charged that such societies contributed to self-

impoverishment. The "deeper consequence" of those "changing life

configurations" induced by the application of new technologies which

sundered traditional, generally more fraternal, patterns of social

intercourse was a proliferation of "anomie," a feeling of "anonymity,"

of being an "entity deprived of humanity."[229] Secondly, he indicated

that such societies engendered human obsolescence. As a result of

"technical change," human beings were constantly being "severed" from

their positions in the workplace; and that, in effect, was essentially

tantamount to telling people they were "useless" or "functionless."

Furthermore, to only compound their problems and "humiliation," these

displaced people were frequently singled out as a "burden to society,"

characterized as a "drag on the taxpayer." In his view, therefore, they

were dealt an acute "double blow": they were deprived of economic security and stripped of self-respect.[230] Finally, Lasswell indicated that the "erratic tempo" of development associated with such economies put individuals under severe emotional strain. The "fundamental problem" facing such societies, he observed, was the need to stabilize the irregular pattern of "social change" which coincided with the "advent of the machine."[231] Indeed, he believed that the oscillations in economic life associated with such societies was even "more upsetting" than the actual "speed" of social change, for it was precisely during these times of "irregularity" that the "position of the ego" was "least secure" and correlative "crises of deference" were most "intense."[232]

Apart from these direct consequences brought on by the "internal evolution" of such societies, Lasswell also charged that the dynamics of liberal capitalistic economies aggravated the tension which marked the network of nation-state relations which defined the international context. "Crises of war and insecurity," he once lamented, "are often among the unintended consequences of economic policy."[233] Basically, he believed this was true because the uneven rate and impact of foreign trade and investment policies pursued by, say, the United States, complicated the rather intricate balancing of power process which obtained in the arena of world politics. Hence observing that the United States and the Soviet Union were the "fixed points" or "polar opposites" which defined the "bipolar" configuration of power which characterized global politics, Lasswell indicated that the extent and character of the United States' penetration into foreign markets figured

as a salient variable when it came to the calculations of power which
determined both the tone and course of Soviet strategy in global
affairs. Consequently, as long as American trade and investment policy
and erratic rate of development impacted on the internal affairs and
actions of countries even marginally associated with the Soviet sphere
of influence, there was little chance that a stable, safe and lasting
balance of power between these two formidable adversaries would be
secured.[234]

> Crises of world insecurity are favored by whatever results in
> erratic rates of social development in different parts of the
> world and in the world as a whole. Our economy, in
> particular, is a source of erratic change, partly because it
> is unbalanced in time and space .... Our economic impact
> modifies the balance of power, and in the postwar world the
> effect will be to complicate our relations with the other most
> powerful state on the globe, Russia.[235]

As he saw it, then, in the forseeable future the international political
arena would remain unstable and insecure; and that, in his view, meant a
heightened expectation of violence and a concomitant increase of
insecurity among the populations involved.

As can be seen from much of the foregoing, Lasswell felt that the
"internal evolution" of modern, capitalistic societies resulted in mass
deprivation. To recapitulate, the spread of "anomie," the exceptionally
high levels of economic dislocation, and the intensified crises in
"deference," all of which were associated with the "internal evolution"
of modern, liberal bourgeois societies, left the masses feeling
deprived, alienated, humiliated and anxious. At the same time, the
heightened expectation of violence associated with an unstable
international political climate reinforced mass insecurity. And all of
this, in turn, left the masses vulnerable to the symbolic appeals of

those who, by agitating for and promising a superior way of life, satisfied the rank and file's "demands" for "collective Justice" and ministered to their psychological needs by "restoring a new sense of significance to damaged personalities."[236]

Overall, Lasswell expected the above sequence of events would produce ominous consequences for rulers as well as ruled. Among other things, it would aggravate a set of conditions which, if left unchecked, would lead "world development" away from "democracy." As far as the United States was concerned, the end result would be a basic transformation in the character of the regime, a "turning of the clock back from the hour of freedom and the forging anew of the chains of caste." In other words, the lasting consequence of all this would be a rather grim political order where "free institutions are crippled, not alone in the government, but in the market, in the forums of public enlightenment, and in the laboratories and libraries of science and scholarship."[237]

Cast somewhat differently, what he expected was a transition from democracy to "despotism." Thus he believed that these conditions where the "level of insecurity" was "high" were propitious for the rise of the "politician," that individual who "seeks to maximize power, rather than profit or honor." Finally, he averred that in the long run power would be transferred from those "politicians" skilled in persuasion to those skilled in coercion. Indeed,

> the insecurities of the contemporary world, sharpened by the vicissitudes of a rapidly expanding and rapidly contracting economy, foster the conditions of perpetual crisis which favor the seizure of power by the agitator, and the retention of power by the man of ruthless violence.[238]

Basically, the chain of reasoning underlying his rather baleful

outlook is fairly straightforward. First, in his view adverse,

deprivational conditions created by lapses and imperfections in the

economy worked to heighten insecurity and foment mass estrangement.

These conditions, in turn, favored the "emergence of leaders" "common to

all social crisis," namely, the "agitational type" of homo politicus, a

personality "whose verbal fluency, hyperexcitability, and mimetic gifts

furnish the masses with that pantomime of their own yearnings which

affords partial catharsis and partial corroboration of their emotional

demands."[239] And because they whipped the masses into a frenzy, the

agitators' rise to eminence would be most disquieting for the current

aggregate of elites. "Tormented" by their own "insecurities," and

"confronted by rival politicians" who propagated a most threatening

counter-ideology, these elites would be "tempted" to restore order to a

chaotic domestic economy by embarking on wars which would open up "areas

to the 'world market' that have been excluded from it by political

means."[240]

As Lasswell saw it, this almost visceral bellicose response by

elites would not be unusual or without precedent; indeed, history

furnished many examples in which war "aided" the "expansion of commerce

and industry" by opening new markets for capital investment, surplus

goods and raw materials.[241] And he estimated that in the short-run such

action might bring some immediate economic stability and relief.

Moreover, he was cognizant of the cathartic value of such action; hence

he recognized mass antagonism could be dissipated by directing

"aggressive impulses" away from elites and toward an external enemy.

Yet, despite the short-term advantages of such action, he surmised its long-term consequences would prove to be quite damaging for rulers as well as ruled. First, this "alternative" forced the elite "into the arms of the military and police, whether in preparation for war or in the attempt to administer 'conquered' territory." The general upshot here was that war would "not restore business" but rather would only serve to "consolidate" the position of the "military and the police."[242] Secondly, he suspected such foreign adventures would only serve to exacerbate the insecurities of an already tense international political climate. All of this, he believed, would serve to heighten the people's expectation of war; and that, when coupled with the oscillations in economic life, would provoke high levels of anxiety. Ultimately, the people, seeking both international security and economic stability, would welcome a new band of rulers who would protect them from external threats and also restore domestic order. In his estimation such a development would not be extraordinary, for in many respects it actually suited the psychological necessities of most human beings.

> Man is prepared for dependence upon others by the
> circumstances of his early relationship to his social
> environment. Every infant passes through a period in which
> the one who performs the maternal role looks after its primary
> needs without specific recompense, thus furnishing the
> experiential base for the infant's primitive mother-sentiment.
> This primitive mother-sentiment becomes detached from
> particular individuals in the environment ..., but the early
> sentiment leaves its residue in the form of a deep yearning
> for the re-establishment of complete dependence. This
> underlying sentiment is reinforced in many ways by subsequent
> sentiments, but it is always present, capable of becoming
> attached to some substitute object like God, or some human
> symbol of universal, protective omnipotence. So man is
> prepared to trust those whom he cannot rationally assess, and
> his seemingly inexhaustible yearning for dependence, for
> submission, for worship, for admiration, for loyalty, is so

generally noticed that many theorists have imputed a
biological basis to it.[243]

In the final analysis, Lasswell expected that the people's desire
to ameliorate their anxieties and insecurities prepared the foundation
for what in his view would be a new form of regime, a political order in
which democratic potentialities and aspirations would be effectively
stifled. Furthermore, it would be a regime in which the many would be
subordinated to ruthless political personalities who appeared as
"specialists on violence." It was this phenomenon which he referred to
as the garrison state.

B. Garrison State

Initially delineated by Lasswell in his 1937 article on the Sino-
Japanese conflict, the concept of the garrison state emerged as
something of a perennial topic of concern in many of his later writings.
Eventually it became, in the words of Samuel Huntington, the "dominant"
characterization of civil-military relations, one "adhered to by
intellectuals and alluded to by mass media."[244]

From the outset, Lasswell frankly admitted that the garrison state
was a developmental construct. Hence it was not offered as a "dogmatic
forecast"; rather, it was more of a "picture of the probable." The
emergence of the garrison state, then, was not "foreordained"; indeed,
he thought it possible that we might be "too deeply entangled in the
titanic movements of world affairs" to be able to distinguish the
"superficial eddies from the deeper currents of our historical epoch."
Nonetheless, in his view there was more than ample evidence to sustain
his position that even as late as the 1960's the garrison state could

still be understood as a "probable image of the past and future of our epoch."[245]

With regard to the construct itself, Lasswell took the garrison state to be the denouement of a protracted sequence of events which saw the power-driven, ruthless experts on coercion wrest control of political institutions from the more benign civilian elites. Thus, insofar as liberal democratic, bourgeois societies were concerned, the political elites, namely, those governmental officials and businessmen who possessed influence and exercised power, would be displaced by a new aggregate of individuals, the "specialists on violence."[246] Consequently, the emergence of the garrison state amounted to what he considered to be a rather subtle form of historical reversion, that is, a movement from "progress" in freedom, enlightenment and felicity "toward a world order in which the garrison-prison state reintroduces caste bound social systems." In effect, subservience under capitalism and socialism, both of which "postulate a higher level of freedom than is compatible with the garrison-prison system," was eminently preferable to supplication before those skilled in the techniques of coercion.[247]

Now, as Lasswell saw it, the catalyst responsible for this reversal in the direction of history would be the high level of insecurity created by an international environment where the threat of war continued unabated. Under such ominous conditions, the people would seek to mitigate their feelings of insecurity by subordinating themselves and their demands to an "overwhelming" concern for safety. Such a mindset, in turn, could not help but accelerate the pressures for internal militarization; indeed, in such an environment "military

considerations" would be given "increasing weight in calculations of official and private policy."[248] And this growing concern for military efficacy bore several negative results.

First, Lasswell believed the attention given to "military considerations" would abet governmental encroachment. Specifically, he expected that as businesses grew increasingly dependent upon the largesse of "defence contracts" they would eventually be forced to relinquish much of their own autonomy. Ultimately, entrepreneurs would be nothing more than "hired administrators of government programs" as they would come to rely more and more on "central decisions" for "allocations" of capital, equipment, "raw materials, specifications, and price." Furthermore, he expected a similar sort of thing would also obtain in educational and scientific activities where the government would be "asked to step in," bringing "government facilities and university talent together." And, in the final analysis, the most disturbing and "insidious outcome" of this marked governmental expansion would be a basic shift in citizens' perceptions, culminating in a "new conception of normality that takes vastly extended controls for granted, and thinks of freedom in smaller and smaller dimensions."[249]

According to Lasswell, a second consequence of internal militarization would be the acceleration of governmental centralization. Thus he wrote: "To militarize is to governmentalize. It is also to centralize." Most simply, he expected that the militarization initiated as a response to collective insecurity would eventuate in enhanced control by the "executive over the government," a culmination which would come at the expense of the "control exercised by courts and

legislatures." This almost axiomatic "tendency" towards the

centralization of the executive in "times of crisis," however, would

not, Lasswell averred, produce advantages to be "uniformly enjoyed by

all departments and agencies." Rather, in such circumstances the

"civilian agencies" would actually witness a "decline in effective

power." Only the "political police" and military establishment would

gain in "influence," thereby emerging as a kind of "self-perputating

caste."[250]

This trend towards centralization which reached its climax in

military hegemony pointed to what Lasswell took to be a third

consequence of internal militarization, that is, the rise of a

qualitatively different set of elites, the specialists in violence and

coercion. Initially starting as "advisers" to the "civilian" components

of government, soldiers and the political police would ultimately "gain

in stature" even in those "states" which possessed relatively "strong

traditions of civilian supremacy." In other words, Lasswell expected

that under conditions of international insecurity such persons would

eventually establish themselves in positions of influence and power.

Moreover, he believed that all of this would be accomplished through

mass acquiescence and approval.[251] Thus, aware of the "screaming-cooing

infant" that "continues within each of us," as well as man's propensity

for "belly-crawling abnegation before an outer image of the all-powerful

Self," he wrote:

> The atmosphere of threat and suspicion provides the incentive
> for the weak to seek protection from the stronger, which
> brings about an informal stratification of society.
> Relationships become less fluid and more fixed, as in a feudal
> form of social organization. Every person of influence is
> surrounded by dependents and retainers who fasten themselves

> upon him more tenaciously than under peaceful conditions ....
> The long-run trend under these conditions is to formalize the
> relationships of dependency-protection ....[252]

According to Lasswell, the end-result of these changes brought on
by internal militarization would be a regime heretofore unwitnessed by
mankind. Hence even though he conceded that there was no dearth of
historical precedents when it came to military societies, he emphasized
that the garrison state, because it combined ruthless leadership with
"modern technology," would constitute a radically novel social emergent.
It would be a regime in which the conditions of life would be so onerous
that the "final fact of war" would most "likely" be "less perilous."[253]
And the reasons as to why he concluded this would be the case can be
gleaned from his discussion of the specific dynamics and consequences of
this regime's form of elite control.

From the outset, Lasswell indicated that the rulers of the garrison
state, because they would rise to dominance in a "modern technical
society," would be distinguished from the "officers of history and
tradition." Thus, unlike their historical predecessors, these
"specialists on violence," so that they might transform the "modern
technical society" into a potent "fighting" association, would, Lasswell
suspected, inevitably become adept in those "skills" needed to
"translate the complicated operations of modern life" into "fighting
effectiveness." In other words, since a "realistic calculation" of
"fighting" efficacy would ultimately be linked to an understanding of
the "psychological" and "technical" facets of modern production, it
would be most "probable" that the elites of the garrison state would
acquire a "large degree" of expertise in those "skills" traditionally

enlisted by "civilian management." Therefore he expected that they
would be knowledgable in the techniques of "administrative
organization," "personnel mangement," "public relations," and production
management. Consequently, insofar as the technical proficiencies and
capacities of such an elite was concerned, we should "anticipate the
merging of skills, starting from the traditional accoutrements of the
professional soldier, moving toward the manager and promoter of large
scale civilian enterprise."[254]

For the most part, Lasswell suspected that this elite, much like
previous ruling classes, would try to control the environment and
protect their hegemony through the manipulation of symbols, goods and
services, practices, and coercion. At the same time, however, he
thought this new elite aggregate would undoubtedly be more proficient
and ruthless in its use of these instruments of domination. First,
since he anticipated that the initial phases of the garrison state would
be most plagued by "problems of morale," he expected that the
"specialists on violence" would manifest a paramount interest in the use
of propaganda. There would, in short, be an "energetic struggle to
incorporate young and old into the destiny and mission of the state."
Symbols would be manipulated so as to channel "aggressive impulses"
toward the external and internal enemies of the state. Ultimately, the
lowest stratum of society, generally the dissidents and the "unskilled
laborers," would emerge as convenient "targets of negative sentiment
against whom contempt and indignation of loyal elements are directed."
In like vein, threats presented by external enemies would be
accentuated; hence frequent "war scares" would be enlisted to ensure

compliance with the rulers' wishes. Finally, Lasswell indicated that such elites, as a result of their "energetic struggle" to absorb the rank and file into the "destiny and mission of the state," would cunningly rely on propaganda to mitigate the insecurities, anxieties, and dissatisfaction of those who, because they were "unemployed," bore the "damaging stigma of superfluity." "No doubt," he wrote, "the garrison state will be distinguished by the psychological abolition of unemployment--'psychological' because this is chiefly a matter of redefining symbols."[255]

In addition to their control of symbols, Lasswell noted that these elites would also carefully tend to the control of the production and distribution of goods and services. First, they would confront the erratic rate of development instigated by the "stupendous productive potentialities" of an economy driven by the twin engines of "science and engineering." Here Lasswell expected that the rulers of the garrison state would be fairly well set, for they would be relieved of many of the obstacles which had previously "stood in the way of adopting measures" or controls required to bring stability to the "rate of production." Secondly, he believed this aggregate of elites, in the "interest of morale," would moderate "huge differences" in income which had previously distinguished individuals. Finally, he expected that the rulers of the garrison state would discourage "immediate consumption" and hold the production of "non-military consumption goods" to a minimum.[256]

In conjunction with their control over symbols and goods and services, the "political elite" of the garrison state, in Lasswell's

view, would find it expedient to "make certain adaptations" in the basic
"practices" of governance. Therefore he expected that in such a state
elections would be replaced by plebiscites, rival parties would be
extirpated, representative institutions abolished, and freedom of speech
eliminated. Thus he wrote: "authority flows downward from the
commanders at the top; initiative from the bottom can hardly be
endured." This, in effect, meant that "decisions" would be
"dictatorial," not "democratic." Thus in practice the functions of
"law-making" would be concentrated in the "hands of the supreme
authority and his council" while plebiscites and assemblies would play a
purely symbolic role as they became nothing more than a "part of the
ceremonializing process in the military state."[257] Furthermore, he
anticipated that with the suspension of elections would come a new form
of elite recruitment, namely, "self-perpetuation through co-optation."
At the same time, however, he suspected that with regard to recruitment
the machinations of a creative, technologically sophisticated elite
would not simply stop at co-option; for, he added, "a garrison police
regime fully cognizant of science and technology can, in all
probability, eventually aspire to biologize the class and caste system
by selective breeding. Such beings can, in effect, be sown and
harvested for specialized garrison police services or for other chosen
operations."[258]

Lastly, of paramount importance for elites in the garrison state
would be the use of coercion; indeed, Lasswell noted violence would be a
most "potent instrument for internal control of the garrison state."
This, he added, was especially true since the use of coercion had a

dramatic impact on many besides those whom it reached directly. The
import of this was clearly underscored when he wrote that the "spectacle
of compulsory labour gangs in prisons or concentration camps," because
it would generally provoke deep and intense feelings of "fear and
guilt," would provide the political elite of the garrison state with a
"negative" though nonetheless efficacious "means of conserving
morale."[259] In addition, Lasswell anticipated that a technologically
sophisticated elite would turn to more subtle and effective
psychological techniques of coercive domination, including various forms
of mental manipulation and thought control. Similarly, he believed that
as a result of "recent advances in pharmocology" drugs would be used to
"replace symbolic methods" of "controlling response"; in fact, he
anticipated elites would soon discern the benefits of using drugs to
"deaden the critical function of all who are not held in esteem by the
ruling elite."[260]

C. A New Epoch?

As much of Lasswell's discussion of this elite's use of the various
techniques of control suggests, the garrison state would be a most
brutal and nefarious political order. In such a regime, all activities
and behavior would be subordinated to and hence determined by the ruling
elite's conception of the interests of the state. Consequently, there
would be "but one alternative" for those who did "not fit the structure
of the state"; and that "alternative," put simply, would be to "obey or
die."[261] Furthermore, for those who chose to adjust their lives to the
structures and dictates of the state, life, at best, would be nothing
short of slavish. Essentially, under this "most threatening of all

forms of rule," the masses would be manipulated, cajoled and coerced by a self-perpetuating caste of ruthless, power-hungry, puerile and somewhat paronoid technicians skilled in mass management and violence. Moreover, given the fundamental character of this regime, the garrison state would be highly stratified with respect to the distribution of most societal values. Finally, in the garrison state things like freedom, human dignity and democracy would be reduced to elusive ideals, that is, hallowed vestiges of an earlier epoch.[262]

As disconcerting as the "probable" emergence of the garrison state might be, however, Lasswell did not counsel surrender or despair. Because he figured this garrisoning process was "probable" and not "inevitable," he surmised that a recognition of this insidious and most "sinister probability," when joined to an evaluation of the "factors" which contributed to it, could actually be used to design and implement public policies capable of deflecting the convergence of historical forces which culminated in the garrison state. In short, what Lasswell advised was the use of understanding or "insight" to avert the rise of an "American edition" of the garrison state.[263]

Basically, Lasswell's exhortation that the knowledge derived by social science should be used to divert or master the historical forces which worked to bring about the garrison state should not seem strange or out of place. Indeed, such a demand could easily be translated into the jargon of configurative analysis as a call for a movement from the contemplative to the manipulative attitude towards political change. Such a challenge, then, dovetailed neatly with his own conception of the policy sciences, that is, those social sciences seen from the

manipulative standpoint. At the same time, however, this demand to
adopt such an orientation raised a whole new set of concerns. As has
been noted, the manipulative facet of the configurative frame of
analysis logically entails prescription, and prescription, because it is
purposive, is not neutral; rather, it is predicated on an antecedent
commitment to goals or norms. Consequently, Lasswell's advice here
brought to the surface questions which centered on the ends or purposes
for which the knowledge derived by socio-political inquiry should be
used.

NOTES

1. Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, pp. 83-84, 32.

2. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

3. Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), p. 352.

4. For example, see Fredrick Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub., 1911); and W. E. Mosher, "The Next Step in Civil Service Reform," National Municipal Review 10 (July 1921), p. 388.

5. Ernest W. Burgess, "The Influence of Sigmund Freud Upon Sociology in the United States," American Journal of Sociology 45 (Nov. 1939), pp. 357-364.

6. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 1.

7. Ibid.

8. "The Scientific Study of Human Biography," Scientific Monthly 30 (Jan. 1930), p. 79.

9. Ibid., p. 80.

10. "Personality Studies" in Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research, ed. T. V. Smith and Leonard White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 177-193.

11. "The Scientific Study of Human Biography," p. 80.

12. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 9-10.

13. "The Study of the Ill as a Method of Research into Political Personalities," p. 996.

14. Ibid., p. 1001; and Psychopathology and Politics, Chapter 1.

15. "Psychoanalytic Conceptions in Political Science," p. 66.

16. "What Psychiatrists and Political Science Can Learn from One Another," p. 37.

17. Ibid.

18. "Psychoanalytic Conceptions in Political Science," p. 66.

19. "Approaches to Human Personality: William James and Sigmund Freud," Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review 47 (Fall 1960), pp. 53, 61.

20. "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," in Analysis of Political Behavior, p. 287.

21. "Self Analysis and Judicial Thinking," International Journal of Ethics 40 (Jan. 1930), p. 362; Psychopathology and Politics, p. 26; and Democracy Through Public Opinion (Menasha, Wis.: George Bates Publishing Co., 1941), p. 50.

22. "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," p. 293; "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," pp. 361-362; Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 36-37; and Democracy Through Public Opinion, pp. 45-60.

23. "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," p. 287; and World Politics and Personal Insecurity, pp. 160-162.

24. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Chapters 2, 7; and A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Chapter 19.

25. "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," p. 289.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., pp. 289-290.

28. In "Psychoanalytic Interview" Lasswell pointed to the effect of transference as being a critical development which facilitated the subject's attempt at self- understanding in the face of strain generated by some of the thoughts uncovered during the interview. See pp. 143-144. His emphasis here, however, clearly underscored the erotic as opposed to the hostile aspects of this transference phenomenon. For a discussion of the role of transference as far as Freud was concerned, see Richard Wollheim, Sigmund Freud (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 165-172.

29. "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," pp. 289, 290; and "Intensive and Extensive Methods of Observing the Personality - Culture Manifold," Yenching Journal of Social Studies 1 (1938), p. 77.

30. "Psychoanalytic Interview," p. 142.

31. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 28.

32. "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," p. 358.

33. "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," pp. 26-27.

34. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 298. See Lasswell, "Veranderungen an einer Versuchsperson wahrend

einer kurzen Folge von psychoanalytischen Interviews," <u>Imago</u> 23 (1937),
p. 377. Lasswell referred to it as "der analytischen Grundregel der
freien Assoziation."

35. "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," p. 358.

36. "Psychoanalytic Interview, " p. 143.

37. "Appraising the Effects of Technology," p. 336.

38. "Psychoanalytic Interview," p. 141. As far as Freud was
concerned, the Oedipus complex and its corollary, the castration
complex, were central threads in orthodox psychoanalytic psychology.
In fact, he averred that inadequate responses to them usually eventuated
in neuroses. He acknowledged, however, that reactions to them were
highly variable. This was especially true for the different genders of
the species. As far as they implicated men, Freud noted that during the
phallic stage of psycho-sexual development the young boy's initial
object cathexis was his mother. Yet even though the "little man" wanted
"his mother all to himself" he was not unaware that his father was "in
the way." He desired intimacy with his mother, but he recognized she
belonged to his father, a person for whom he felt no small amount of
tenderness. The result, in most cases, was the adoption of an
ambivalent attitude towards his father. And on certain occasions the
object cathexis was so intense that it provoked parricidal impulses
towards his father. Yet, at the same time, he felt such thoughts left
him imperiled. He anticipated his compulsions would precipitate an act
of paternal retribution. "The danger" he feared was "the punishment of
being castrated, of losing his genital organ." Thus, driven by
incestual cravings and deterred by fears of brutal emasculation, the
young boy, at least in the more normal course of events, sought a via
media. That is, he assuaged his fears and satisfied his drives through
introjection of the father object. Through such an intense
identification, he could vicariously possess his mother, palliate his
fear of castration, and, finally, resolve his ambivalience towards his
father. Furthermore, this internalization culminated in the formation
of the super-ego, "the heir of the Oedipus complex."
        As far as the female of the species was concerned, however, the
process was clearly more complicated. Basic anatomical differences gave
the castration complex a radically different meaning. For the young
girl the castration complex appeared as penis envy, and it occupied a
different position in the Oedipal phase of development. Penis envy did
not precipitate a resolution of the Oedipus complex; rather, it only
initiated it. Leaving aside the more convoluted dynamics of the
transference of cathexis from mother to father which obtained for
females during the phallic stage, it is sufficient for our purposes here
to note that Freud surmised that the "castration complex prepares for
the Oedipus complex instead of destroying it; the girl is driven out of
her attachment to her mother through the influence of her envy for the
penis and she enters the Oedipus situation as though into a haven of
refuge. In the absence of fear of castration the chief motive is
lacking which leads boys to surmount the Oedipus complex ... they

[Girls] demolish it late and, even so, incompletely. In these
circumstances the formation of the super-ego must suffer; ..."
For Freud's elaboration of this phenomenon, see A General
Introduction to Psychoanalysis, pp. 339-347; The Ego and the Id, Chapter
3; and New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, pp. 62-65, 85-87,
118-135. In addition, Lasswell alluded to the dynamics of the Oedipus
complex without ever referring to it as such in his discussion of "Mr.
A" in Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 99-100.

39. Such an attitude was reflective of his later neo-Freudian
emphasis on the interpersonal context. Examples of people affected by
such deprivations would include Judges X and Z in Power and Personality,
pp. 65-72, 77-88; "Mr. B" in Democracy Through Public Opinion, pp. 51-
58. Also important in this regard is his discussion of the "game
politician" and the "gain politician" in Power, Corruption, and
Rectitude, pp. 44-55.

40. "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," p. 27.

41. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 47; "Psychoanalytic
Interview," p. 146; and "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral
Sciences," p. 27.

42. "Psychoanalytic Interview," pp. 146-147.

43. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 34; and "Psychoanalytic
Interview," p. 141.

44. "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," p. 362; and Democracy
Through Public Opinion, p. 59. As he once observed, the subject in many
cases enlisted "all sort of subterfuges" so as to "obviate the necessity
for enduring" the anxiousness percipitated by a consideration of such
offensive ideas. On certain occasions, however, the subject's tolerance
for the recognition of such material was so low as to render the whole
interview process to be impracticable. See "Psychoanalytic Interview"
p. 148; and "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," p. 291.

45. "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," p. 361.

46. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 36-37.

47. "The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences," p. 27;
and Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 30-31.

48. "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," pp. 355, 359-361;
and Power and Personality, pp. 65-88.

49. Harold D. Lasswell and Lawrence Zelic Freedman, "The Common
Frontiers of Psychiatry and Law," American Journal of Psychiatry 117
(Dec. 1960), p. 494.

50. "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 104; and "The Impact of Psychiatry upon Jurisprudence," Ohio State Law Journal 21 (1960), p. 23.

51. Harold D. Lasswell and Gabriel Almond, "Twisting Relief Rules, The Personnel Journal 13 (April 1935), pp. 338-343.

52. "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," pp. 356-358; and Psychopathology and Politics, p. 37.

53. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 37; and Power and Personality, pp. 196-197.

54. "Appraising the Effects of Technology," p. 337. Such a theme was clearly apparent in Psychopathology and Politics, Chapter 3, as well as "Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking," pp. 354-362. In addition, as he and Gabriel Almond once observed, research guided by a more intensive observational approach might conceivably facilitate a more "impartial administration of rules." See "Twisting Relief Rules," p. 343.

55. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 45.

56. "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," p. 293; and Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 60.

57. See his review of William Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, and Anna Mae Bowers, "The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis as Related to Personality and Behavior," The American Journal of Sociology 36 (Jan. 1931), p. 654; and Psychopathology and Politics, pp. vi - vii.

58. "Afterthoughts," p. 274.

59. Included in this group were many individuals who rejected or else reshaped much of Freudian orthodoxy. For instance, in Psychopathology he acknowledged the assistance provided to him by several early defectors from the Freudian movement, including William Stekl, Alfred Adler and Sandor Ferenczi. At the same time, he developed close relationships with several prominent neo-Freudians. Specifically, most important on this count were Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, Franz Alexander and Theodor Reik. It should, however, also be noted that he appears to have been deeply impressed by writings of the more orthodox British schools, including works by Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, a person whose work he considered to be a "landmark" in the advent of ego-psychology; moreover, it should also be remembered that his writings on personality were informed by psychologists who stood outside the psychoanalytic tradition as well as by many sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers and even political scientists. See Bruce Lannes Smith, "The Mystifying Intellectural History of Harold D. Lasswell," pp. 44-69; and Arnold Rogow, "Toward a Psychiatry of Politics," in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, pp. 125-131. In addition, Helen Swick Perry offers interesting observations on the collaborative efforts of Sullivan

and Lasswell in _Psychiatrist of America: The Life of Harry Stack Sullivan_ (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press, 1982), Chapters 30, 31, 38, 39. On his relationship to Elton Mayo see Richard Trahair, "Elton Mayo and the Early Political Psychology of Harold D. Lasswell," _Political Psychology_ (Fall/Winter 1981-82), 170-188.

60. "Afterthoughts," p. 274; "The Prolonged Insight Interview of Freud," pp. 292-293; and _Psychopathology and Politics_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 275. As Lasswell noted in the first edition in an appendix omitted in the previously cited edition of _Psychopathology and Politics_: "Special attention should be called to the forthcoming volume by Harry Stack Sullivan on _Personal Psychopathology_ in which systematic treatment of the whole field of psychiatry and sociology is presented. Dr. Sullivan has vastly stimulated a _rapprochement_ between physician and social scientist in the United States."
For a discussion of the neo-Freudian perspective, see Martin Birnbach, _Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy_; and J. A. C. Brown, _Freud and the Post-Freudians_ (Baltimore, Md: Penguin Books, 1969).

61. "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 106; _The Future of Political Science_, p. 228; and "Afterthoughts," p. 274.

62. "Afterthoughts," p. 274.

63. "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 96.

64. "Afterthoughts," pp. 274, 275.

65. _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 14.

66. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

67. _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 204; "Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview: A Preliminary Communication," _Psychoanalytic Review_ 22 (Jan. 1935), p. 11; "The Problem of Adequate Personality Records: A Proposal," _American Journal of Psychiatry_ 8 (May 1929), p. 1057; and "Personality Studies," p. 192.

68. "Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview: A Preliminary Communication," pp. 10-13. As he once noted, the opportunity of "removing 'hunches' from the realm of art into the area of dependable knowledge depends upon the development of adequate records, and the checking of predictions." See "The Personality System and Its Substitutive Reactions," p. 437.

69. "Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview: A Preliminary Communication," p. 10.

70. "Afterthoughts," p. 293. For a general overview of his proposals, see "The Problem of Personality Records: A Proposal," pp. 1057-1066. In addition, his own attempts to quantify and objectify the interview process were discussed in the following: "Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview: A Preliminary Communication," pp. 10-24; "Veranderungen an einer Versuchperson wahrend einer kurzen Folge von psychoanalytischen Interviews," pp. 375-380; "Certain Prognostic Changes During Trial (Psychoanalytic) Interviews," Psychoanalytic Review 23 (July 1936), pp. 241-247; and "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," Psychiatry 1 (1938), pp. 197-204.

71. "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," p. 197 (Emphasis mine).

72. Ibid., pp. 197, 204, 199. As he and Dorothy Blumenstock noted in a discussion which preceded the publication of their research on the impact of propaganda in Chicago during the depression, it was "necessary to devise new ways of describing propaganda symbols because the existing procedures were unstandardized." Thus they found that one of their "initial tasks" was to develop "ways of describing symbols" which would admit the comparison of competing propagandas. See "The Techniques of Slogans in Communist Propaganda," Psychiatry 1 (1938), pp. 506, 505. Though an elaboration of how this might be done can be gleaned from many of his own diverse contributions to the study of quantitative semantics, the following two works go far in elucidating what he thought such a task entailed: Harold D. Lasswell and Associates, "The Politically Significant Content of the Press: Coding Procedures," Journalism Quarterly, 19 (1942), pp. 12-23; and Language of Politics.

73. "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," p. 197; Psychopathology and Politics, p. 241; and "Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview: A Preliminary Communication," p. 13.

74. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 229.

75. Lasswell detailed the results of these experiments in the following studies: "Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview: A Preliminary Communication," pp. 10-24; "Certain Prognostic Changes During (Trial) Psychoanalytic Interviews," pp. 241-247; and "Veranderungen an einer Versuchperson wahrend einer kurzen von psychoanalytischen Interviews," pp. 374-380. His reference to the old physician can be found in Psychopathology and Politics, p. 239.

76. At one point, however, he did admit that in some cultures, due to "certain formations in the culture itself," the "full procedure" might be impracticable. Yet, he continued, other methods might be substituted for the purpose of deriving similar bits of information. See World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 162; and "A Hypothesis

Rooted in the Preconceptions of a Single Civilization Tested by
Bronislaw Malinowski," in Methods in Social Science: A Case Book, ed.
Stuart Rice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), pp. 483-484.

77. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 240; and "General
Framework: Person, Personality, Group, Culture," p. 220.

78. See "Intensive and Extensive Methods of Observing the
Personality-Culture Manifold," pp. 74-88; and "Afterthoughts,"
pp. 291-300.

79. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, pp. 18-19.

80. Who Gets What, When, How, p. 132; and "Impact of
Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," pp. 112-113. This
theme was most starkly emphasized in World Politics and Personal
Insecurity and "Psychoanalyse und Sozioanalyse," pp. 377-383.

81. "The Methods of Interlapping Observation in the Study of
Personality in Culture," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
32 (July-Sep., 1937), p. 242; and World Politics and Personal
Insecurity, pp. 161-162.

82. World Revolutionary Propaganda, p. 294; "Intensive and
Extensive Methods of Observing the Personality-Culture Manifold,"
pp. 81-82; and World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 161.

83. "The Psychology of Politics," Psychology Today 2 (Oct 1968),
p. 64.

84. "Afterthoughts," pp. 293-294.

85. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 8, 9.

86. The Policy Orientation of Political Science, p. 82;
Psychopathology and Politics, Chapters 4-5.

87. The Policy Orientation of Political Science, p. 83; Power
and Personality, p. 41; and Power and Society, p. 78.

88. Power and Personality, p. 107.

89. Psychopathology and Politics, Chapter 4; Power and
Personality, Chapters 3-4; The Policy Orientation of Political Science,
pp. 83-84; and "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear,
Co-Relational, Developmental," Journal of Social Issues 24 (July 1968),
pp. 81-82.

90. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 49-51.

91. Power and Personality p. 54.

92. Power and Society, p. 78; and Power and Personality, pp. 56, 57.

93. Power and Personality, pp. 55, 57, 58.

94. Ibid., pp. 55, 56, 58.

95. Ibid., p. 58; and "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 221.

96. Power and Personality, pp. 56, 39; Power and Society, pp. 12-13; "Describing the Contents of Communications," in Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 81-82; and "Democratic Character," p. 481.

97. "Democratic Character," p. 496; and World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 29.

98. "Political Constitution and Character," p. 324.

99. "Political Systems, Styles and Personalities," in Political Leadership and Industrial Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis, ed. Lewis Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 332.

100. "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 205; and "Political Constitution and Character," p. 324.

101. Power and Society, pp. 13, 11, 12; "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 206.

102. "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," pp. 205-206; "Democratic Character," p. 481; "Postscript," p. 194; and Power and Personality, pp. 56-57.

103. Power and Personality, pp. 57.

104. Ibid., pp. 37, 38.

105. Ibid., pp. 22, 59.

106. "Types of Political Personalities," Proceedings of the American Sociological Society 22 (1927), pp. 159-168.

107. "What Psychiatrists and Political Scientists can Learn from one Another," p. 38; Psychopathology and Politics, p. 54; and "Afterthoughts," p. 275.

108. "The Psychology of Politics," p. 62.

109. _Psychopathology and Politics_, pp. 78-79; and _Power and Personality_, p. 59.

110. _Psychopathology and Politics_, pp. 263, 127; and _Power and Personality_, pp. 59, 90.

111. _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 54.

112. _Who Gets What, When, How_, p. 145.

113. _Psychopathology and Politics_, pp. 53-54.

114. Ibid., p. 53.

115. "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental," pp. 81-82; and _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 55.

116. _The Policy Orientation of Political Science_, p. 83.

117. _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 60; and "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental," p. 82.

118. _Psychopathology and Politics_, pp. 7, 8.

119. "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental," p. 82; _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 61; and _The Policy Orientation of Political Science_, p. 84.

120. "Psychology and Political Science in the U. S. A.," p. 534.

121. _The Policy Orientation of Political Science_, p. 83; _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 45; and "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental," p. 84.

122. _Psychopathology and Politics_, pp. vii, 6-7.

123. "Afterthoughts," p. 273.

124. Ibid., pp. 273-274.

125. _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 6.

126. _Democracy Through Public Opinion_, p. 51; and "The Study of the Ill as a Method of Research into Political Personalities," p. 1001.

127. _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 16; and "Psychoanalytic Interview," pp. 140, 141.

128. _Psychopathology and Politics_, pp. 77, vii.

129. As one reviewer noted, "it is inevitable that many readers will be offended, if not incensed" by his theories and interpretations." See Lawrence K. Frank, Review of Psychopathology and Politics, The American Journal of Sociology 37 (July 1931), p. 156.

130. Power and Personality, p. 165.

131. See Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 79-105, 106-112, 127-136.

132. Ibid., pp. 127-136.

133. On this count see the twenty different case studies in Psychopathology and Politics, Chapters 4-6.

134. The agitational type, Lasswell noted, was an offshoot of the dramatizing character. See Power and Personality, pp. 88-89.

135. Ibid., pp. 77-80.

136. Ibid., pp. 78, 81, 82.

137. Ibid., p. 86.

138. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

139. "Introduction: The Study of Political Elites," p. 1.

140. "The Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 207.

141. Power and Personality, p. 39.

142. The impact of Lasswell's proposition can, for example, be found in the work of Alexander George. See, for instance, "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders," Journal of Social Issues 24 (July 1968), pp. 29-49.

143. For Adler's position, see The Individual Psychology of Alfred Alder: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His Writings, ed. Heinz L. Ansbacher and Rowena Ansbacher (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1956), Chapter 4.

144. Power and Personality, p. 40; and "The Selective Effects of Personality of Political Participation," p. 214.

145. Power and Personality, p. 40; and "The Selective Effects of Personality of Political Participation," p. 214.

146. Power and Personality, p. 162; and "The Selective Effects of Personality of Political Participation," p. 214.

147. "Psychology Looks at Morals and Politics," in Analysis of Political Behavior, pp. 18-19.

148. Power and Personality, p. 116; "Democratic Character," p. 509.

149. "Democratic Character," p. 512.

150. The Policy Orientation of Political Science, p. 91.

151. Power and Personality, p. 40; "The Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," pp. 214-215;.

152. "The Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 215.

153. Power and Personality, p. 41; and "The Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 215.

154. See The Policy Orientation of Political Science, p. 84; Power and Personality, p. 39; "Afterthoughts," pp. 300-301; and "The Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 207.

155. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 75-76; World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 31; World Revolutionary Propaganda, pp. 295-296; Who Gets What, When, How, p. 133; and Power and Personality, p. 38.

156. World Revolutionary Propaganda, p. 296; and Power and Personality, p. 38.

157. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 76.

158. Power and Personality, p. 51.

159. Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, pp. 44-55.

160. Ibid.; and Power and Personality, pp. 52-53.

161. Who Gets What, When, How, pp. 132-144; The Policy Orientation of Political Science, p. 84; Power and Personality, pp. 43, 46-47; Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, pp. 44-55.

162. Who Gets What, When, How, pp. 140-141.

163. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 7.

164. Richard Merelman, "Harold D. Lasswell's Political World," p. 477.

165. Power and Personality, pp. 61, 62.

166. Ibid., pp. 88-91.

167. Ibid., p. 64.

168. Power and Personality, pp. 65-72; and Merelman, "Harold D. Lasswell's Political World," p. 477.

169. "Two Forgotten Studies in Political Psychology," American Political Science Review 19 (Nov. 1925), p. 713.

170. Power, Corruption, and Rectitude, p. 35; and "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 221.

171. "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental, " p. 84.

172. Power and Personality, pp. 159-160, 166.

173. "Democratic Character," p. 498.

174. Ibid.

175. "Afterthoughts," p. 303; "Selective Effects of Personality on Political Participation," p. 221; and "The Psychology of Politics," p. 60.

176. "Afterthoughts," pp. 305, 302.

177. Psychopathology and Politics, Chapter 7; and Power and Personality, Chapter 4.

178. Power and Society, p. 242; and "The Psychology of Politics," p. 61.

179. "The Psychology of Hitlerism as a Response of the Lower Middle Classes to Continuing Insecurity," in The Analysis of Political Behaviour, pp. 235-245. See also World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 124.

180. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 168; and Power and Personality, p. 163.

181. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 194.

182. Ibid.

183. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 151.

184. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 194, 193, 203.

185. Ibid., pp. 185, 195.

186. Ibid., pp. 195-196, 197, 184.

187. <u>Democracy</u> <u>Through</u> <u>Public</u> <u>Opinion</u>, p. 84; and <u>Psychopathology</u> <u>and</u> <u>Politics</u>, p. 196.

188. <u>Who, Gets</u> <u>What,</u> <u>When,</u> <u>How</u>, p. 147.

189. <u>World</u> <u>Politics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Personal</u> <u>Insecurity</u>, p. 3; and <u>Who</u> <u>Gets</u> <u>What,</u> <u>When,</u> <u>How</u>, p. 13. In <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u> Lasswell admitted finer distinctions could be made with regard to the distribution of values. Some people, he noted, could occupy a middle level position with respect to values; and these, he indicated, could be referred to as a kind of middle elite when it was necessary to introduce "further differentiations." See p. 62.

190. <u>Who</u> <u>Gets</u> <u>What,</u> <u>When,</u> <u>How</u>, p. 34; and Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. Easton Rothwell, <u>The</u> <u>Comparative</u> <u>Study</u> <u>of</u> <u>Elites</u> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 13.

191. <u>Who</u> <u>Gets</u> <u>What,</u> <u>When,</u> <u>How</u>, p. 112; <u>World</u> <u>Politics</u> <u>and</u> <u>Personal</u> <u>Insecurity</u>, p. 85; "Skill Politics and Skill Revolution," pp. 133-145; and "The Moral Vocation of the Middle-Income Skill Group," <u>Ethics</u> 45 (Jan 1935), pp. 127-137.

192. <u>Who</u> <u>Gets</u> <u>What,</u> <u>When,</u> <u>How</u>, p. 23.

193. <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, p. 203; and "Introduction: The Study of Political Elites," p. 9.

194. <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, pp. 57-58.

195. Ibid., pp. 203, 219; and <u>The</u> <u>Comparative</u> <u>Study</u> <u>of</u> <u>Elites</u>, p. 7.

196. <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Society</u>, p. 219. This, however, did not preclude the possibility of democracy. As he noted in this regard: "In a modern large-scale society the leaders do exert an enormous impact on war and peace and on major questions of domestic policy. But democracy is not extinguished unless a community-wide basis of selection and responsiblity is done away with." See <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Personality</u>, p. 110. In addition, for a more detailed discussion of this see Heinz Eulau, "Elite Analysis and Democratic Theory: The Contribution of Harold D. Lasswell," pp. 7-28; and Peter Bachrach, <u>The</u> <u>Theory</u> <u>of</u> <u>Democratic</u> <u>Elitism</u>, Chapter 5.
On a related note, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, Lasswell sometimes obfuscated his discussion of the elite concept by vesting it with contradictory meanings on occasion. One such example which was never reconciled with his other discussion can be found in <u>Power</u> <u>and</u> <u>Personality</u> when he observed that the "elite of democracy" is "society wide." Here elite refers to the collectivity from which leaders are recruited. Given what he has written about elites elsewhere, it is, as Eulau has observed, "difficult to interpret this formulation." In this regard, see also Merélman, "Harold D. Lasswell's

Political World," pp. 483-484; and Bernard Crick, American Science, pp. 184-185.

197. Power and Society, p. 58; and A Pre-View of Policy Sciences (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), p. 21.

198. World Revolutionary Propaganda, pp. 8-9; World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 3; and Who Gets What, When, How, p. 27.

199. Who Gets What, When, How, pp. 63, 62.

200. Ibid., Chapter 4. The importance he ascribed to a measured control of the ecomony was betrayed by Lasswell when he pointed out that the accretion of "emotional tension provoked, say, by a "depression," increased the likelihood that the "ruling order" would emerge as a convenient "target of attack." For, he added, "in the name of some utopian symbol, possibly of the classless society, revolutionary mass movements may divert collective aggressions against the [institutional] patterns formerly hold in esteem." See World Politics and Personal Insecurity, pp. 118-119.

201. Who Gets What, When, How, p. 67.

202. Ibid., p. 80, 81.

203. Ibid., Chapter 5.

204. Power and Society, p. 265.

205. Who Gets What, When, How, Chapter 3; and Power and Society, pp. 265, 266.

206. Power and Society, p. 121.

207. "Propaganda in a Planned Society," in Planned Society Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, ed. Findley Mackenzie, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1937), p. 630; "The Language of Power," p. 10; and "The Strategy of Revolutionary and War Propaganda," p. 189.

208. Propaganda Technique in World War I, p. 222; and "Propaganda in a Planned Society," p. 629.

209. "Propaganda," in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 12 (1934), p. 521.

210. "Person: Subject and Object of Propaganda," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 179 (1935), p. 189. With regard to Lasswell's definition of propaganda, it should be pointed out that, at certain times, he gave the term a more restricted meaning. Periodically, he would define it as the "use of symbols to influence controversial attitudes." See, for example, "The Rise of the Propagandist," in Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. 175.

In general, what he meant to convey by limiting propaganda to "controversial attitudes" cannot be grasped apart from his discussion of propaganda in "Person: Subject and Object of Propaganda." In that article he observed that for the sake of clarity it was sometimes convenient to distinguish propaganda as a "technique of social control" from propaganda as a "species of social movement." When referred to as a technique of control, propaganda simply referred to the manipulation of attitudes through the use of symbols. Consequently, when used in this sense it included "the use of significant symbols to inculcate love of family, country, God, democracy and constitution." When used with regard to "social movement," however, propaganda took on a radically different meaning, one which was "often contrasted with education." Construed from the perspective of "social movement," propaganda was restricted to the "spread of controversial attitudes and skills." Yet, paradoxically, much of what was propaganda when it was defined as a "technique" was essentially education when it was viewed as a "species of social movement." Seen in this light, the "inculcation of traditional Americanism" was not propaganda; rather, it was really education. Unfortunately, then, this distinction between "social movement" and "technique," as opposed to bringing clarity to a discussion of propaganda, only served to obfuscate it.

211. World Revolutionary Propaganda, p. 9; and Power and Society, p. 10.

212. "The Theory of Political Propaganda," American Political Science Review 21 (August 1927), p. 631; "Propaganda," p. 526; and Who Gets What, When, How, p. 31.

213. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 37; See also on this point "The Rise of the Propagandist," pp. 173-179.

214. Who Gets What, When, How, p. 32.

215. "Propaganda," p. 523; and "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," pp. 148-149.

216. "Propaganda," pp. 526, 524; "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," pp 149; and "The Theory of Political Propaganda," p. 631.

217. Propaganda Technique in World War I, pp. 15, 221.

218. "Propaganda," p. 527; and "The Function of the Propagandist," p. 264.

219. "The Study and Practice of Propaganda," in Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography, ed. H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and B. L. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), p. 19. In this regard, he noted that the goal of the propagandist was "to intensify attitudes favorable to his purposes, to reverse obstructive attitudes," and, finally, "to win the indifferent."

See "Propaganda," p. 524; and "The Theory of Political Propaganda,"
pp. 629-631.

220. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 184.

221. "The Study and Practice of Propaganda," p. 13; and World
Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 31.

222. "Propaganda in a Planned Society," pp. 637-638; and Who Gets
What, When, How, p. 169.

223. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 19.

224. "The Strategy of Revolutionary and War Propaganda," p. 189.

225. Power and Society, p. 264; and World Politics and Personal
Insecurity, p. 7.

226. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, pp. 117-119.

227. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 154; and World Politics
and Personal Insecurity, p. 119.

228. World Revolutionary Propaganda, Chapters 11-15.

229. "Civic Education in the Technoscientific Age," in Approaches
to Education for Character, ed. Clarence H. Faust and Jessica Feingold
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 29-30.

230. "Toward a Science of Democracy," in Science, Philosophy, and
Religion, ed. Lyman Bryson and Louis Finkelstein (New York: Conference
on Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1941), p. 241.

231. Democracy Through Public Opinion, pp. 168-169.

232. Ibid., p. 151.

233. World Politics Faces Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., Inc., 1945), p. 9.

234. Ibid., pp. 3-91. For a more complete discussion of United
States-Soviet relations see the following: "The Prospects of
Cooperation in a Bipolar World," University of Chicago Law Review
15(Summer 1948), pp. 877-901; "The Scientific Study of Bipolar
Attitudes," American Journal of Psychiatry (March 1951), pp. 644-648;
"'Inevitable' War: A Problem in the Control of Long-Range
Expectations," World Politics 2(Oct. 1949), pp. 1-37; and "The World
Revolution of Our Time," pp. 68-72.

235. World Politics Faces Economics, p. 89.

236. "Agitation," in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1(1930), p. 487. As Lasswell once observed in this regard: "That the masses may be lured to action by millenial hopes is one of the oldest experiences of our society." See the "Strategy of Revolutionary and War Propaganda," p. 191.

237. The Comparative Study of Elites, p. 16; and National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950), pp. 49, 46.

238. The Comparative Study of Elites, pp. 15-16; and Who Gets What, When, How, p. 147.

239. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 121.

240. Power and Personality, p. 215.

241. World Politics Faces Economics, p. 4. As he once observed very early in his career on this point: "Unrestrained by the obvious fact of relative weakness in fighting effectiveness, ... the American elite will be strongly impelled to escape from internal difficulties by expansionism in Latin America and the Pacific," See World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 178.

242. Power and Personality, pp. 215, 216.

243. "The Triple-Appeal Principle: A Dynamic Key," in The Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. 186.

244. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1964), p. 347. See also Raymond Aaron, "Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State,'" Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1979), pp. 347-359.

245. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 146; "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus The Civilian State," Chinese Social and Political Science Review 21(1937), pp. 649, 647; and "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," p. 67.

246. "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," p. 51. Lasswell admitted that he was not the first person to ever reach such an understanding. "To speak of a garrison state," he once confessed, "is not to predict something wholly new under the sun. Certainly there is nothing novel to the student of political institutions about the idea that specialists on violence may run the state." As he pointed out, Comte, Spencer and Tocqueville had all written of such societies. In this regard, see "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 147; and "The World Revolutionary Situation," p. 362.

247. "The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State," in Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1939-1949, ed. Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein and R. M. MacIver (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), pp. 323, 325.

248. "The Prospects of Cooperation in a Bipolar World," p. 882.

249. National Security and Individual Freedom, pp. 26-27; and "The World Revolutionary Situation," p. 365.

250. "Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 275(May 1951), p. 111; National Security and Individual Freedom, p. 41; "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 77; and "The Scientific Study of Bipolar Attitudes, p. 646.

251. "The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State," p. 324. As he observed with regard to the elite of the garrison-state: "the predominating influence is in the hands of men who specialize on violence. Skill in business, in organization, in propaganda counts for less in entitling the individual to his share... [of] community deference." See "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus The Civilian State," p. 643.

252. "Propaganda and Mass Insecurity," Psychiatry 13 (1950), p. 293; and National Security and Individual Freedom, p. 44.

253. "The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State," p. 323.

254. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 148.

255. Ibid., pp. 147-151; and "The World Revolutionary Situation," p. 368.

256. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 153.

257. "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus The Civilian State," p. 649; and "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," pp. 151, 152. For his discussion of the prospective transformation of American political practices, see National Security and Individual Freedom, pp. 30-49; and "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites," pp. 267-268.

258. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 152; and "The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom," p. 975.

259. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 150.

260. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 77; and "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 151.

261. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," p. 149.

262. National Security and Individual Freedom, pp. 23-49; "The World Revolutionary Situation," pp. 360-372; and "Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?" p. 113.

263. "The World Revolutionary Situation," pp. 371-372.

CHAPTER IV

THERAPEUTIC POLITICS

As indicated by much of the preceding chapter, Lasswell's

investigation into the dynamics and processes of political life brought

to the fore a series of rather disquieting concerns. First, his work

culminated in a set of findings which debunked many of the basic tenets

underlying democratic liberalism. Secondly, the results of his research

raised disturbing questions concerning the democratic regime's capacity

to survive in the modern world.

With regard to his challenge to the principles undergirding

orthodox liberalism, the reader will first of all recall that the

findings of his personality research directly called into question the

conventional view of man postulated by traditional democratic theory.

Specifically, by disclosing the non-rational and unconscious

determinants of human behavior he ostensibly vitiated what, in the

words of Edwin S. Corwin, was the "most fundamental assumption" of

democratic liberalism, that is, the notion "that man is primarily a

rational creature, and that his acts are governed by rational

considerations."[1] Secondly, his elaboration of elite domination and

control raised serious doubts about the validity of democratic

liberalism's premises of equality and popular rule. In effect, by

highlighting the presence of a self-serving elite who maintained their

position of hegemony through the skillful management of "propaganda,

inducement, coercion and organization," he undermined the fundamental liberal democratic presumption that free, autonomous, and equal citizens retained ultimate control over the exercise of power through neutral institutional devices designed to secure the rulers' responsiveness to the interests and claims of the governed.[2]

Apart from challenging many of the previously uncontested presuppositions of democratic liberalism, Lasswell also indicated that the future of the modern, liberal democratic regime rested on a most tenuous foundation. As will be recalled, such an assessment was based on his analysis of current practices, events and details of life from the encompassing historical perspective gained through the application of developmental analysis. And, as much of our foregoing discussion in this regard has clearly indicated, this appraisal differed sharply from the "free-enterprise democrat's" sanguine expectation that the "free society was just around the corner." Indeed, whereas adherents of democratic capitalism had confidently and even somewhat arrogantly pronounced "a sentence of inevitable death" upon the "caste society of the feudal-monarchical era," Lasswell concluded that the structural inadequacies of "dilatory capitalism" in a tense and unstable geopolitical environment would only create or exacerbate those conditions which transformed the historical "tendency toward democratization" into a "trend toward caste societies run by military-police families."[3]

In the final analysis, then, it must be admitted that Lasswell presented a profound intellectual challenge to the orthodox view of democratic liberalism. Specifically, he questioned some of its most

basic assumptions, and he further indicated that its optimistic view of the future was unfounded. At the same time, however, he was not content to let it go at that. As we have had occasion to mention, his acceptance of the manipulative attitude towards political change suggested that he wanted to be more than just a neutral and hence complacent observer of collective life. Like many of his early colleagues, he believed that socio-political life could be "ordered" to a "humanly desirable" set or "plan" of "values."[4] Also, like them, he anticipated that this preferred state of affairs could be consciously effected through the application of scientific intelligence. Science, in his estimation, provided the "technical means of ministering to man"; and, further, its "very presence" in society fortified "man in the search for perfection."[5] Ultimately, his faith in the potential of science was so firm that he could unabashedly write that man, "following Divine precedent," was on the "eve of creating life" in the "image" of his "nobler aspirations." Thus, standing "at the threshold of the period" wherein he could create an "artificial world nearer to his heart's desire," it was, Lasswell surmised, no longer necessary for man to remain passive under the dominion of nature; science, in effect, now provided him with an opportunity to perform an "unprecedented role of midwifery in cosmic evolution."[6]

For the most part, Lasswell combined this strong faith in the potential and beneficence of science with a profound desire for relevance in inquiry. Consequently, even though he believed that the researcher must proceed with "maximum objectivity," he nonetheless concluded that the "tools of methodological convenience" did not have to

be "deified and invoked to evade moral consequences." More importantly, in keeping with an instrumentalist tradition in political science which emphasized social reconstruction or meliorism through the use of "creative intelligence," he admonished his readers to bear in mind that "inquiry" was "not an end in itself." Rather, for him the application of the "observational methods of science to the understanding of man" was ultimately intended to gain "control of all that makes for human destructiveness."[7] Yet, as was mentioned earlier, Lasswell's avowed interest in manipulation and control brings to the fore questions concerning goals and purposes. To reiterate, control, because it is essentially a purposive activity, depends on a prior commitment to ends. And it is to Lasswell's attention to these that we now turn.

The Goal of a Science of Politics

From Lasswell's perspective, there was little room for doubt when it came to the "socio-political objective" which he thought a science of politics should serve. Keeping in "step" with what he understood to be the "ideal values" embodied in both the "American tradition" and the "progressive ideologies" of the "epoch," he unequivocally declared that his "ultimate goal" was the "realization of human dignity in theory and fact." This was his "central focus"; and he further concluded that anyone who doubted its future realization took but a "dim view of human perfectibility."[9]

Admittedly, this professed desire to realize a community in which "human dignity" is actualized in both "theory and fact" is a most nebulous commitment. Yet, Lasswell wrote, "any statement of values" must first begin with "words of high-level abstractions." But, he

continued, even though value statements were initially "formulated" in

terms of "ambiguous reference," they eventually needed to be elaborated

in "sufficient detail" so that they could be "considered contextually."

Thus "dangling sentences of ambiguous reference" might be tolerated for

"artistic and propaganda purposes"; but for the political scientist the

"cryptic and fragmentary" sentences that pertained to "morals" needed

to be "made part of a special language" which specified how the "key

terms" were to be applied by "observers" who took up "various

standpoints for the observation of reality." And it was this act of

specification that he referred to as "goal clarification."[10]

Goal Clarification

Traditionally, the analysis, synthesis and refinement of a concept

like "human dignity" would have fallen within the domain of political

philosophy. But in Lasswell's estimation the "specialists on ethical

philosophy and metaphysics" had shown themselves to be unprepared for

such an important undertaking. Their propensity for "ancient exercises"

in syllogistic reasoning only took them and their epigones down a

fruitless "blind alley." Thus he wrote:

> Divorced from operational rules ... [philosophical
> derivation] quickly becomes a futile quest for a meaningless
> "why," perpetually culminating in "some inevitably circular
> and infinitely regressive logical justification" for preferences.
> From any relatively specific statements of social goal
> (necessarily described in a statement of low level abstraction)
> can be elaborated an infinite series of normative propositions of
> ever-increasing generality; conversely, normative statements
> of high-level abstraction can be manipulated to support any
> specific goal.[11]

As we shall eventually see, Lasswell's willingness to dispense with

the assistance of philosophical analysis in this regard would ultimately

have far-reaching, if not embarrassing, implications. But more about

that later. What we are more concerned with here is finding out what

Lasswell actually meant when he wrote that his "ultimate goal" was the

complete realization of "human dignity." And to achieve that end, it is

first necessary to consider what he took to be a fundamental distinction

"among statements" that purport to "clarify goals."

According to Lasswell, "goal clarification" actually encompassed

two, analytically different intellectual activities. Thus, as he

construed it, the task of clarifying goals could be likened to an

expedition traveling a "road that forks in two." Following this

analogy through, he indicated that "one fork" proceeded to the "uplands

of abstraction" where it eventually disappeared in "mist and cloud

beyond the eye of the empirical." Those who followed this path engaged

in a form of goal elaboration commonly referred to as "grounding a

judgment." Emblematic of this "line of elaboration" was the

"transempirical derivation" of goals reflected in the works of those

"specialists" in theology and metaphysics.[12] By way of contrast,

whereas the first fork in the road led to the ethereal "uplands of

abstraction," the second one, according to the logic of this analogy,

descended to the more mundane "low country" where it was "easy to

specify the foothills, villages, plains, and beaches." Lasswell

observed that the "line of elaboration" represented by this fork was

generally referred to as "specifying a judgment." Most commonly

associated with the principles of scientific inquiry, this form of

specification centered on the effort to make the "terms of reference" to

a selected goal "more operational." Understood in this way, the task of

"specifying a judgment" demanded that the individual make the terms of "general propositions" on goals "more explicit" by relating them to "observable reality."[13]

Now, recognizing that Lasswell disdained the "ancient exercises" and "word-mongering" of the "specialists on ethical philosophy and metaphysics," it should come as no surprise to discover that when it came to "goal clarification" he selected the path which took him down to the mundane world of "observable reality." And it is to his own attempt to specify what he meant when he indicated that a science of politics should serve the "overriding goal" of the realization of "human dignity in theory and fact" that we now turn.

Characteristics of the Commonwealth

Although Lasswell frankly admitted that "many differences of specification exist," he indicated that "human dignity" always implied an unrestricted "opportunity for mobility on the basis of merit."[14] Thus to say that "human dignity" was "optimally realized" was essentially "equivalent to saying" that values were shaped and shared on a "wide rather than a narrow basis." Viewed from this perspective, the commitment to the ideal of "human dignity" was inseparable from a preference for that peculiar form of social order which generated and maintained "wide" participation in the determination and allocation of human desiderata. And, as Lasswell made quite clear, that order which fostered the realization of "human dignity" was nothing other than what he referred to as the true democratic society or the "free-man's commonwealth." Fully realized in fact, it was "characterized by wide rather than narrow participation in the shaping and sharing of values."

Thus it cherished the "dignity and worth of the individual." By

implication, then, the "democratic community" emerged as that "form of

society" which it was his "purpose to achieve on the widest possible

scale in both space and time."[15]

As indicated by the foregoing, despite the force and substance of

his own criticism of democratic politics, Lasswell did not summarily

dismiss democracy as a practicable form of government. To be sure, his

own "examination of the total state of the person," as he himself

confessed, had cast "serious doubt" on the "efficacy" of the democratic

state's traditional way of "handling social problems." Nonetheless, he

conceded that even the recognition that much public behavior was only

symptomatic of psychological maladjustments did not inevitably lead to

the conclusion that a "dictator is essential." Indeed, he contended

that "no student of individual psychology" could help but affirm E. J.

Kempf's conviction that "'[s]ociety is not safe ... when it is forced to

follow the dictations of one individual, of one autonomic apparatus, no

matter how splendidly and altruistically it may be conditioned'."[16]

Rather, in his estimation the appropriate response to the current state

of affairs involved a "drastic" reconstruction of civilization. In

effect, what was required was the creation and maintenance of a

comprehensive "democratic community" which implemented and sustained the

"optimal realization" of "human dignity." And that, in turn, demanded

that the "entire social structure" must be made to "embody democracy."[17]

Guided by the "absolute intention" of bringing into existence the

conditions constitutive of "human dignity," Lasswell attempted to define

in "operational" terms his conception of the "good society." And for

him that entailed specifying in "operational definitions" both the basic

"myth" which was in "harmony with shared values" and the "patterns of

technique" which met the "minimum requirements of sharing."[18]

Now, as will be recalled from our earlier discussion of Lasswell's

writings on elites, for Lasswell the "myth" of any society comprised

the "fundamental assumptions" which supported both the distribution of

values and institutional practices current in any society. Furthermore,

in his view these "fundamental assumptions" could be divided into three

analytically distinct categories, namely, "doctrine," "miranda," and

"formula." "Doctrine," in turn, was defined as that component of

"myth" which "authoritatively" formulated the "basic expectations and

demands" with respect to the shaping and sharing of values. Usually the

"doctrine" of any society was articulated in preambles to constitutions,

charters, formal declarations and so forth. "Miranda," on the other

hand, was that part of "myth" which included the "symbols of sentiment

and identification" which aroused "emotions indulgent to the social

structure" and also promoted "mutual identification" and hence

"solidarity." Accordingly, the "miranda" included the social emblems or

shibboleths which evoked popular "admiration and enthusiasm" while

heightening the "awareness" that these "emotions" were shared by others.

Finally, the "formula" was that aspect of "myth" which encompassed the

set of prescriptive statements which elaborated in detail the practices

and conduct of the "social structure." Generally, it was this aspect of

"myth" which was embodied in the "basic public law."[19]

Whereas "myth" referred to "fundamental assumptions," "technique,"

Lasswell indicated, pertained to actual procedures or "operations."

Seen in this way, "technique" encompassed the traditional practices associated with any peculiar social institution. "Technique," in other words, included the "ways" in which "myth patterns" were "actually used" or applied.[20]

Once Lasswell had identified and differentiated the concepts of "myth" and "technique," he then proceeded to delineate in "operational" terms the appropriate form they took for each welfare and deference value within the context of the democratic community. And it is through a consideration of these specifications that Lasswell's characterization of the "good society" can best be discerned.

A. Welfare Values

1. Enlightenment. As Lasswell made quite clear, the ideal democratic society would give "full weight" to the "undeniable though often neglected fact that men are conscious and can be rational." Thus it would emphasize and attempt to cultivate those conditions which facilitated an equitable distribution cf "knowledge and insight." Consequently, Lasswell observed that the "myth" of the "democratic community" would embody the assumption that there "should be wide access to available knowledge on matters of important public policy."[21]

With respect to the "techniques" of enlightenment, Lasswell indicated that in a polity where "human dignity" was "optimally realized" the "overwhelming mass of mankind" would be equipped with the skills and information required to make a "proper evaluation of policy goals and alternatives." To achieve such an end, the genuinely democratic community would first of all nurture the intellectual capacities of its citizens through appropriate forms of education.

Hence in the "good society" people would be exposed to the methods of

logic, science and free-fantasy, that "powerful" "tool of intelligence"

which could be "spread throughout society as an aid in the pursuit of

truth."[22] Furthermore, in such a society "information on significant

questions of policy" would be made accessible to all individuals. Thus

in the "democratic community" every citizen would have "access" to

channels of "communication" which reported "news of current

developments." In a similar vein, he concluded that there would be

broad as opposed to constricted admission to the "media for the

dissemination of facts and interpretations." Finally, he added that in

ideal "democratic community" concerted effort would be taken to ensure

that information transmitted through the public channels of comunication

was both accurate and complete. This, in turn, meant that in such a

society the people would be properly informed as to the "interest, bias,

and competence" of those who disseminated messages through the media.

In addition, it implied that this society would enlist "specialists on

intelligence" who provided the masses with a "picture of reality" that

was "true, clear, and vivid."[23]

2. Skill. As was observed earlier, Lasswell's conception of skill

referred to efficacy in the practice of occupational talents. Thus it

centered on "proficiency" in "arts or crafts, trade or profession."

Viewed within the context of the "good society," the prevailing "myth"

as it pertained to skill, Lasswell believed, would stress the

realization and perfection of "latent talent." In practice, the

democratic community would provide ample "opportunity" for the

"discovery" and development of native abilities "free from

discrimination on grounds of religion, culture or class." Moreover, he also pointed out that such a society would take positive measures to ensure that each person's skills were put to maximum use. Consequently, it would implement a program of "full employment" which provided each person with an opportunity to apply their creative talents in some socially useful way. The general upshot of all this would be that in the true democratic community men and women would be assured of something more than simple job security; that is, they would be entitled to a position fully commensurate with their developed capacities and talents.[24]

3. Well-being. In Lasswell's view, the value of well-being encompassed both physiological and psychlogical health. As he put it, "[t]he culminating moment in well-being, positively conceived, is an interpersonal relationship in which the psychic and somatic potentials of the participants are at their highest." Hence, as he saw it, the "myth" of the democratic community would emphasize "the importance of somatic and psychic well-being," and it would, moreover, interpret the "ideal" in a "scientifically correct manner."[25]

Insofar as "technique" was concerned, Lasswell indicated that the democratic community would institute a health program properly suited to the medical needs of the "diseased, injured and handicapped." Similarly, it would vigorously pursue those avenues of research and policy which contributed to "optimum somatic and psychic activity throughout life." Along the same lines, in such a community substantial "progress" would be "made toward the lengthening of life" under conditions of "optimum" psychic and somatic well-being. Finally, in

such a society "the motives and circumstances leading to suicide, murder, war and civil violence" would be either greatly "reduced or eliminated."[26]

4. Wealth. With respect to wealth, Lasswell observed that the "importance of balanced income for democracy" was a leitmotif of most "systematic political speculation" since the time of antiquity. And this "basic" theme, he further indicated, would also find expression in the "myth" and "operations" of the ideal democratic community. Thus, as he understood it, that part of the democratic "myth" which pertained to wealth would stress the "importance" of realizing a "balanced distribution" of wealth within the context of an expanding economy. In a similar vein, he surmised that the democratic society would bring its practices in line with the "myth" through the adoption of investment and production policies which, because they sustained continued growth in "aggregate income," made more wealth available for redistribution. As a result, in the genuinely democratic commonwealth the "pattern of income distribution" would "in fact" be "balanced" rather than "dichotomous." Finally, apart from achieving a "balanced" distribution of wealth through its economic policies, the democratic commonwealth, Lasswell added, would see that everyone was "guaranteed" a "basic income."[27]

B. Deference Values

1. Affection. As will be recalled from our earlier discussion on values, Lasswell defined affection so that it encompassed those sentiments conveyed in interpersonal expressions of "friendship," "love," and "sexual intimacy." And in discussing how this peculiar deference value fit into the framework of the democratic community, he

noted that the "myth" of such a society would affirm man's natural

sociability. Thus, whereas the "doctrines" of other societies portrayed

man as egoistic and "predatory" by nature, the democratic "myth" would

emphasize both the "desirability of congenial human relationships" and

the "capacity of human beings for entering into such relations."[28]

As Lasswell understood it, the democratic community would make a

deliberate effort to promote those conditions which facilitated the

free exchange of affection in social intercourse. This, he believed,

would be accomplished in a variety of ways. For instance, he expected

that the "good society" would sustain "friendly attitudes" and "positive

relations" by explicitly "clarifying" for its members "common goals and

capacities." Also, he indicated that the democratic society would seek

out and apply those child-rearing practices which nurtured in each one

of its citizens a personality structure capable of entering into and

maintaining congenial human relations. Further, in this regard, he

surmised that the society would instill in its members the character

structure suited to the exercise of self-control by cultivating the

"ideal of giving calm consideration to one's impulses." Consequently,

"in the ideal commonwealth affections would be so developed from infancy

that incentives would be lacking for conduct inimical to freedom." In

addition, and of equal importance, Lasswell observed that in the

democratic community the scope of affection would include all humanity.

Thus, as he saw it, in such a society "less inclusive loyalties" would

be "made compatible with the whole," and "exclusive couplings" which

emerged as the result of an "intense and all-absorbing" form of bonding

would be strongly discouraged.[29]

2. Rectitude. According to Lasswell's understanding of the
matter, rectitude was the "value of morality." More specifically, he
indicated that it encompassed personal traits like "virtue," "goodness,"
and "righteousness." Viewed in this light, then, rectitude entailed
something more than mere "terror-stricken conformity" to those legal,
social and moral norms which regulated human "conduct." In particular,
Lasswell believed that rectitude implied a firm internalization of
the belief that such prescriptions "ought" to be followed. Thus it
involved "perspectives in which the 'self' demands that the 'self'
adhere" to the socially sanctioned set of formal and informal rules
which directed and thus delimited appropriate forms of human behavior.[30]

Lasswell averred that in the democratic community the "principle of
rectitude" would not be "overlooked"; indeed, its activities would be
accepted as both "right" and "expedient." Consequently, he noted that
the democratic "myth" would "articulate a demand" that "each person
ought to feel, think, and act responsibly for the purpose of perfecting
the good society." Moreover, he observed that the "myth" would also
contain a body of "standards" which prescribed "conduct consistent with,
and facilitative of," that society which aspired to be a "commonwealth
of human dignity."[31]

Insofar as the practice of rectitude was concerned, Lasswell
observed that the democratic society would be most concerned with
cultivating an appropriate interior disposition in each of its citizens.
In effect, it would attempt to instill in its members correct desire,
that is, a "sense of impulsion to act for the common good." Ultimately,
this meant that in the democratic commonwealth the "old conscience" of

each citizen would be "divided against itself and cleansed of its antidemocratic part." In fact, one of the "great objectives" of "democratic practice" was the treatment and prevention of the "social paranoias" from which "mankind" has historically suffered. Thus, for example, perceptions of "white supremacy," "Aryan superiority" and even the "notion that the Jew or anybody else is a 'chosen' biological category" were "diseased conceptions" which the "perfect society" would not condone and allow to stand uncorrected. Conceivably such "social paranoias" would be at least partially eradicated through education, especially since one of its "legitimate" functions was to "reduce the number of moral mavericks who do not share democratic preferences." In any event, in such a society all individuals would be animated by an "impulsion" to bring their "private judgments" and behavior in "public matters" into harmony with the "standards of right conduct" ensconced in the democratic "myth." Consequently, in the "perfect society" there would be "no discrepancy between prescriptions and compliance." As a result, in such a community "negative sanctions" would rarely be applied, and "enforcement efforts" would most likely be restricted to "education" and the dissemination of "information."[32]

3. Respect. As the reader will recall, Lasswell equated respect with "honor," "status," "prestige" or "recognition." Most simply, it involved the "recognition" of an individual's inherent "worth" as a human being. Consequently, when it was understood in this way the democratic "myth" would, according to Lasswell, stipulate that all persons were entitled to be treated with regard simply "because they are human." In like manner, the prevailing "myth" would also underscore the

notion that the members of the community would be accorded "status" or "prestige" strictly on the basis of "personal merit" or achievement.[33]

Insofar as the practice of respect was concerned, Lasswell indicated that it could be manifested in "ways that may be called negative and positive." First, the "negative side" of respect was demonstrated in those interpersonal situations in which "large zones of self-determination for the private person" were preserved. The "positive side" of respect, on the other hand, involved access to and recognition of meritorious achievement. Hence it pertained to an equal "opportunity for maturing latent capacity into socially valued expression." Thus, bearing in mind these two different ways of showing respect for individuals, the democratic society would first of all secure for its citizens "large zones of self-determination" in which they could exercise their discretion unencumbered by external acts of "compulsion and prohibition." Therefore in the ideal democratic society there would be a "strong presumption" against any effort or "proposal to pour the individual into a mould." Ultimately, any restrictions placed on the "individual's own judgment" would have to be justified on the basis of "overwhelming necessity" or else "clear evidence that men are affected destructively by the prevailing degree of self-direction." Secondly, recognition of the "positive side of respect" meant that in the democratic society invidious distinctions made on the basis of race, social class and so forth would not be tolerated; rather, access to those values which conditioned the "giving and receiving of prestige" would remain open to all and therefore would be based only on the criterion of individual merit. Furthermore, and on

a somewhat related note, the "community as a whole" would take "postive

measures" to provide assistance to those who, because of various social,

physical, and intellectual "handicaps," would be unable to "realize

their full potentialities" unless "special measures" were taken in their

behalf. Consequently, in the "good society" special "facilities" or

"exemptions" would be "made available to the immature; to the crippled,

injured, and ill; to the unemployed and the recipients of low incomes;

to those who have received unfortunate early training."[34]

4. Power. As will be recalled from our earlier discussion,

Lasswell understood power to be that deference value which pertained to

participation in the making of those choices or policies which invoked

severe value deprivations for those who challenged those choices or

policies. Understood in this way, then, power, as we have observed, was

construed to mean "decision-making." Hence, by implication, the

democratization of power entailed the "practice of general participation

in the making of influential decisions."

In keeping with the above, Lasswell observed that the democratic

"myth" would contain "doctrinal statements," "authoritative

prescriptions" and "miranda" which corresponded with wide participation

in the making of sanctioned choices. Consequently, the doctrinal aspect

of the myth would embody formulations which justified and endorsed open

and free participation whenever decisions were made. Moreover, the

"democratic formula" would set forth "authoritative prescriptions" which

allowed for effective representation and meaningful and frequent

participation in the activities of the "functional" institutions of

government. Finally, the "miranda" of the body politic which realized

the democratic ideal would depict a "popular version of history and destiny" which indicated that "decisions" were "properly in the hands of the people"; indeed, in a "full democracy" the "poetry," "anecdotes," "songs" and "drama" would serve to "portray and reinforce the democratic ideal."[35]

When the democratic precept of shared power was effectively implemented, all individuals, Lasswell wrote, would have unrestricted access to the value conditions required to participate in the making of sanctioned choices. Equally important, such persons would in fact take part in making those "decisions" which affected their lives. And this, moreover, meant that in the democratic community individuals would be vested with an opportunity to engage in decision-making processes in organizations besides the "conventionally" designated organs of government. Therefore in the "perfect society" citizens would be guaranteed an active and meaningful role in the determination of the content and shape of those policies which emanated from any of the "functional" institutions of government. In short, wherever "monopolistic-political conditions" were found, some "means" would be "invented for representing those affected." Thus in the democratic society citizens would be entitled to participate fully in the activities of those churches, unions, corporations and other social institutions which, because they made choices which involved severe deprivations, actually made "power decisions."[36]

The Commonwealth in Perspective

In surveying the basic contours of Lasswell's version of the ideal democratic polity in which "human dignity" was realized in both "theory

and fact," one cannot help but be deeply impressed by his profound

commitment to democracy. Indeed, for Lassswell it was, as he himself

admitted, "the entire social structure that must embody democracy, not

merely the social order, the regime, or the rule alone."[37] Hence,

according to his perspective, in the truly democratic commonwealth the

spirit of democracy permeated and thus infused virtually every

conceivable facet of human existence.

To be sure, it scarcely needs to be mentioned that much of what was

embodied in Lasswell's ideal construct of the "good society" is in vogue

in certain intellectual circles today. As Jacques Ellul has suggested

on this point, much of the current debate on the fundamental character

of democracy has shifted its focus from institutions and procedures to

the underlying social and economic prerequisites of democracy.

Essentially, what is being advanced in this regard is the contention

that a meaningful exercise of political rights by the general population

cannot be fully effected without a more equitable distribution of the

socio-economic conditions which provide access to power.[38] Quite

clearly, such a concern resonated throughout Lasswell's version of the

"perfect society." At the same time, however, the compass of value

sharing reflected in his ideal political society extends far beyond what

is generally envisioned by even the most ardent democrats. That is to

say, in calling for a sweeping egalitarianism with regard to values like

affection, respect, and rectitude, Lasswell, in the words of Arnold

Rogow, emerged as a most "radical thinker."[39]

In many respects, the egalitarian spirit which animated much of

Lasswell's own thinking reached its culmination in an almost arcadian

democratic vision. As he himself intimated on occasion, the peculiar order he had in mind was not far removed the democratic utopia Engels divined when he "wrote of the eventual withering away of the state." Indeed, for Lasswell the "thread of anarchist idealism" which appeared in all "uncompromising applications of the key conception of human dignity" was to "get rid of power" and bring about a "free-man's commonwealth" in which "coercion" was "neither threatened, applied nor desired." When viewed from this perspective, then, the ultimate "aim" of such a society was "nothing less than the perfection of man."[40]

At this point, however, it must be acknowledged that Lasswell's uncompromising and extensive commitment to democracy still does not reveal the reasons why he reached the conclusion that such a regime was either desirable or practicable. Thus it might first of all be asked whether or not there was any foundation for his "absolute intention" of bringing into existence his peculiar version of the democratic commonwealth. Secondly, and of equal importance, given his own "informed" conviction that the traditional methods and devices of democratic politics only obfuscated political problems and compounded "social difficulties," there is more than little reason to wonder how the social situation entailed by his "absolute intention" could be implemented and sustained. And it is to these two concerns to which we will now direct our attention.

Man Redux

First, with regard to the desirability of the democratic commonwealth, from Lasswell's perspective definite reasons could be supplied to support his claim that the "democratic community," as he

defined it, was eminently preferable to any other alternative form of

social order. Basically, underlying his "absolute" commitment to a

democratic social order was the proposition that such a polity, more

than any other, was gauged to the development of a sound and healthy

human personality. Indeed, it was in this regard that some scholars

have suggested that Lasswell was posing an "attempt to remarry science

and philosophy through the bond of human nature."[41] Ultimately, the

full thrust of his position here can be unraveled, clarified, and

further amplified through a more detailed consideration of what he

understood to be the source of psychological maladjustment, as well as

through an assessment .of what he figured to be the personality type

associated with the "free-man's commonwealth," namely the "democratic

character."

Interpersonal Psychiatry

According to Lasswell, the conventional "frame of reference or

relevance" applied in the study and practice of psychiatry had undergone

"profound redefinition" in recent decades. As seen through his eyes,

the "understanding of human behavior" for many years had been

"handicapped" by a virtually uncontested acceptance of the

"physicalistic conception of totality." Essentially, what this meant

was that psychiatrists who labored under the dominant "physicalistic

bias" defined the context to be applied in the determination of "health"

and "disease" to be nothing more than the "cell bundle comprising the

body." Further, since the isolated physical organism was the "entity"

or "whole" with which they were predominantly concerned, their principal

task, as they conceived it, was the connection of "deviational processes

with specific lesions." The first major challenge to this view in
psychiatry, Lasswell noted, came under the guise of Freudian
psychoanalytic psychology. Specifically, he recognized that Freud, by
employing theoretical categories which could be applied for the sake of
explicating the subtle interactions between "symbols and soma," ventured
beyond a purely "physicalistic bias" which relegated "meaning-events" to
the status of "second class" "citizens" in the "hierarchy of scientific
data." In addition, he contended that Freud's oblique recognition of
the "impact" of the "social context" on the child as he developed from
birth also suggested that the traditional focus on the physical organism
as an isolated "whole" was not unproblematic. Still, he maintained that
even Freud's more expansive view did not completely disabuse psychiatry
of its conventional "bias." Quite simply, notwithstanding the depth and
endurance of Freud's insights, Lasswell concluded that "'intraorganic'
events, the psychosomatic processes occurring within the somatic
envelope," remained the "center" of Freud's "interest."[42]

Yet from Lasswell's perspective, even though Freud did not
completely escape the pitfalls of the traditional "bias," the findings
and novel observational standpoint gained from his psychology ultimately
pointed the study of personality and human behavior in a new and more
fruitful direction; that is, as a result of the "disciplined
observation" inspired by Freud's intensive observational standpoint and
"hypotheses," many psychiatrists, social psychologists and
anthropologists soon discovered that distortions in "human personality"
were frequently unintelligible when viewed in isolation from the
practices, events and interpersonal arrangements peculiar to the

"culture-personality manifold." And, as Lasswell suggested in this regard, this discovery of the importance of the "interactionist context" was the great eclaircissement for those who were interested in understanding the dynamics of the personality process. In effect, as a consequence of the recognition that the appropriate "frame of reference" was the "culture-personality manifold," "blinders fell from the eyes of the psychiatrists." Thus aware that it was "no longer useful to conceive of the locus of pathological process as restricted by the cutaneous boundaries of an actor in the social process," practitioners of modern psychiatry finally freed themselves from their preoccupation with the "cell bundle." Further, in redefining this "frame of relevance" so that it would encompass the "pattern of culture itself," psychiatrists ultimately gained "new freedom" when it came to the study and treatment of disease.[43]

For Lasswell, of special importance in this transformation of psychiatry's "frame of relevance" was the work carried on by Harry Stack Sullivan. Specifically, Sullivan's own investigation of patients who manifested symptoms of distorted development revealed that personality was not an isolable "whole" which could be abstracted from reciprocal experiences gained through social transactions. Hence in Sullivan's view personality was elaborated, shaped and periodically modified by the nature and quality of interpersonal relations and cultural dictates. Moreover, seen from this perspective personality disorder and anxiety were understood to be rooted in difficulties and maladjustments in the larger "interindividual" setting. And for Lasswell the implications of Sullivan's stance were revolutionary. In effect, he suggested that

Sullivan, along with others who endorsed a similar view, actually turned much of the orthodox position in psychiatry on its head. Indeed, once it was recognized that "the symptoms which are localized within particular individuals (such as somatic disturbances) turn out in the modern perspective to represent localizations of damage in a total context of social interaction," the "interactions" appear as the "locus of the disease process, not the symptoms."[44] And it was this "revolutionary change" which Lasswell found to be most profitable for informing his own understanding of the processes of "health" and "disease." Thus he wrote:

> When the entire pathic sequence is taken into consideration, the interpersonal context reappears at the focus of the observer's attention. The environing provocation is as much involved as the events regarded as internal to the actor who is the locus of the specific events we call symptoms. The destructive acts of the parent of the child who suffers from certain symptoms is also part of the pathic process, as is the spouse or the foreman or the boss in relation to many of the symptoms shown by the marriage partner, the employee, or the subordinate. Clearly, it is more precise to speak of "sociopsychosomatic" difficulties than of psychosomatic troubles alone, since the prefix points to the relevant context.[45]

According to Lasswell's assessment of the matter here, this recognition of the "relevance of cultural configurations" in the understanding of "health" and "disease" had manifold implications. Especially pertinent for our purposes here are what he took to be the consequences for both the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.

A. Interpersonal Context of Disease

Central to Lasswell's understanding of the "pathic sequence" which led to personality distortion was "one major hypothesis." "Stated in many ways by many scientists," this hypothesis held that "personality

failure" was primarily a direct consequence of "<u>interpersonal situations</u>
<u>in which low estimates of the self are permitted to develop</u>."[46]
Further, this hypothesis, since it had been amply sustained by
observations gained through the "disciplined study of human
personality," had gradually taken the "center of the stage" for those
interested in the analysis and treatment of those who suffered from
various psychological disorders. Thus Lasswell informed his readers
that

> ...the causes of destructive impulses have been painstakingly
> explored, and the upshot is to emphasize anew the pathogenic
> importance of insufficient self-respect. We can recognize
> these basic relations the most readily in the lives of
> children. We are familiar with the child who bullies weaker
> playmates, and we know how often this is connected with deep
> concern about the status of the self and represents an over-
> compensation against ridicule for a weak and flabby
> appearance. We know, too, the timid and "beaten" child,
> wholly withdrawn into itself, hopeless of affection.[47]

In general, the dynamics and implications of this "major
hypothesis" become clearer when seen against the backdrop of our earlier
discussion on the role Lasswell believed value indulgences and
deprivations played within the context of social intercourse. As
the reader will recall from our earlier discussion on this point,
Lasswell contended that "low estimates of the self" were induced by
value deprivations. To recapitulate, a value deprivation appeared as a
"deprivational appraisal" which the individual incorporated and
ultimately applied to the "self." Further, though this privation could
involve any value, from Lasswell's perspective deprivations in welfare
values were of importance in this regard only when they occurred within a
context in which the individual witnessed concomitant losses in
deference values. That is, incurring losses in welfare values only

contributed to a decline in self-esteem and hence affected "character

formation" when they conditioned "deference responses" of others. In

any event, the general upshot here was that interpersonal situations in

which value deprivations occurred were especially critical because, as

the "scientific advances" of the day had demonstrated in graphic

"detail," "destructive processes" were "stimulated" by those social

transactions characterized by "deficient deference." Specifically, such

situations lowered "self-esteem" and triggered those feelings of

anxiousness which set in motion a "host of defensive reactions." And

all of this, moreover, worked to impair the capacity of an individual to

"enter into a fully creative and congenial relationship" with others in

the future.[48]

B. The Context of Health

From Lasswell's perspective, once it was fully recognized that the

"human personality" was warped or distorted by those interindividual

contexts in which "low estimates of the self" were allowed to develop,

it would eventually become obvious to all concerned that conventional

therapeutic methods were not always adequately suited to deal with the

factors responsible for psychological maladjustments. Quite

understandably, since personality failure was in most instances only

symptomatic of the "damage" which transpired within the "total context

of social interaction," the "reduction of mental disorder" required "new

methods" which allowed for an "extensive modification of important

features of community relations." Thus Lasswell, believing that the

"disease rate in society" could be more "profoundly affected" in ways

besides the "ususal one-to-one treatment by the psychiatrist," suggested

that modern physicians would find it useful to collaborate with "skillful students of social life" for the sake of developing and applying techniques in collective therapy. In addition, he also contended that modern psychiatry might eventually find that the most expedient and "far-reaching way to reduce disease" would be through the cultivation of "closer contacts with the rulers of society." Ultimately, this would be done out of the conviction that those at the helm of the social order could be encouraged to use the "influence" of their positions for the "prompt re-arrangement of insecurity producing routines."[49]

Now, as is evident from much of the foregoing, those who performed collective therapy would direct their salutary efforts to the "true field" of psychiatry, namely, the "context of interpersonal relations." More specifically, the appropriate frame of relevance for these social psychiatrists included all those "patterns of culture" and interpersonal situations which impaired an individual's "self-esteem," that positive conception of the "self" which psychiatrists had found to be of "fundamental importance" for the "healthy evolution of human personality."[50] Further, armed with a greatly expanded theoretical understanding of the "pathological process," these social psychiatrists would find that their "range of therapeutic intervention" had been "enormously widened." Thus, recognizing that "medical inquiry" had demonstrated the "dependence of the bodily and mental integrity of the person" upon the amount of "affection," "respect" and "deference" shown to him, the "scientists and physicians" who espoused this point of view would find themselves "committed" to a sweeping exploration of

the "entire social process" for the sake of correcting or "abolishing
whatever impairs the self-respect of human beings." In particular,
those who practiced social therapy would seek to eradicate or rectify
those social, economic, cultural and personal factors which worked to
undermine indulgent and hence mutually respectful relationships between
people.[51] Viewed from this perspective, they would endeavor to effect
those conditions which sustained the value shaping and sharing necessary
to correct or else prevent those interpersonal situations which allowed
"low estimates of the self" to develop. In many respects, they would
try to foster and maintain value conditions not unlike those which
Lasswell ascribed to his version of the democratic community.
Essentially, given the nature of the allocation of values associated
with that society which Lasswell conceived to be in a state of
democratic equilibrium, interpersonal relationships which culminated in
self-devaluation were, by the very character of the regime itself,
almost unthinkable. Indeed, as he defined it, the democratic community
was the "commonwealth of mutual deference"; it was that society which
practiced "mutual respect among men."[52] Consequently, it should come as
no surprise to discover that, in his view, social therapy eventually
merged with the study and practice of the politics of the democratic
community.

> The implication is that there is room for a social psychiatry
> of society which is in fact the social psychiatry of
> democracy. It becomes one of, if not cotermimous with, the
> developing sciences of democracy, the sciences that are slowly
> being evolved in the interest of democratic policy.[53]

In general, there is little doubt that Lasswell believed that a

fully realized democratic community, since it would be characterized by

a "network of congenial and creative interpersonal relations," was most

suited to the psychic integrity of individuals. Indeed, the inhabitant

of such a society, because he was set within a context of mutually

indulgent and respectful relationships, would be relieved of all anxiety

associated with devalued conceptions of the self. And it was this

psychologically free and healthy person which was graphically portrayed

in Lasswell's elaboration of that personality type which he referred to

as the "democratic character." Seen through his eyes, it was this

personality which was "capable of respecting both the self and others";

and it was, moreover, the "perfecting of the democratic charcter" which

appeared as a "partial end" of the "democratic society."[54]

Democratic Character

According to Lasswell's understanding of the matter, the democratic

character was that personality type which developed with a "minimum of

distortion."[55] Hence this type stood in marked contrast to those

personalities who met "low self-estimates" through defensive reactions

which could run the complete range from "hopeless acquiescence" to

"reaction formations." In particular, Lasswell observed that

> [w]hat is meant by the democratic character is thrown in sharp
> relief by the deficiencies of character formation that spring from
> insufficient self-respect. There is the timid child, deeply
> wounded by rebuff, and withdrawn into the self, not out of love,
> but out of fear. There is the bullying child, overreacting in
> order to cover up the deep distrust of himself.[56]

When it came down to actually fleshing out his conception of the

democratic character, Lasswell noted that, for analytical purposes, his

elaboration proceeded according to "two grand divisions." Specifically,
the first part of his discussion focussed on the "self-system" peculiar
to the democratic character. The second part of this elaboration, in
turn, centered on the "energy system" appropriate to the democratic
character. Most generally, what was involved in this regard was a
consideration of the degree of support provided to the democratic
character's "self-system" by the unconscious components of the
personality.[57]

A. Democratic Self-System

Now, as the reader will recall, Lasswell believed that "self" was
more inclusive than the "me" or "I" generally implied by "ego." In
particular, the "self," as he understood it, was a social emergent
constituted through identification, a process through which the "primary
ego," namely, the "'me,' the 'I'," was amplified through the
incorporation of "secondary symbols" such as "family," "friends,"
"nation" and so forth. This, in turn, meant that with the rare
exception of the completely egocentric personality, demands and
expectations were always understood and advanced with reference to the
"self-system."[58] Seen in this light, then, any specific "self-system"
comprised "three main sets of patterns: identifications, demands,
expectations." Consequently, the elucidation of any "self-system,"
including the one associated with the democratic character, requires a
consideration of these three subsystems embodied in the "self."[59]

1. Identifications. As was mentioned above, for Lasswell
identification was a "process" by which an individual symbolized his
"ego" as a "member" of some "aggregate or group of egos." Now, insofar

as the pattern of identifications of the democratic character were
concerned, Lasswell suggested that such a personality type maintained an
"open as against a closed ego." By this he meant that the democratic
character's attitude towards the rest of mankind remained "warm rather
than frigid, inclusive and expanding rather than exclusive and
constricting." Most simply, the democratic character as delineated by
Lasswell possessed an "underlying personality structure" which was both
"capable of friendship" and "unalienated from humanity." Consequently,

> [s]uch a person transcends most of the cultural categories
> that divide human beings from one another, and senses the
> common humanity across class lines within the culture, and in
> the world beyond the local culture. In the extreme case we
> have "saints" who have undergone the deprivations of a
> concentration camp without losing the serenity of outlook
> that reaches out hopefully and tolerantly toward other human
> beings.[60]

2. Demands. Most generally, for Lasswell demands were
"preferences and volitions." Thus, by implication, the demand subsystem
of the "self" encompassed the value claims advanced by the "self."[61]
With regard to the demand component of the democratic character's "self-
system," Lasswell indicated that such a person could be characterized as
"multi-valued rather than single-valued, and as disposed to share rather
than to hoard or to monopolize." Further, insofar as the demand system
was concerned, the health and stability of the democratic character
could be graphically underscored by comparing it to those personality
types which were fixated on any one specific value. For example, we are
told that the "clinician" has traditionally found in both the "over-
sensitive neurotic" and the "grandiose delusions of the paranoid"
vestiges of an extreme obsession for respect. Likewise, we read that
the "physicians" were more than well-acquainted with the "character

deformations" produced by "hyper-specialization" on rectitude. And, for a final example on this count, Lasswell reminded his readers that the psychiatrist, familiar with the "sly ruthlessness of some of the paranoid patients with whom he has come in contact in the clinic," could not help but feel "at home in the study of ardent seekers after power."[62]

3. Expectations. For Lasswell, expectations were simply nothing more than "matter-of-fact references to past, present, or future events."[63] As far as the pattern of expectations associated with the "self-system" of the democratic character was concerned, Lasswell indicated that such a person manifested "deep confidence in the benevolent potentialities of man." Further, his "affirmative trust" in the benevolence and ultimate perfectibility of mankind helped the democratic character maintain equanimity in light of the deprivations sustained during "adverse experiences." Indeed, in times of social turmoil and personal hardship such personalities, Lasswell observed, evinced an "extraordinary capacity" to remain "generous, warm, enduring, hopeful and spontaneous when others project blame, dash themselves to pieces or retire, trailing clouds of regressive fantasy."[64]

B. Energy System

In addition to his discussion of the democratic character's "self-system," Lasswell briefly alluded to the proper role the unconscious would play in such a personality. As he noted in this regard, the "self-system" of the democratic character would "have at its disposal the energies of the unconscious part of the personality." Specifically, what this meant was that in the democratic character the structural

aspects of the personality, that is, the "id system," the "super-ego system," and the "ego [self] system," would constitute a unified and harmonious psychic whole. In effect, such a person would stand in marked contrast to the individual whose "super-ego system of restriction and compulsion" conflicted with the "recurring initiatives of the id-system," leaving the "enegies" so "divided and opposed to one another" so as to be unavailable to the "self-system." Ultimately, set in a context of indulgent relationships where unrealistic ideals were no longer cultivated, the democratic character would in good part be relieved of the psychologically enervating battle betweeen unconscious inhibitions and destructive impulses. Thus unencumbered by insecurities and anxieties, the democratic character would be driven by an energy system which allowed the "self" to engage a meaningful, active and creative role in social affairs.[65]

A New Image of Politics

As is evident from much of the foregoing, in the "free-man's commonwealth" Lasswell offered what he considered to be an ideal of personal and social health. Seen through his eyes, such a society would be distinguished by the presence of "congenial and creative" relationships between fundamentally equal individuals. Further, in this society which practiced "mutual respect" among people the personalities of its inhabitants would develop with a "minimum of distortion."
Thus in the "free-man's commonwealth" the warm, sharing, optimistic and psychologically healthy democratic character would be "perfected." And the presence of such types, moreover, would work to fortify and sustain a healthy democratic equilibrium.

Though optimistic, Lasswell fully recognized the magnitude of the
social transformation required to attain such a political order. As he
himself confessed, the creation of a "democratic equilibrium" where
"deviations" were "promptly rectified" entailed a massive and
interminable "reconstruction" of "civilization." It would
be a "complex" and "tremendous" task which called for the isolation and
elimination of those "destructive" social practices which provoked
destabilizing and "intense concentrations of destructive impulse."
Further, given that the "basic postulate" governing human behavior was
the "maximization principle," this effort in social reconstruction would
require the consolidation of "democratic conduct by directing the
indulgences toward those who act democratically, and the deprivations
toward those who do not."[66] At this point, however, it should be
acknowledged that such an admission only brings to the fore the question
as to how this "tremendous task" of social "reconstruction" would be
effected. As we already have had occasion to mention, from Lasswell's
perspective democratic societies were simply not equipped to engage in
such comprehensive and unending social overhaul. At best, their
"technique of discussion" only served to provide a momentary release of
tension created by social "maladaptations" and frustrations. But for
what Lasswell had in mind "catharsis" through "political symbolization"
would not suffice. Rather, what was required was "rational, selective,
progressive change" which would remove the causes of social strife and
tension by readjusting "prevailing institutions" so that they more
effectively advanced the ends of democracy.[67] When viewed in this
light, the facilitation of "discussion" and the improvement in the

"machinery of settling disputes" were only peripheral items on the

democratic agenda. The "real problem," wrote Lasswell, was to be "ruled

by the truth about the conditions of harmonious relations." And the

"discovery of the truth," he hastened to add, "is an object of

specialized research; it is no monopoly of people as people, or of the

ruler as ruler."[68]

As is suggested by the foregoing, in Lasswell's view the creation

of the genuinely democratic community was very much dependent upon the

attitudes and actions of "those who think about society."[69] In

particular, he fervently believed that the success of this "complex" and

"tremendous" effort in social meliorism depended on the willingness to

gain and apply the "truth" as discerned by that congeries of

individuals whose business it was to conduct "specialized research."

According to this view, the "knowledge" made available through

"scientific observation" provided democratic societies with an

unprecedented opportunity to gain strength and clarity of vision in an

epoch in which mankind faced "collossal crises of self destruction."

Indeed, through the "cultivation of science" democracies, Lasswell

observed, could eventually ascertain the understanding required to

control both "destructive practices" and "destructive impulses."

Put somewhat differently, he believed that "science" promised to "give

hands and feet to morality"; that is, through "insight and direction"

humanity's heretofore "blind groping for deference" could finally be

given "clarity and vitality." And it was out of his conviction that the

logic and methods of science were "certain to contribute, here and now,

to the practice of democratic morals," that his effort to craft a
science of democracy was conceived.[70]

The New Politics of Democracy

Admittedly, the idea that scientific knowledge should be used to
inform political practice is hardly novel. Though appearing in many
different formulations, such a notion is deeply rooted in the Western
tradition. Yet in the modern era probably no other person gained
greater notoriety for his effort to bring scientific rationality to the
political process than Lasswell. As Paul Lazarsfeld has observed in
this regard: "One cannot talk about policy sciences without referring
to Harold Lasswell.... There is scarcely an idea in the current
literature on policy science which could not be paraphrased by a
quotation from Lasswell's early work."[71] And it is to Lasswell's
distinctive contributions in this area that we now direct our attention.

The New Science

Although Lasswell passionately believed that the "realization" and
ultimate "perfection" of democracy depended on science, he nonetheless
realized that certain "difficulties" were present in any effort to bring
those "two great enterprises into harmonious relationship with one
another." As he saw it, many proponents of democracy betrayed a
fundamental distrust of scientific intelligence. Such an aversion, in
fact, was reflected in the popular acceptance of the "formidable
portrait of science the destroyer." This view depicted science as
"destroying respect for personality by magnifying the importance of
impersonal factors," and as "destroying humanity itself by preparing the

weapons of war and despotism." Lasswell furthermore suggested that this popular portrait was not completely unfounded. "Science," he conceded, had often been "applied in ways that imperil democracy." But, he continued, that was not a fault which could be attributed to science per se, for science was only a "servant" to be employed in "man's quest for perfection." Seen in this light, the real problem was the failure to coordinate and direct the instruments and advances of science to the needs of democracy. Thus what was required was the development of an overarching science which discovered and showed how the "scientific enterprise" could be used for the benefit of the full realization of the "free-man's commonwealth."[72] And it was this architectonic science which Lasswell referred to as the "science of democracy" or the "policy sciences."

In general, the science of democracy or the policy sciences fostered the "instrumentation" of "democratic morals" through the "timely application" of the logic, methods and findings of science to the "end of realizing democracy." In keeping to a view which equated "democracy" with "health," Lasswell observed that such a science, much like medicine, would restrict itself to an understanding and control of the "disease process," that is, those factors which "prejudice" both the attainment and perpetuation of the genuinely democratic community. Moreover, as implied by the foregoing analogy, the policy sciences of democracy, much like medicine which was a form of applied biology, gave primacy to the "practical" as opposed to the purely "theoretical."[73] Consequently, such an orientation brought the attitude of the scholar much closer to that of the "agitator-organizer."[74]

Postponing for a moment a more detailed consideration of the
specific attributes and functions of a science of democracy, it might be
fruitful to consider the characteristics of those who were best equipped
to play the role of democratic scientist. Specifically, who were these
individuals and where would they come from? Though implicit in much of
the foregoing, it is to Lasswell's direct response to such a question
that we will now turn.

The New Elite

In general, Lasswell's understanding of the group of individuals
who could be recruited to play the role of scientific midwife to
democracy is inseparable from his distinctive conception of the "world
revolution of the recent past and the immediate future." Specifically,
as we observed earlier, in Lasswell's view the revolution of the current
epoch was distinguished by the emergence of a new "skill group," namely,
the "intellectual class." Primarily, this aggregate of individuals was,
he believed, composed of specialists in analysis, propaganda,
administration, organization as well as the new technicians of
coercion.[75] And it was in this group of "modernizing intellectuals"
that the "key persons" capable of "initiating and facilitating" that
sequence of policies which mitigated the "sources of insecurity" were to
be found. In effect, they constituted a "special skill group."[76] And,
in his mind, they were primarily the "meek," truth-seeking "professors
of social science" who heretofore fired their "barrages from the
battlements of universities." Fully apprised of their "power position
in society," this "meek," "self-selected elite," wrote Lasswell, could
conceivably "inherit the earth." More importantly, in his view the fate

of mankind was contingent on their recognition of their position in
society and their willingness to act on it. Ultimately, the "hope" of
the "world" depended on the "competitive strength of an elite based on
vocabulary, footnotes, questionnaires, and conditioned responses."[77]
Thus, when viewed against the backdrop of current historical conditions
and the ascendancy of the intelligentsia, academic quiescence, Lasswell
surmised, would have untoward consequences. The most likely result of
their failure to act would be the continued evolution toward the
"garrison-state," that despotic regime where

> ... power will eventually be concentrated in an elite class
> (eventually caste) of intellectuals who constitute a ruling
> oligarchy. In addition to using communicative skills for
> purposes of indoctrination, they can be expected to adapt
> medical skills to check on loyalty and inculcate obedience.
> Not the whole intellectual class but an oligarchical segment
> can be expected to rise to a dominant position under these
> conditions.[78]

At one point, in the earliest stages of his career, Lasswell
suggested that the primary obstacle which hindered the realization of a
therapeutic science of society was the academician's lack of
consciousness of his respective "power position" in society. Thus he
indicated that once the "meek" "college professor" was made aware of and
accepted the fact that with "truth" came "control" the principal hurdle
which stymied the development and practice of a science of democracy
would be removed. In accepting and fulfilling their obligations, the
practioners of such a science would eventually win the "requisite
deference" from the masses, those "puzzled people who feel their
responsibilities and who respect objective findings."[79] Some time
later, however, he frankly confessed that the "puzzled people" would not
always fall into line. Essentially, among many those academics who met

their obligation as democratic midwife were, Lasswell observed,
unflatteringly identified as "half man, half brain." Indeed, such a
person remained "sufficiently intellectual" to evoke feelings of
"inferiority" among "men of affairs." At the same time, however, he was
considered enough of a "man of affairs" to introduce a "note of
constraint" among other members of the "intellectual community."[80]
Ultimately, when seen in this light, the "practical problem" of the
policy scientist remained one of gaining "lay confidence" in their
"ability" and "good intentions." To increase the number of people in
places "powerful and humble" who would rely on the "expert" advice and
direction made available by these social scientists, Lasswell considered
it essential that they cultivate a favorable "public image" of their
profession. In particular, he believed that through efforts in
education, propaganda and persuasion conducted through highly visible
professional associations they could win popular acceptance and also
provide cues to the "layman" when he selected his "expert advisers and
guides."[81]

This recognition that these democratic scientists would constitute
a "special skill group" of the intellectual class, however, still does
not tell us much about how Lasswell expected these individuals would
serve the ends of the democratic community. Thus, to better understand
how the science of democracy would contribute to the realization of the
"free-man's commonwealth," we must consider the distinctive outlook and
functions that would occupy the attention of this "special skill group."
And it is to such a consideration that we now direct our attention.

Principal Attributes

With regard to specifics, the policy orientation, as seen through

Lasswell's eyes, encompassed two distinct, though "entwined," tasks.

The first task included in the policy approach was an analysis of the

"decision process" itself. Here attention was primarily directed to an

evaluation and understanding of the ways policies were articulated and

executed. The second task involved in the policy orientation centered

on the job of "relating knowledge to public action." In this regard,

the policy scientist was concerned with improving the information and

interpretations available to those who made policy.[82] Both tasks

implied by this "twofold orientation" were undertaken to provide the

intelligence required to meet the policy needs of a democratic society.

And to achieve that end, the policy sciences, Lasswell contended, sought

to attain "three principal attributes," namely, "diversity,"

"contextuality," and "problem orientation."[83]

First, in this regard, for Lasswell "diversity" meant "multi-

method." In his estimation, the overall success and hence acceptance of

a science of democracy ultimately depended on the ability to forge a

"systematic account" of all the "factors" which controlled or in some

way affected "personality and politics." Further, in his view "no one

professionally trained group" possessed all the "skills" required to

provide such a comprehensive "account"; rather, "every expert" brought

with him "valuable instruments for the common task." Thus to achieve

success the policy orientation would be constrained to apply, coordinate

and integrate all the "methods of theory formation" and all of the

"procedures of data gathering and processing" found among any of the

physical, behavioral and social sciences.[84] In addition, and along similar lines, he suggested that policy scientists, in their effort to "cope with complexity, and with the future-oriented, exploratory, and creative dimensions of the policy process," would evolve techniques like "prototyping," "computer simulation" and "micromodeling."[85]

In Lasswell's view, a second major and "unescapable" attribute of the policy orientation was contextuality. Most simply, this adherence to the "principle of contextuality" implied that the policy approach would adopt the frame of reference made available by the configurative mode of analysis. This, in turn, meant that those who followed the policy orientation would be compelled to derive a more complete understanding of the meaning and relevance of details by viewing them in their relation to the larger configuration of events of which they were a "part." Seen in this light, the policy scientist would attempt to define the meaning of policy problems, values, institutions, and propositions of relations within the larger context of the "inclusive image" of the "whole." And proposed policies, moreover, would always be considered in light of the "full range of costs and benefits."[86]

The final major attribute Lasswell ascribed to the policy approach was "problem orientation." The science of democracy, in short, would not be "problem blind." This concern for "policy problems," however, did not imply that the "energy" of the policy scientist would be "dissipated on a miscellany of merely topical issues"; rather, as Lasswell viewed it, investigators who subscribed to the policy orientation would concentrate on the "fundamental" problems which emerged in the "adjustment of man in society."[87] And to achieve that

end, the policy orientation would engage the distinctive tasks
constitutive of any problem solving activity. For Lasswell, these
included the following: (1) goal clarification; (2) trend description;
(3) analysis of conditions; (4) projection of developments; and (5) the
invention, evaluation, and selection of alternatives.[88]

The first task of the problem solving orientation, goal
clarification, involved specifying in clear "operational terms" the aims
of the body politic. For the democratic policy sciences, this entailed
an explicit statement of those value conditions in both "myth" and
"operations" which needed to be realized to attain the commonwealth of
human dignity. The second intellectual task involved in problem
orientation was the determination of trends. Of special importance here
was the description of where society was on the historical axis with
respect to the realization of its "preferred terminal states." The
third chore implied by the problem solving frame of reference involved
the investigation and study of those variables which conditioned the
previously described historical trends. Thus this intellectual chore
went beyond mere "inventories of change." Specifically, it involved the
application of the "scientific pattern of thought" for the purpose of
isolating those intervening "factors" which modified the social
equilibrium and hence accounted for both the direction and magnitude of
the current historical movement towards or away from the realization of
goals. The fourth task of the problem solving frame of reference,
projection, involved the articulation of a more "explicit and dependable
map" of "future developments." It was, Lasswell believed, "essential to
emphasize the crucial significance of this task" in the problem

orientation. Since decisions or policies necessarily involved a "step into the future," one principal way of improving the "rationality" of a policy was by "improving" "estimates" on prospective developments. The final task implied by the problem solving frame of reference centered on the invention, evaluation and selection of alternatives. In many respects, this was the "pay-off function" in the problem orientation. Most simply, it involved the ascertainment of that aggregate of policies which promoted value maximization for society as a whole.[89]

As can be reasonably inferred from the above discussion, in serving the ends of the democratic community the policy scientist would be constrained to perform an extensive variety of technical chores which required a set of rather sophisticated cognitive skills. Thus, if the science of democracy was to succeed, Lasswell concluded that the policy scientist would require a "different type of education." Such an education, moreover, would have to start from the premise that it "takes longer to train a good social scientist than it takes to train a good physical scientist."[90] The "good social scientist" would first of all have to be provided with an opportunity to disembarrass himself from his unconscious yet obtrusive and crippling biases through protracted "self-scrutiny by the best-developed methods of personality study." He would, moreover, have to become acquainted with the "long and arduous" yet nonetheless "indispensable" task of "goal clarification." Further, adherence to the principle of contextuality required that the "good social scientist" develop an understanding of the mechanics of configurative anlaysis. Finally, since he must inevitably establish "personal contact" with his "material," his training had to be

"directed" to the techniques of "social intercourse." Consequently, "he must mix with rich and poor, with savage and civilized, with sick and well, with old and young."[91]

Policy Scientist as Therapist

As has been repeatedly emphasized in much of our foregoing discussion, in Lasswell's estimation the policy scientist's principal task was the "instrumentation" of "democratic morals"; indeed, in his view anyone who espoused the "fully contextual" outlook implied by the policy perspective would find it extremely difficult not to commit himself to the ideal represented by the "free-man's commonwealth."[92] And in meeting this commitment, those who possessed the "truth" as revealed to them by "specialized research" would use their scientifically ascertained knowledge to elevate both the "democratic leader" and the "democratic layman."

> The degree of intelligence in society is not only a matter
> of the level of thought and observation, but of the number
> and skill of all who specialize upon intelligence. There
> are those who specialize upon the discovery of truth, upon
> clarity, and upon interest. If the flow of communication
> is to further the discovery of the public interest, there
> must be a proper relationship among every kind of specialist
> upon intelligence.[93]

In directing their intellectual energies to an investigation and understanding of the "basic conflicts" in society, these "specialists on intelligence," Lasswell surmised, would "supplement" the "practice of democratic statecraft" by providing and recommending the "best facts" and the "most thoughtful interpretations available in the body politic at any given moment in history."[94] When viewed in this light, Lasswell indicated that the policy approach would not be confounded with the suggestion that social scientists ought to devote all their attention to

advising politicians on "topical" issues and problems of the moment.
Nor, for that matter, would it be confused with the "superficial" idea
that the "thinker-scholar" should completely abandon his vocation as a
scientist and "engage full time in practical politics." Rather, in his
view the "most fruitful" application of the "policy idea" really implied
somthing quite "different."[95]

In plying their trade, policy scientists, after having clarified in
"operational terms" the meaning of "democratic morals," would, Lasswell
observed, be constrained to conduct a "rigorous audit of the human
consequences" of all prevailing social, cultural, political, and
economic practices and programs. Their "central problem" was the
reduction of the "level of strain" and social "maladaptation," and the
"entire social process" would constitute the focus of their "continuing
audit" conducted through the "disciplined methods" made available by
science. Consequently, "no social practice" in the "home, school,
factory, [or] office" would be exempt from analysis. When viewed in
this light, all familial, business, labor, educational, industrial, and
governmental practices and policies would fall within the democratic
scientists' domain of inquiry. Further, since "practices in different
parts of the world" had "dynamic implications" which extended far beyond
the territorial boundaries of any one given nation, the scope of concern
of these "specialized thinkers" would eventually have to be modified to
stop at "nothing short of the world as a whole."[96]

To facilitate their task, Lasswell expected that these democratic
scientists could establish numerous "social-self observatories" from
which this "continuing audit" of the "impact" of social and cultural

institutions and practices upon the formation and maturation of "human
personality" could be carried out. Most simply, under the auspices of
these specialized research institutes they could gather and process data
on those conditions and impending developments which threatened to
destabilize the democratic equilibrium and deflect society away from its
goal of the realization of human dignity within the framework of the
"free-man's commonwealth." Further, having located the "zones of poor
democratic performance," and having isolated the "factors that
contribute to their continuation," these policy scientists would, on the
basis of future expectations and through the application of quasi-
experimental techniques, design, test and evaluate policy alternatives
which would perfect the "values and institutions of the democratic
commonwealth." All of this, of course, would be done to supply
democratic leaders and citizens with the "proper raw materials of
thought" to make the decisions or policy choices required to attain true
"democratic justice."[97]

In sum, in Lasswell's view the fundamental task of the "specialists
on the understanding of human nature and society" was to overcome the
cognitive ineptitude of the democratic "layman" and leader in the quest
for those policies which could "aid the progressive transformation of
human society into a free-man's commonwealth." Basically, according to
his understanding of the matter the "puzzled people" had no choice but
to "rely" or "depend" upon the "expert advisers and guides" for the
"patient observation, record-making and analysis to provide the
knowledge" and "most thoughtful interpretations" needed to "implement
democratic aspirations." "Democracies," in short, "perish through

ignorance"; and, as will be recalled, the "discovery of the truth" was
"no monopoly of people as people" or of "ruler as ruler" but rather was
an "object of specialized research."[98] Thus, when seen from this
perspective, the policy scientist served society in much the same way
that the analyst served his client. By increasing the community's
"insight" into the heretofore unrecognized causes of destructive
interpersonal relationships which held in the past, the policy scientist
enlarged the people's "scope of freedom" to abolish or amend those
anxiety producing routines which impaired interpersonal relationships
and threatened to upset or destroy the future of the stable and healthy
democratic equilibrium. Ultimately, when this science of "integrative
politics" was most fully realized and implemented, it would provide the
"basis" for the "profound reconstruction" required to achieve the
complete and total realization of the "free-man's commonwealth." Seen
in this light, the final goal of the policy scientist was to put himself
out of business. Or, as Lasswell put it, the "aim of the science of
man" was to inevitably "make such a science superfluous."[99]

NOTES

1. Edwin S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and the Future of
Political Science," American Political Science Review (August 1929),
quoted in Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, p. 78.

2. World Revolutionary Propaganda, p. 9.

3. Power and Personality, pp. 210, 211.

4. Labor Attitudes and Problems, p. 505.

5. "Toward a Science of Democracy," p. 239.

6. "Postscript," p. 200; "The Political Science of Science,"
p. 977; "The Research Frontier," Saturday Review 3(Nov. 1956), p. 50;
World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. x; and "An Interview with H.
D. Lasswell," conducted by David Kemp and Graham Little, Melbourne
Journal of Politics 4(1971), p. 44. This was a view Lasswell clearly
shared with Merriam. See, for example, New Aspects, pp. 229-230.
Concerning Lasswell's claim in this regard, John Hallowell sardonically
remarked: "That man should aspire to do better the work of God in His
Creation, in effect to become God, is an aspiration not confined to the
twentieth century nor to contemporary social scientists, but that such
an aspiration can be put forth without any hint of blasphemy and
listened to respectfully attests to the degradation of contemporary
civilization." See "Obstacles to the Recovery of a Christian
Perspective on Human Nature," Modern Age (Winter 1983), p. 5.

7. "The Commonwealth of Science", p. 399.

8. Ibid., p. 405; Power and Personality, p. 9.

9. Power and Personality, p. 9; Power and Society, p. xxiv; "The
Policy Orientation," p. 15; and "The World Revolution of Our Time,"
pp. 36, 35.

10. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 31; and "The
Developing Science of Democracy," pp. 2-3. See also in this regard, A
Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 42.

11. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 31. See also in this
regard, Power and Personality, p. 202; and "Clarifying Value Judgments:
Principles of Content and Procedure," pp. 88-90.

12. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 31; and "Clarifying
Value Judgments: Principles of Content and Procedure," pp. 88-90.

13. "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 2.

14. The Future of Political Science, p. 5.

15. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 42; and "Democratic Character," p. 473.

16. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 197; and Power and Society, p. 239.

17. "Democratic Character," p. 513.

18. Ibid., p. 473.

19. Power and Society, pp. 117, 119, 126.

20. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 44.

21. "Legal Education and Public Policy," pp. 44; Power and Personality, p. 188; and "The World Revolution of Our Time, p. 58.

22. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 45; and Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 45.

23. "Democratic Character," pp. 479-480; and Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 66.

24. "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 61-62; "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 31; and "Democratic Character," p. 479.

25. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 59.

26. Ibid., pp. 59-60; "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 52; and "Democratic Character," pp. 478-479.

27. "Legal Education and Public Policy," pp. 45-46; and "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 60-61.

28. "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 57.

29. "Democratic Character," pp. 477, 478, 500.

30. Power and Society, p. 56; and "The World Revolution of Our Time," p. 56.

31. Power and Personality, p. 195; and "Democratic Character," p. 477.

32. Power and Personality, p. 195; "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 30; "Democratic Character," p. 477; and "Legislative Policy, Conformity and Psychiatry," Proceedings of the American Psychopathological Association 43(1953), p. 24.

33. "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 53-54.

34. "Legal Education and Public Policy," pp. 42, 43.

35. "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 46, 47.

36. Power and Personality, pp. 190-193; and Power and Society, pp. 234-235.

37. Power and Society, p. 239.

38. Jacques Ellul, The Political Illusion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 231-232.

39. Arnold Rogow, "A Psychiatry of Politics," in Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, p. 142.

40. Power and Personality, p. 110; and "Toward a Science of Democracy," p. 238. See also "Democratic Character," p. 525.

41. Easton, "Harold Lasswell: Policy Scientist for a Democratic Society," pp. 450-477; Lipsky, "The Theory of International Relations of Harold D. Lasswell," pp. 43-44, 54-57; and Waldo, Political Science in the United States, p. 32.

42. "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," p. 274; "The Commonwealth of Science," p. 400; "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 93.

43. "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 93; "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 11; and "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," p. 270.

44. "Legislative Policy, Conformity, and Psychiatry," p. 29.

45. "Impact of Psychoanalytic Thinking on the Social Sciences," p. 94.

46. Power and Personality, pp. 161-162.

47. "Psychology Looks at Morals and Politics," p. 15.

48. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 33; and Power and Personality, p. 162.

49. "What Psychiatrists and Political Scientists Can Learn From One Another," pp. 38, 39; and "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," p. 270.

50. "The Policy Orientation," p. 8.

51. Power and Personality, pp. 112-118.

52. "Toward a Science of Democracy," p. 238.

53. Power and Personality, pp. 118-119.

54. "Toward a Science of Democracy," p. 246.

55. "Legal Education and Public Policy," p. 37.

56. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 129.

57. "Democratic Character," p. 495. My work here has been greatly aided by Fred Greenstein's discussion in the following works: "Harold D. Lasswell's Concept of Democratic Character," Journal of Politics 30(1968), pp. 696-709; and Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), Chapter 5.

58. Power and Society, pp. 10-28.

59. "Democratic Character," p. 481.

60. Ibid., pp. 495-496.

61. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 25.

62. "Democratic Character," pp. 497-502.

63. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 25. At times, Lasswell referred to these as "acceptances." See, for example, "Describing the Contents of Communications," p. 82.

64. "Democratic Character," pp. 502-503; and Power and Personality, p. 163.

65. "Democratic Character," pp. 503-513; and Power and Personality, p. 150.

66. "Democratic Character," pp. 513-514; and Power and Personality, pp. 110-111.

67. Power and Personality, pp. 127-131.

68. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 197.

69. Ibid., p. 198.

70. "The Developing Science of Democracy," pp. 1, 12; and "Psychology Looks at Morals and Politics," pp. 20, 19.

71. Paul Lazarsfeld, "The Policy Movement (An Outsider's View)," Policy Sciences 6(Sept. 1975), p. 213. For a general overview on Lasswell's policy sciences perspective, see the following: Paul Kecskemeti, "The 'Policy Sciences': Aspirations and Outlook," World Politics 4(1952), pp. 520-535; Carl J. Friedrich, "Policy--A Science?," Public Policy 4(1953), pp. 269-281; G. David Garson, Policy Studies

Journal 9(1981), pp. 535-544; and Weldon V. Barton, "Toward a Policy Science of Democaracy," _Journal of Politics_ 31(Feb. 1969), pp. 32-51.

72. "Toward a Science of Democracy," pp. 238, 240.

73. Ibid., p. 247; and "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 7.

74. _Who Gets What, When, How_, p. 24.

75. "Skill Politics and Skill Revolution," pp. 133-145; "The World Revolution of Our Time," pp. 80-94; _World Politics and Personal Insecurity_, pp. 84-86; and _Who Gets What, When, How_, pp. 97-112.

76. "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," p. 273.

77. _World Politics and Personal Insecurity_, pp. 15, 16.

78. "Policy Sciences," p. 186.

79. _World Politics and Personal Insecurity_, p. 16; and _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 203.

80. _A Pre-View of Policy Sciences_, p. 121.

81. _Power and Personality_, pp. 131-147.

82. "The Changing Image of Human Nature: The Sociocultural Aspect," _American Journal of Psychoanalysis_ 26(1966), p. 160; "The Emerging Conception of the Policy Sciences," _Policy Sciences_, (1970), p. 3; and "The Policy Orientation," p. 3.

83. _A Pre-View of Policy Sciences_, p. 4.

84. _Power and Personality_, pp. 124, 121; _The Policy Orientation of Political Science_, pp. 12, 13.

85. _A Pre-View of Policy Sciences_, Chapter 4. Prototyping refers to innovations applied on a small scale for heuristic purposes. In many respects, they are not far-removed from controlled experimental designs. Lasswell participated in two such efforts designed to facilitate power sharing. One occurred at a hacienda in Peru; the other, at the Yale Psychiatric Institute in New Haven. For a more detailed discussion on these, see the following: "The Transferability of Vicos Strategy," in _Peasants, Power and Applied Social Change_, ed. Henry F. Dobyns, Harold D. Lasswell, and Paul Doughty (Berkeley: Sage Publications), Chapter 7; "The Emerging Policy Sciences of Development: The Vicos Case," _American Behavioral Scientist_ 8(March 1965), pp. 28-33; and Harold D. Lasswell and Robert Rubenstein, _The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Micromodeling involved a number of techniques which could be used to manage the "vast Niagara of

pertinent information" available to the policy scientist. For Lasswell, the most important of these techniques were the "decision seminar" and the "social planetarium." On this count, see The Future of Political Science, Chapter 6.

86. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 14; Power and Personality, p. 218; "Postscript," p. 186; "The Changing Image of Human Nature: The Socio-Cultural Aspect," p. 161; and "From Fragmentation to Configuration," p. 444.

87. "The Policy Orientation," p. 14.

88. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, p. 39.

89. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, Chapter 3; and "Postscript," pp. 187-189. See also "Policy Sciences," pp. 182-188; and The Policy Orientation of Political Science, Chapter 4.

90. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 201; "Legal Education and Public Policy," pp. 30-35; and The Future of Political Science, Chapter 10.

91. Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 201, 202.

92. "Policy Sciences," p. 182.

93. Democracy Through Public Opinion, pp. 27-28.

94. "The Policy Orientation," p. 8; and "Afterthoughts," p. 316. The "specialized thinker," he wrote, "is justified in claiming access to the attention of those who participate in decision." See "Some Perplexities of Policy Theory," Social Research 41 (Spring 1974), p. 189.

95. "The Policy Orientation," p. 7. As he observed: "The main burden of effective politics rests with those who perform the principal political roles in society." See "The Major Trends in World Politics," in The Ethic of Power: The Interplay of Religion, Philosophy and Politics, ed. Harold Lasswell and Harlan Cleveland (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 355.

96. Psychopathology and Politics, p. 197, 198, 199-201; World Politics and Personal Insecurity, p. 20; Power and Personality, pp. 111, 117, 174-187; Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 34; "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," p. 273; and "The Commonwealth of Science," p. 404.

97. Power and Personality, p. 168; "Policy and the Intelligence Function: Ideological Intelligence," in Analysis of Political Behavior, pp. 122-123; The Policy Orientation of Political Science, pp. 43-54; and Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 61.

98. _Democracy Through Public Opinion_, p. 131; "The Developing Science of Democracy," p. 1; and _Psychopathology and Politics_, p. 197.

99. "The Policy Orientation," p. 8; and "Democratic Character," p. 524.

CONCLUSION

As was indicated by much of the preceding chapter, it cannot be denied that Lasswell offered his readers a decidedly utopian vision of the future. According to his understanding of the matter, once the democratic "leader" and "layman" had gained "insight" or "freedom" as a result of the efforts of those "expert advisers and guides" who possessed the "truth" about congenial interpersonal relations, they could finally transcend the infirmities imposed by ignorance. Thus, furnished with the "proper raw materials of thought," the people would be well-situated to abolish those acute "sources of human destructiveness" by implementing a set of corrective policies which effectively adjusted social and cultural institutions and practices to the ends of democracy. They would, in short, eventually be capable of bringing into existence the "free-man's commonwealth." Seen in this light, not only would they be able to reverse the ominous drift toward the "restoration of a caste society," but the fruit of their labor promised to be a community distinguished by a broad distribution of values and harmonious interpersonal relationships, a society not unlike that "fairyland of human achievement" which Merriam had so passionately urged Lasswell and others around him to pursue.

In assessing the primary thrust of Lasswell's thought, it must be admitted that few people would disagree with his "absolute intention." That is to say, few individuals would seriously object to the pursuit of

a more egalitarian and deferential community. Many who are committed to

such a society, however, would find Lasswell's call for the creation of

a democratic technology to be a self-defeating and ultimately

unpalatable course of action. And it is to the reasons as to why this

would be the case that we shall now direct our attention.

The Commonwealth Revisited

A fundamental premise of self-government is that ordinary citizens

are better equipped to judge their own interests than is any other set

of individuals. This was a premise, however, which Lasswell could no

longer accept. To be sure, out of his regard for "human dignity"

he accentuated the importance of giving credence to the fact that all

individuals were "minded organisms," fully vested with a capacity for

independent, rational thought. Nevertheless, as was alluded to earlier,

his own language betrayed an underlying conviction that political

matters were presumably too important to be trusted to the unassisted

judgment of the "puzzled people." Left to his own devices, the "layman"

was incapable of discovering that "course of procedure" which would

afford him an opportunity to lead a "happy and well-adjusted life." In

most instances, a depraved citizenry's untutored thinking and undirected

discussion only culminated in results which were "absurd." Viewed from

this perspective, the cognitively inept "layman" required the assistance

of a new, full-blown democratic technology which could furnish him with

the "proper raw materials of thought."

Put into its proper perspective, Lasswell made quite clear that his

new, applied democratic science was not to be confounded with those

past efforts in civic education which had occupied the attention of an

earlier political science; indeed, the "delusions of the community"
could not be "healed" by "drilling a hundred million people in rules of
logic."[1] Rather, this new technology involved the mobilization of a
"self-selected elite" who through "specialized research" discovered the
"truth" and provided the "puzzled people" with the "most thoughtful
interpretations available in the body politic at a given moment in
history." Specifically, through the "long and arduous" process of "goal
clarification" this "special skill group" could elevate those "laymen"
who still remained in a "fog about the meaning of democracy" and the
particulars of "democratic justice."[2] Too, this "self-selected elite"
could "guide" the "puzzled people" to that sequence of policies which in
fact reduced the level of social maladaptation and contributed to the
practice of "democratic morals."

Upon further reflection, it becomes apparent that in his effort to
constrain a politics of irrationalism and popular depravity by
subjecting it to rationalist goals and direction Lasswell ultimately
extracted the very essence out of democratic liberalism. First, in this
regard, his position distorted the very meaning of democratic rule.
Secondly, if fully realized in fact, such an attempt to impose rationalist
principles on public life would seriously threaten to undermine many of
the basic values of democratic liberalism by opening the door to a
politics of manipulation and control.

The Contradiction

First of all, on closer inspection it becomes evident that this
"expert-layman" dichotomy contained in his conception of a democratic
tehnology is, in the final analysis, irreconcilable with a "free-man's

commonwealth." This becomes clearer through a reconsideration of the basic role and position this "self-selected elite" would have in a democratic society.

As was observed earlier, in the "drastic and continuing reconstruction of society" this techno-scientific elite would be primarily concerned with the investigation of social institutions and practices for the sake of uncovering those "zones of poor democratic performance." Thus by virtue of their putatively superior intelligence they would not only establish the conditions of democracy through "goal clarification," but they would also serve as the arbiters of those behavioral patterns which constituted "deviations" from the specified democratic equilibrium. Furthermore, they would be entrusted with the responsibility of guiding "social energy" to the "abolition" of those "recurrent sources" of social strain. Consequently, they would be given the task of "initiating and facilitating" that "sequence of policies" which "promptly rectified" the discovered "deviations" by "directing" value "indulgences toward those who act democratically, and the deprivations toward those who do not." Hence through the inclusion of certain issues and policies and through the exclusion of others this "self-selected elite" would primarily shape and define the agenda of decisions which allocated value indulgences and deprivations. And through their participation in those decisions which involved the distribution of such indulgences and deprivations they would, by implication, possess and exercise a rather substantial amount of power. Or, as Lasswell more bluntly put it, as a result of their possession of the "truth" they would have "control" and ultimately "power."[3] When

seen in this light, the creation of a "free-man's commonwealth" required
a fusion of two incompatible elements. Stated most concisely, according
to Lasswell's presentation of the matter the modification of man's
"social inheritance" required to create the genuinely democratic
community where power was shared depended on a rather large
concentration of power in an elite intellectual class whose primary
claim to rule was based not on popular choice but rather on "vocabulary,
footnotes, questionnaires, and conditioned responses."

In a democratic society, the devolution of an enormous amount of
power to any one group of individuals on the basis of knowledge is
problematic. Such a state of affairs, however, becomes even more
troubling when that power can be exercised arbitrarily, unencumbered by
the constraints of popular control. Most simply, the possession and use
of power without political accountability is the antithesis of
democracy. Yet despite the immense amount of prestige and power
Lasswell hoped these democratic scientists would have, his discussion of
this democratic technology sidesteps the fundamental question of
political responsibility. According to his understanding of the matter,
the accountability of this powerful, "self-selected elite" depended on
little more than a fragile commitment to "human dignity" and "democratic
morals." In this regard, he assumed that through education and through
insight gained through psychotherapy such individuals would somehow
automatically internalize a set of perspectives or norms which would
guarantee conduct in harmony with the dictates of the "free-man's
commonwealth." Clearly, this was an unwarranted assumption. Even Freud
himself admitted that there was no necessary connection between moral

conduct and the ability to deal objectively with the physical and

symbolic aspects of the environment which was gained through analysis.

More importantly, such a presupposition was at odds with much of

Lasswell's own understanding of the dynamics of human behavior. As was

mentioned earlier, in his view the "basic postulate" which guided human

conduct was the maximization of value indulgences over value

deprivations. He further suggested that this principle applied with

equal force to all members of the species, including those individuals

who constituted the intelligentsia: "The 'capital' of the intellectual

is his learning, and he may be considered to be in competition with

landowners, business enterprisers, and manual workers for safety, income

and deference in society."[4] Furthermore, as he occasionally made quite

clear, individuals in that peculiar component of the intellectual class

on which the future of the world depended, namely, the specialists in

"naturalistic thinking," were not above this propensity for self-

aggrandizement. In fact, he himself sometimes confessed that both

physical and social scientists were occasionally "corrupted" by promises

of wealth and power gained through their affiliation with businesses,

the defense industry and a multitude of governmental agencies and

organizations.[5] Also, he acknowledged the possibility that even in

light of a general commitment to democracy that there was no assurance

that this elite would be able to free themselves completely from their

own partisan preferences. Thus he wrote:

> Shall the physician-scientist simply call his social
> convictions "health" and dismiss his opponents as "sick"?
> If the physician is a Republican, are the Democrats ill?
> If the physician believes in capitalism, is he free to

> call socialists and communists sick? ... If he believes
> in the United Nations, is everybody on the other side
> diseased?[6]

The general upshot of all this here, quite simply, is that
political responsiblity and adherence to the common good is not
necessarily provided through education and training. And such a
consequence is not without import. In particular, the exercise of power
without accountability not only violates basic tenets of democratic
liberalism, but it also produces consequences which more frequently
approach despotism than democracy.

In light of the foregoing, Lasswell's persistent call for the
application of a science of democracy to attain a genuinely democratic
community is most vexing. At least on an intuitive level, it would
appear that a society which would allow a politically irresponsible,
"self-selected elite" to define the "meaning" of "democratic morals"
while also permitting that elite to shape the contours and direction of
its decisions and policies violates the very spirit and intent of
popular democratic government. Most simply, a "democratic revolution"
given impetus and guided from above may be a revolution; however, once
set in motion such a state of affairs almost certainly ceases to be
democratic. Yet, popular reliance on an unaccountable yet powerful
"self-selected elite" generally does something more than to distort the
basic principles of liberal democratic government; indeed, the very
presence of such individuals who attempt to implement the "truth" as
they understand it most usually portends consequences which are far more
despotic than democratic. And it is to this particular concern to which
we will now turn.

Politics of Manipulation

In her criticism of new class politics, Jeane Kirkpatrick
underscored a fundamental problem associated with the effort to subject
political life to rationalist principles under the guidance of an
intellectual elite. "The political temptation of the new class," she
observed,

> lies in believing that their intelligence and exemplary
> motives equip them to reorder the institutions, the lives
> and even the characters of almost everyone--this is the
> totalitarian temptation. This is also the reason that a
> politics featuring large roles for intellectuals is
> especially dangerous to human liberty .... As surely as
> a monopoly of power or wealth is dangerous to the rest of
> us, a new-class monopoly on meaning and purpose is incompatible
> with the common weal.[7]

For the most part, Kirkpatrick's statement highlights a fundamental
danger inherent in any effort to apply a form of political technology to
the practice of "democratic statecraft." As she suggests, in many
instances those who feel compelled to impose their vision of the "good
society" on reality through the manipulation of conditions and people
most usually undermine basic democratic values. In particular, in the
quest to implement the egalitarian social order liberty, human autonomy
and ultimately the dignity of the individual are relegated to the status
of second class citizens. And it was a danger very much like this one
which was contained in Lasswell's conception of a science of democracy.

Now, as has been indicated by much of what was said earlier, there
is little doubt that Lasswell was interested in the manipulation and
control of people. Indeed, as he put it, the policy sciences were
simply the social sciences seen from the "manipulative standpoint."
What may not be readily apparent, however, are the ways and extent to

which he believed man's life could be manipulated and reordered in the
pursuit of the "free-man's commonwealth." Basically, according to his
understanding of the matter, there was "no social practice" which, given
the appropriate technical capacities, could not be subjected to rational
change and control. The "policy sciences," he observed, "must
contribute to the continual reconstruction of whatever practices stand
in the way of democratic personality and polity."[8] Consequently, in his
view everything from familial relations and child-rearing practices, to
organizational behavior, to larger socio-cultural institutions and
policies could and indeed should be reconstituted to produce results
which conformed to the dictates of the "free-man's commonwealth."
Further, to achieve that frictionless, egalitarian community populated
by healthy, loving, democratic characters it would, in his estimation,
be necessary to shape and mold public attitudes and behavior through an
adroit manipulation of symbols. First of all, such action would be
necessary to reinforce the public's commitment to the democratic
"myth."[9] Too, symbolic manipulation could be applied both for the
purposes of "mass therapy" and for the sake of reducing tension which
periodically builds up in society as the result of minor social
maladaptations.[10] Finally, and most importantly, "handling men" through
the manipulation of the "symbolic environment" would be required to
implement those policies designed to correct those faulty "institutional
routines" which culminated in conflict, character deformation, and "sick
rather than sound thinking." Thus he wrote: "sound policy dictates the
timely use of skillful propaganda for the purpose of organizing
necessary changes in faulty routines of institutional life. The masses

can contribute acquiescence."[11] And if all that failed he suggested

that sterner measures might be required: "We must not overlook the

possible use of narco- and hypno-analytic aids to the general reduction

of tension in the community."[12]

Upon further reflection, it becomes painfully obvious that a course

of action such as that plotted above would come dangerously close to

undermining both the very goals of democratic liberalism and the dignity

of the individual. According to a more conventional understanding, man

is presumed to be a free and rational moral agent, an individual who is

fully capable of personal development and self-expression. Further, in

this view, respect of the inherent worth of an individual not only

entails recognition of the limits imposed by another moral agent's ends,

but it also proscribes behavior which violates respect for the

individual to pursue his selected ends through his own free action.

Viewed from this perspective, recognition of the dignity of the

personality forbids the paternalistic promotion of another moral agent's

ends; instead, it demands respect for liberty and human autonomy. Put

in this context, the principal function of political rule is to maintain

order while safeguarding that liberty and autonomy which is a

precondition for free individual expression, self-development and

ultimately human dignity itself. When seen in this light, any effort

which proposes to elevate man above the "moral struggles of the day" by

modifying character and culture so that it conforms to an ideal standard

of behavior appears to be less attractive. Not only does such action

frequently deny the legitimacy of the ends of others, but such

manipulatory efforts most usually subvert respect for autonomy and

liberty, the very two conditions which human dignity presupposes.
Finally, such action undermines the very purposes of political rule;
indeed, liberalism out of its indifference to and its concern for the
protection of the ends of the independent moral agent must by its very
nature resist an alliance with any specific vision of public morality.
Equally important, and probably even more disconcerting, is that such a
course of action such as the one proposed by Lasswell has implications
which are far more totalitarian than benign. The effort to create a
homogenous character and culture by imposing a selected vision of the
"truth" on reality violates the very existence of a highly pluralized
liberal democratic order. And, ultimately, it was this conception of a
powerful intellectual elite who engaged in large scale manipulation and
control to create a homogenous character and society which prompted one
of Lasswell's critics to conclude that his proposed course of action
would "make those tyrannies with which homo politicus has periodically
tarnished the history of mankind look, literally, like child's play."[13]

Final Reflections

In the final analysis, it must be admitted that Lasswell's proposed
solution to the problems of liberal democracy leaves much to be desired.
Ultimately, in his effort to constrain a politics of irrationalism and
popular depravity by subjecting it to rationalist principles he
distorted the very meaning and purposes of democratic liberalism. Be
that as it may, he must be given credit for both enriching the empirical
study of politics and for directing the focus of the discipline beyond
a sterile concern with methodology. Indeed, when all is said and done
it must be admitted that few people have had a greater impact on the

growth and development of American political science than Lasswell. As

Richard Merelman has written in this regard,

> ... it is not just because Lasswell raises questions which
> continue to trouble our own time that he remains an inspiration
> to many social scientists. His career itself is a source of
> inspiration. He was perhaps the last modern social scientist
> to attempt the quadrivium of ambitious theorizing, methodological
> innovation, empirical research and policy advocacy.[14]

NOTES

1. "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," pp. 272-273.

2. Power and Personality, pp. 201-202.

3. World Politics and Personal Insecurity, pp. 15-16.

4. Ibid., p. 85.

5. Power and Personality, pp. 140-141; and A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, Chapter 6.

6. Power and Personality, p. 116.

7. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Politics and the New Class," The New Class?, ed. B. Bruce-Briggs (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1979), p. 47.

8. Power and Personality, p. 148.

9. Democracy Through Public Opinion, p. 98.

10. Power and Personality, pp. 127-130, 201.

11. "Political Psychiatry: The Study and Practice of Integrative Politics," pp. 273, 274.

12. Power and Personality, p. 200.

13. Robert Horowitz, "Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell," p. 300. See also Bernard Crick, An American Science, p. 208.

14. Richard Merelman, "Review Article: Harold D. Lasswell's Political World," p. 497.

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